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Abstract 
Improving Intrusion Prevention, Deteetion and Response 
Tar ik Mohamed Abdel-Kader Ibrahim 
BMath (Hons) 
In the face of a wide range of attacks. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and other Internet 
security tools represent potentially valuable safeguards to identify and combat the problems 
facing online systems. However, despite the fact that a variety o f commercial and open source 
solutions are available across a range of operating systems and network platforms, it is notable 
that the deployment of IDS is often markedly less than other well-known network security 
countermeasures and other tools may often be used in an ineffective manner. 
This thesis considers the challenges that users may face while using IDS, by conducting a web-
based questionnaire to assess these challenges. The challenges that are used in the questionnaire 
were gathered from the well-established literature. The participants responses varies between 
being with or against selecting them as challenges but all the listed challenges approved that 
they are consider problems in the IDS field. 
The aim of the research is to propose a novel set of Human Computer Interaction-Security 
(HCI-S) usability criteria based on the findings of the web-based questionnaire. Moreover, 
these criteria were inspired from previous literature in the field of HCI. The novelty of the 
criteria is that they focus on the security aspects. The new criteria were promising when they 
were applied to Norton 360, a well known Internet security suite. Testing the alerts issued by 
security software was the initial step before testing other security software. Hence, a set o f 
security software were selected and some alerts were triggered as a result of performing a 
penetration test conducted within a test-bed environment using the network scanner Nmap. The 
findings reveal that four of the HCI-S usability criteria were not ful ly addressed by all of these 
security software. 
Another aim of this thesis is to consider the development of a prototype to address the HCI-S 
usability criteria that seem to be overlooked in the existing security solutions. The thesis 
conducts a practical user trial and the findings are promising and attempt to find a proper 
solution to solve this problem. For instance, to take advantage o f previous security decisions, it 
would be desirable for a system to consider the user's previous decisions on similar alerts, and 
modify alerts accordingly to account for the user's previous behaviour. Moreover, in order to 
give users a level o f fiexibility, it is important to enable them to make informed decisions, and 
to be able to recover from them i f needed. It is important to address the proposed criteria that 
enable users to confirm / recover the impact of their decision, maintain an awareness of system 
status all the time, and to offer responses that match users' expectations. 
The outcome of the current study is a set of a proposed 16 HCI-S usability criteria that can be 
used to design and to assess security alerts issued by any Internet security suite. These criteria 
are not equally important and they vary between high, medium and low. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Overview 
1 Introduction and Overview 
Network technology takes place in many major activities. For instance, it is used in Internet 
banking, telecommunications, electronic commerce and transportation. Hence, the need for 
secure information, computers and networks is increased in the network world because o f the 
importance o f this technology, specially, in the civilized societies. It is common in the network 
security field to encounter the term intrusion. Unfortunately, the concept o f intrusion can have 
various meanings among the specialists who work in the technology field (Amoroso 1999). 
Moreover, some of them use the terms intrusion, incident, threat, malicious activity and attack 
interchangeably, which is not always true. However, there is no doubt that intrusions can cause 
damages; the amount of damages which varies according to many criteria, such as the 
vulnerability level of the attacked system, the skills level of the attacker and what is the purpose 
of the attack. 
Evidence o f the scale o f this problem is that Symantec created 1,656,227 new malicious code 
signatures in 2008 (Symantec, 2009).The report mentioned that that number of intrusions is 
increasing every year and at the same time the nature o f them became more sophisticated. 
Further evidence comes from the recent CSI/FBI survey (Peters, 2009), the Verizon report 
states that, of the breaches they investigated that involved malware in some fashion, 59% 
involved highly customized malware. The fact that such incidents occurred, in spite of that fact 
that an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) was used by 72.6% of the organizations while 
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) was used by 59.1%, suggests that improvements in the 
technologies (or their deployment) are required to increase protection. 
1.1 Intrusion Prevention 
One of the major aims of most of the organizations is to have a secure system (i.e. information, 
computers and networks). Usually, these organizations achieve this goal by checking their 
systems frequently to reduce the flaws in them and by reconfiguring the system periodically. 
Moreover, these organizations search and inspect to discover i f there is any vulnerability in the 
system and work hard to patch them as soon as possible. In other words, the intrusion 
prevention process focuses on the pre-attack period and works towards protecting the system 
from the known and the anticipated intrusions (Schultz and Ray 2007). Unfortunately, this 
process is not enough because the infrastructure o f the network becomes more complicated and 
intruders become more intelligent and skilled. In addition to that, the aims o f the intruders vary 
in a way that they know exactly what they want to do and how to do it. Therefore, highly 
skilled intruders can manage to avoid the traditional security tools. At this point, the importance 
of IDS appears. 
f .2 Intrusion Detection 
Intrusion detection can be defined as the process of monitoring and identifying the computer 
and network events, to determine the appearance of any unusual incident, as consequence, this 
unusual event is considered to be an intrusion. In other words, intrusion detection is defined as 
the "the process of identifying and responding to malicious activity targeted at computing and 
networking resources" (Amoroso 1999). 
The intrusion detection research began in 1980s, with seminal work from (Denning, 1986) 
proposing a model of intrusion detection.. Denning later extended this work with the 
development o f the real time intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES) (Denning, 1987). 
Furthermore, a lot of research has been done for studying intrusion detection; as a result, some 
experiments have been undertaken by practitioners to improve the performance of the existing 
IDS. 
The problem of attacks and the need for defensive technologies to protect, detect and respond 
to them such as IDSs, firewalls and antiviruses is a requirement. Each o f them has its own 
advantages and disadvantages. Chapter 3 and chapter 4 wi l l focus on the IDS challenges in the 
real world. 
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Research 
This research investigates methods o f protecting network systems, with a specific reference to 
prevention, detection, and response against intrusions. The focus o f the research is on IDS 
technologies. The work investigates previous and current IDS, their structure, their 
methodology, the place of deployment, their cost-effectiveness, their advantages, and their 
limitations. 
The research can be divided into five phases 
• The focus of the research during the first phase is to identify and analyze problems 
associated with the deployment o f these technologies. The investigation establishes an 
awareness of existing published research in the area and then investigates problems that 
organizations actually face, by actively making contact with them. The aim is to have a 
good analysis of the problems that impede the use o f IDS technologies. 
• It is anticipated that the previous phase wi l l reveal a significant problem of false 
positives (Yurcik 2002) as well as other challenges such as handling heavy network 
traffic in real-time. On this basis the challenges that encounter by the organizations in 
reality wi l l be investigated to evaluate the severity o f false positives and the other 
challenges. According to the findings recommendations wi l l be provided to alleviate 
these problems. 
• To develop a set o f HCI-S usability criteria based on the established literature and a 
walk-through method using the Norton 360 product. 
• The previous HCI-S criteria wi l l lead the current phase o f the research by examining a 
selected set of integrated security products to assess whether they meet the HCI-S 
usability criteria requirement or not. 
• Finally, the research proposed a solution to implement the criteria that were not fully 
addressed by the security products in the previous phase. 
A prototype wi l l be designed in the final phase to assess how would end users manipulate with 
the HCI-S usability criteria especially those criteria that were not addressed by the security 
products within phase 4. 
1,4 Thesis Structure 
The main discussion starts with Chapter 2, which introduces the main concepts of intrusion 
detection. In particular, the history, the models and the methods o f intrusion detection wi l l be 
clarified. 
Chapter 3 presents the shortcomings and the challenges that are encountered with IDS. Hence, 
the main purpose of this chapter is to verify and demonstrate the existence of these challenges 
from the theoretical and academic point o f view. Moreover, a list o f these challenges is 
generated; this list is the base o f the research that follows in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 utilises the list of challenges as the basis for a questionnaire and sent it to significant 
number o f participants, most of them are practitioners in order to explore IDS challenges that 
are faced in practice. The results o f the questionnaire are analyzed and the conclusions are 
provided. 
Chapter 5 presents a new set of Human Computer Interaction and Security HCI-S usability 
criteria based on the established guidelines in the field o f research. The criteria are tested by an 
alert issued by a well known security product namely Norton 360 version one. 
Chapter 6 builds upon the findings of Chapter 5 by evaluating a selected set of security 
products to design, develop and evaluate IDS alerts that support end-users in protecting their 
network system and to improve the efficiency o f responding to intrusions. Therefore, the 
outcome of the research should provide the end-users with a significant interface, informing 
them of the current state of the system and appropriate solutions to handle the situation. 
The analysis in Chapter 6 reveals that several o f the HCI-S criteria remain unaddressed by 
current packages, and Chapter 7 therefore proposes and implements a prototype solution that 
demonstrates approaches for handling these points. The prototype is then used as the basis for 
an end-user trial, enabling an assessment of its effectiveness in practice. A n analysis o f the 
resulting findings is presented, leading towards the final conclusions o f the research in Chapter 
8, which reviews the contributions and considers potential future work. 
Chapter 2 
A Review of Intrusion Detection Technologies 
2 A Review of Intrusion Detection Technologies 
The previous chapter focused on the terms of prevention, detection and response to intrusions. 
Hence, it is useful to mention that the term "system" can be used for a workstation, a network 
element, a server, a mainframe, a firewall, a web server, an enterprise network, etc.; and the 
term "audit" is used to indicate the information provided by the system including the inner 
work and the behavior o f the system. 
Computer system intrusion is an attempt to violate the integrity, confidentiality or availability 
of resources (Abimbola et al. 2006). There are many ways to protect systems against intrusions, 
some of which are called preventative techniques. Three of these preventative techniques are 
access control (Caelli 1994), authentication (Russel and Gangemi 1992) and encryption ( Holz 
2004).They are security techniques which are used to prevent intruders (specially unauthorized 
intruders) but they are not always successful. These types o f security techniques can be the first 
line of defense against intrusions but because they sometimes fail there is a need for a second 
line of defense (Wu et al. 2006). Researchers suggest Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to be 
the second line of defense, which can detect intrusions when they happen and then have a 
response (the type of response depend on the kind of IDS). 
This chapter wi l l cover the efficiency o f IDS, and their types and methods. In order to 
understand the behavior of IDS, the responses o f these systems wi l l be considered. Actually, 
the security administrator is responsible of the system security issue and what techniques wi l l 
be used, but there is usually the problem of what type of IDS is suitable to use with the system 
that he/she is responsible of. There are two main detection methods and they are constructed 
with respect to information, i f the intrusion-detection system uses information of the behavior 
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of the system it monitors, it is called anomaly detection system. I f the intrusion-detection 
system uses information about the attacks, it is called misuse detection system. 
2.2 Efficiency of Intrusion Detection Systems 
There are many researches in the area of intrusion detection systems and researches construct 
many prototypes, attempting to determine the best among them. Actually, it is difficult to 
determine an efTicient IDS without identifying some criteria to compare between them. 
Researchers state the criteria from their point of view; some of these proposed criteria are 
(Porrasand Valdes 1998, Debar etal. 1999): 
• Accuracy: The less the intrusion-detection system indicates a normal action as an 
intrusion the more accurate it wi l l be. 
• Performance: The more auditing the intrusion-detection system does the better 
performance it wi l l have (more auditing means here the speed of auditing); good 
performance means that the real-time detection for the intrusion is more possible. 
• EfTectiveness: An intrusion-detection system should be designed in a way that makes it 
safe from any kind of attack, because i f an attacker successes in his attack all the 
systems that IDS is used as a line defense for wi l l be under attack as well. 
• Completeness: Completeness means that the intrusion-detection system can detect all 
the types of attacks. This criterion i f very hard to be measured because every day there 
is a new kind o f attacks so no IDS wi l l be complete 100% at least now. Constructing 
complete IDS is a hard research aim. 
2.3 Misuse versus Anomaly Intrusion-Detection 
There are two types of intrusion detection. The following sections describe each of them. 
9 
2.3.1 Misuse Detection 
Misuse detection sometimes called knowledge-based intrusion detection or detection by 
appearance (Spirakis et al. 1994), is based on the intrusions which happened and detected in the 
past and then analyzed in a way that the researchers gain information from it and save these 
information in a knowledge base. In some organizations the security administrators only deploy 
the knowledge-based intrusion detection system, and they encounter the intruder's attempts to 
attack their systems. Therefore, i f the type of the intrusion is found in the knowledge base that 
implies that the IDS w i l l detect the attack (Sundaraml996), In other words, any action that the 
knowledge base does not classify as an attack wi l l be classified as a normal activity. Hence, the 
accuracy of the knowledge-based intrusion detection systems is certainly good but the 
completeness of this method of detection needs an effort to update the knowledge base 
regularly. 
Most of network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) use misuse detection methods to detect 
attacks, where the packets in the network traffic are compared against the signatures o f a 
signature set that defines characteristics o f an intrusion. I f there is a match between a packet 
and a signature in the signature set then the intrusion detection system sends an alert to the 
security administrator or make any other response that depend on the way where the intrusion 
detection system is programmed to act (Kreibich and Crowcrof^ 2003). 
It was mentioned that most of network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) depends on 
signatures so it is worth explaining what signatures are and how to generate them. Attack 
signatures describe the characteristic components of attacks. There is no common standard 
definition for these signatures, so different systems use different signature languages. The 
generation of these signatures is mostly a manual process that needs detailed knowledge o f 
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each intrusion or attack that might be captured. Too simple (general, loose) signatures tend to 
generate large numbers o f false positives, while too specific (tight) signatures cause false 
negatives. 
Advantages o f the misuse approach are that they have low false alarm rates (i.e. false alarm is 
one o f the biggest problems in network security) and the knowledge base of the intrusion 
detection system is obvious so the security administrator o f intrusion-detection system can have 
a fast response to an attack (Green et al. 2007). 
Disadvantages of the misuse approach are that it is not easy to construct the knowledge base, 
because that needs to record in it all the types o f attacks and a lot of information about them. 
This is the problem with previous attacks so for new attacks, the knowledge base needs to be 
updated regularly or this detection method w i l l not be efficient enough. 
The implementation of misuse intrusion-detection techniques can be done in several ways. The 
most widely used tools to misuse intrusion-detection are: 
• Signature matching 
• Signature languages 
2.3.1.1 Signature-Matching 
Signature matching is used to inspect user activity and identify, based on rules, what 
constitutes an attack. The attack signatures can be easily shared and provide a popular 
method o f detecting known attacks. 
Signature-matching also has disadvantages because when using tight signatures the signature 
matcher has no ability to detect attacks other than those for which it has exact signatures so the 
I I 
signature matcher wi l l not detect new types of attacks, loose signatures have the problem of 
false positives where alerts do not reflect an actual attack. It is important to know the difference 
between un-harmful network traffic causing an alert and successful attacks (Sommer and 
Paxson 2003). 
2.3.1.2 Signature Languages 
Any signature-based NIDS requires a language for defining signatures but most string-based 
NIDS use their own signature language, that way diflerent NIDS are incompatible. For 
instance. Snort is an open-source lightweight network-based IDS which have a large collection 
of signatures (Roesch 1999, see www.snort.org). Moreover, Snort use a pattern matching model 
to detect network attack signatures using characteristic elements such as IP addresses, 
TCP/UDP port numbers, TCP fields, ICMP and strings contained in the packet payload (Patton 
et al. 2001). Each Snort rule has a rule header and rule options (Eckmann 2001). 
NIDS Bro (Paxson 1999) is another known signature language which is constructed of two 
components: protocol analysis and policy script. The protocol analysis component provides the 
policy script component with a stream of events that categorize the activities detected by the 
protocol analysis (Sommer and Paxson 2003). One of the features o f the Bro language is that, 
instead of using strings to detect an attack as many NIDSs do, it uses what is called regular 
expressions. These regular expressions have the ability of set-wise matching which make 
matching faster (Coit et al. 2001; Fisk and Varghese 2001). 
Furthermore, there exist other signature languages such as N-code language used by Network 
Flight Recorder (NFR) (Ranum el al. 1997), the State Transition Analysis Technique (STAT) 
(Eckmann et al. 2002) and Production-Based Expert System Toolset (P-BEST) (Lindqvist and 
Porras 1999). 
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2.3.2 Anomaly Detection 
Anomaly detection (sometimes called behavior-based intrusion detection or detection by 
behavior (Spirakis et al. 1994)) is based on monitoring and analyzing the system activities until 
generating what is called the normal system activity profile. As the security administrator uses 
the anomaly intrusion detection system, i f the activity o f the system is similar to the normal 
system activity that means that there are no intrusions but i f the activity o f the system is not 
similar to the normal system activity that means that there are intrusions (Sundaram 1996). 
The completeness o f the anomaly detection method vs. the accuracy of the anomaly intrusion 
detection shows that the completeness is good as the method has the ability to detect intrusions 
without the need for the signature database as the case of misuse detection method while the 
accuracy o f the anomaly intrusion detection is not very good, because the high rate o f false 
positives in comparison with the misuse detection method. 
The advantage of anomaly intrusion detection is that it can detect new types of attacks that 
misuse intrusion detection cannot detect. 
The disadvantage of anomaly intrusion detection is that, when the behavior o f the system is not 
similar to the normal system activity the IDS classifies this as an intrusion, but sometimes there 
is no intrusion but there is just a deviation o f the normal system activity, this case is called false 
positive error. Sometimes the intruder behaves like the normal system activity so the IDS do 
not refer this as an intruder and treat him as a normal user, this case is called false negative 
error. 
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Both false positive errors and false negative errors are significant problems. The first one 
requires a lot of effort to deal with what the security administrators considers as an attack and at 
ultimately they find that they spend a lot of effort on nothing. The problem, in practice, that 
there is not one error but many of them. Hence, a lot o f effort, time and cost are wasted for 
nothing. 
While in the case of false negative errors there is no effort but the problem is that the security 
team can not know anything about the intrusion until the damage has happened (of course that 
depends on the type of intrusions and the expertise o f the security team). 
The implementation of anomaly intrusion detection techniques can be done in several ways 
(Bierman et al, 2001). The following are an example of the most widely used analysis methods 
to build anomaly intrusion detection: 
• Statistics 
• Neural networks 
• Computer Immunology 
2.3.2.1 Statistics 
Many researches worked in the field of the statistical anomaly detection such as (Helman et al. 
1992, Helman and Liepins 1993) but the challenge that still encounters the statistical-based IDS 
is the requirement for gathering the sufficient amount of data to construct an efficient 
mathematical model. Unfortunately, the process of gathering the data is not practical, especially 
when the complexity of the network traffic is considered (Gordeev 2000). In addition, the 
Bayesian algorithm is used to improve the anomaly network intrusion detection method (Farid 
and Rahman, 2010). 
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2.3.2.2 Neural Networks 
The science o f neural networks (NN) gained a lot of interest in various researches. Therefore, 
intrusion detection researches also used N N , hence, some early researches such as (Debar et 
al. 1992, Sarle 1994) took advantage of the training process in the N N and employed them to 
develop their methods of the research (Giacinto et al. 2003; Cho 2002). The disadvantage of 
many of the IDS researches that employ the N N is that they use only a single neural network. 
Therefore, the neural network is unable to understand the environment, even i f the NN is 
trained for a long time. Thus, to avoid this limitation, it is recommended to use more than one 
single layer (i.e. increase the number of the hidden layers). This strategy provides the advantage 
of better understanding of the environment by increase trading period for the N N because it wi l l 
be more complex and sophisticated (Zhang et al., 2005, Seliya and Khoshgoftaar, 2010). 
2.3.2.3 Computer Immunology 
A n Artif icial Immune Systems (AIS) is a paradigm inspired by the immune system and is 
used for solving computational and information processing problems (Stibor et al. 2005). 
The AIS has the ability to adjust with their environments. They have the ability to differentiate 
between the existing pattern or normal, so-called " s e l f and the new patterns or abnormal, so-
called "non - se l f (Overill 2007). Moreover, (AIS) has been used in improving (IDS) from a 
long time, for instance, the work of (Debar et al. 1998 a, Debar et al. 1998 b) until now, for 
instance, the work of (Kotov and Vasilyev, 2009) and (Fang and L i , 2010). 
The aim of AlS-based IDS is to perform a classification to the network traffic to decide 
whether it is self or non-self. The term detectors have a vital role is this process. Therefore, the 
process starts with creating a random set of immature detectors, these detectors wil l be 
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combined with the environment "self panerns" for a period o f time. Thus, there are two main 
possibilities for this process: 
(a) Some of the immature detectors wi l l be similar to one of the "self patterns", hence these 
immature detectors wi l l be taken out from the process (i.e. so-called negative selection). 
(b) Some of the immature detectors wi l l not be similar to any o f the "self patterns", hence these 
immature detectors wi l l be called mature detectors. Hence, these mature detectors wi l l be 
representing the "non-self patterns". In addition, these mature detectors be examined by further 
learning process until the system be satisfied that they are an attack or just a suspicious activity. 
The disadvantage of using AlS-based IDS is that there is no guarantee of the amount o f false 
negatives. In other words, there is no complete control on the attacks categories that might 
bypass the system without being detected (Dozier et al. 2004). 
2.4 Passive versus Active Intrusion Detection 
This section is concerned with how an intrusion detection system can respond to an attack. 
When the intrusion detection system detects an attack, it wi l l have a reaction to the attack; this 
reaction may be a corrective action such as solving a weakness in the system, or proactive 
actions such as logging o f suspicious traffic or closing down the connecting port. In the case 
that the reaction of the IDS is corrective or proactive the intrusion detection system is called to 
be an active intrusion detection system. I f the intrusion detection system only generates alarms 
to the security administrator, the intrusion detection system is called to be a passive intrusion 
detection system. Most intrusion detection systems are passive (Tian and Xueming, 2009), that 
means a large possibility of false positive alarms, having a negative impact on the system. 
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2.5 Summary 
This chapter covers the two major methods o f IDS: anomaly intrusion detection and misuse 
intrusion detection. In the real world, the use of anomaly intrusion detection is not enough; the 
case is the same for the use o f misuse intrusion detection, because no one o f them can detect all 
types o f intrusions. It appears to be better to construct a hybrid IDS (i.e. an IDS which have the 
facilities o f both anomaly intrusion detection and misuse intrusion detection). It wi l l be easy for 
the security administrator to detect the intrusions for which pattems are recorded in the 
knowledge base by using the benefits of misuse intrusion detection while the anomaly intrusion 
detection give IDS the ability to detect unknown intrusions. Of course the accuracy of the 
misuse intrusion detection is better than the accuracy o f the anomaly intrusion detection but it 
can not detect new attacks until its knowledge base is upgraded, which itself still an open area 
for research. 
Even though there are many types o f signature-based IDS and they are using different types of 
signatures languages. Snort and Bro are the most popular in the area o f intrusion detection. 
There is still a need to improve them or to develop a new powerful signature language that has 
the advantages o f both o f them but at same time reduces the false rates and reduces the cost o f 
detection as well and make the detection faster. 
There are many open areas for researchers, such as it is not easy to define what the normal 
system activity, and to identify the IDS sensitivity problem to the environment. Moreover, 
studying the attempts of how to decrease the false alarms and how to make the IDS more active 
but at the same time the system does not lose its availability. Furthermore, how to deploy the 
IDS to be more effective. Therefore, it is recommended to the researchers who want to improve 
their IDS, firstly to understand their system and what kind of threat can affect it, secondly to 
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understand intrusion signatures. The next chapter wi l l be the initial phase for studying some of 
these points. The aim of Chapter 3 is to provide a sufficient overview of the problems 
encountered by the users of IDS, as the first step in the overall process to develop a method to 
reduce the impact of at least one of the challenges that impede the IDS efficiency. 
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Chapter 3 
IDS Challenges 
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3 IDS Challenges 
Whilst a variety of IDSs exist within the marketplace, the level o f deployment of such systems 
is far lower than other security countermeasures, such as anti-virus and firewalls. The CSI 
Computer Crime and Security Survey 2009 (Peters. 2009) shows adaption o f IDSs at 72.6%. 
However, the deployments o f anti-virus and firewall protection are used by 99.1% and 97.8% 
of respondents respectively. The adoption o f IDSs can also be improved to reach a similar 
percentage. 
Such findings raise questions about why IDS are less prominent than other well-known 
countermeasures, including many that have appeared in the marketplace more recently and had 
less time to establish themselves. One possible reason could, o f course, be that the threats that 
IDS seek to combat are not as prominent or significant as those targeted by the other, more 
popular countermeasures. However, given that IDS can actually assist in dealing with many o f 
the same threats as firewalls and anti-virus, this would not be a valid conclusion. Similarly, 
another possible argument is that they may not represent an effective solution, and therefore 
many organisations chose not to use them. However, i f this was the case then one would 
instinctively expect the level o f penetration to be even lower. As such, it appears likely that 
other factors are also coming into play, with potential users facing challenges that ultimately 
prevent IDS from being adopted. 
With the above in mind, this chapter seeks to further explore the challenges posed by IDS 
technologies, drawing upon a literature-informed assessment of the potential problem areas. 
These wi l l be used to establish a design of a survey amongst IDS users and others in a position 
to deploy the technology. More details about the survey can be found in chapter 4. 
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This chapter is organized as follows: deployment challenges, management challenges, technical 
challenges, detection challenges and finally, response challenges. 
3,1 Deployment Challenges 
This section focuses on the challenges that arise based on the way an IDS is configured, 
installed, and positioned in an organization. The following challenges have been identified: 
• Scalability constraints, 
• Switched Networks, 
• Packet dropping and high speed network traffic, 
• Encrypted traffic and IPv6, 
• Initial deployment cost. 
Each of the challenges are discussed and demonstrated in the following subsections. 
3.1.1 Scalability Constraints 
The size o f the system affects the decision of what type of IDS should be used (Zhang et al. 
2010). When the size of the protected network is small, the system administrator concentrates 
on the outsider attacks but when the size of the network is large, the insider attacks are 
considered as well. Moreover, when the size of the network is large the amount o f data to be 
analyzed is large. Therefore, the efficiency of the IDS decreases when the size o f the network 
increases. For instance, as the size of the network increases, the efficiency of signature-based 
IDS decreases. 
Nowadays, the nature of the networks is large-scale distributed systems. These large-scale 
distributed systems require the deployment of distributed IDS (i.e set o f IDS deployed in the 
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network and have the ability communicate with each other even directly or indirectly through 
an additional central server) to detect security events effectively (Fessi et al. 2007). 
The deployment o f the distributed IDS have various advantages, such as discovering attack 
scenarios, but it also has some limitations and challenges during the implementation process: 
First, the increase in the network congestions, during the communicating processes between the 
distributed IDS. Definitely, the more complex the network topology is, the more increase in the 
network congestions wi l l be. 
Second, the selection o f efficient methods for the decision making process must be considered. 
The decision making is based on the information transmitted from the various distributed IDS 
but this information should be evaluated carefully before making any decision. 
Third, the selection of the sufficient number of IDS to support the decision making process 
must be considered. Therefore, the location where the IDSs are deployed should be selected 
carefully, at the same time, the number of the IDSs should be selected carefully as well, not too 
small; i f the number is too small the awareness of the overall network wi l l be not possible, not 
too large; i f the number is too large even i f the awareness of the overall network becomes 
possible there wi l l be an overload with redundant information. 
3.1.2 Switched Networks 
Networks used to depend on hubs, which let the information available to all the ports. This 
ability is one of the hubs disadvantages, which help the attacker to sniff the network traffic 
(Tanase 2001). Later, switches were developed to increase the speed o f the network. Switches 
have another important feature; they are capable of avoiding the sniffing process of the 
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attackers. Unfortunately, this feature reduces the effectiveness o f the NIDS. This problem can 
be solved by increasing the number of NIDS in the network but this solution wil l not be cost-
effective (O'Sullivan et al. 2005). 
Some research has been conducted to measure the performance of IDS within the switched 
network environment (Iheagwara and BIyth 2002). The result of the research reveals Uvo 
important points. Firstly, that the IDS performance becomes less effective when the bandwidth 
utilization is increased. Therefore, to avoid that impact more sensors can be used to increase the 
IDS performance but unfortunately this solution is expensive. Secondly, the IDS performance 
becomes more effective when the sensors are deployed at main entry points o f the network. The 
final result does not neglect the importance of deploying sensors in other locations but that 
importance depends on the whole infrastructure of the network and other criteria according to 
the security policy o f each organization. It is worth to mention that, the impact o f routing and 
switching the packets has a great concern in this sort of research, especially, the amount of 
packets that might be lost because of the routing and switching process. 
3,1.3 Packet Dropping and High Speed Network Traffic 
The high speed of network traffic combined with the information overload can cause packet 
dropping. Therefore, the probability of missing attacks increases. Traditionally, IDS were off-
line systems, logging and analyzing packets, hence, their performance was not that good 
because they did not have the ability of real-time response. Therefore, the research trend was to 
have real-time IDS which in theory is a perfect idea but in practice encountered the problem of 
dropping packets, leading to false negatives as well . Sometimes the system administrator is 
required to undertake the risky task o f selecting the packets to be dropped (Salour and Su 
2007). 
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Even though signature-based IDSs are widely used in the IDSs security world, they still suffer 
from the large volume of network traffic, which is transmitted through the network segments. 
These IDSs suffer because all the transmitted packets have to be checked by every signature in 
the database to identify i f a match exists or not. Usually, these databases contain hundreds or 
thousands of signatures. Moreover, the signature-based IDSs are not only a resource consuming 
process but they are time consuming as well. 
Existing signature-based IDSs cannot always handle all the network traffic, therefore, they start 
to drop packets as soon as they failed to compare all the coming packets with the signatures 
within the signature database. Hence, the possibility to bypass the IDS without being detected 
increases (i.e. false negative rates wi l l increase) (Salour and Su 2007). 
Most IDS have problems in detecting intrusions in low and medium network traffic speed but 
the problem is exaggerated when networks administrators or engineers start to use high speed 
networks to improve their performance from a communication point o f view. 
The high speed of the network traffic means that the IDS wil l receive a large amount of data 
that should be analyzed in real-time. Moreover, a drop of packets wi l l occur i f the processor 
speed in the IDS is not high enough to let the analysis process be done in real-time. Since most 
of the IDS are signature-based IDS and the rate o f the increase of new intrusions is high, the 
developed signatures are increasing as well, therefore, the signature-based IDS suffer more than 
other IDS. In general, the problem is worse when the traffic in encrypted (Peddisetty 2005). 
3.1.4 Encrypted Traffic and IPv6 
IDS have the ability of monitoring normal network traffic; hence, it can analyze them and 
perform a suitable response. The problem of the normal traffic is that some attackers can 
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monitor them as well; therefore, the idea of encrypted traffic appears to have a more secure 
traffic. In other words, encrypted traffic supports the confidentially o f the transmitted 
information. The drawback of the encrypted traffic from the IDS researchers and practitioner's 
point o f view is that the encrypted traffic attacks can successftjlly reach the destination without 
being monitored by IDS (Fadlullah el al. 2010). 
In the field o f the network every computer connected to a network system must have an 
address, this address is called Internet Protocol Address (IP address). Most of the current IP 
addresses are IP version 4 (IPv4) which are 32-bit address space. Therefore, there was a need to 
increase the address space because of the increasing in the number o f people using the network. 
To face this problem, IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) started to develop a new version 
and called it (IPv6) which are 128-bit address space. The use o f the new IPv6 encounters some 
problems when it was applied in the network environment. 
The first problem is that (IPv6) is compatible with the old version (IPv4) but the reverse in not 
possible. The second problem is that since (IPv6) does not allow fragmentation at intermediate 
routers so it may be vulnerable to fragmentation attacks created to (!Pv4) stacks (Durdag'i and 
Buldu, 2010). 
3.1.5 Initial Deployment Cost 
The initial deployment costs may include the cost o f purchasing the IDS and the initial training 
for those who wi l l be responsible for managing it. Initially, the organizations should determine 
the components of their network system and evaluate the advantage o f having each of them. 
(Wei et al. 2001) outlined some of the initial deployment costs as shown in Table 1. 
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COST CATEGORY COST ELEMENTS 
Equipment and Hardware Computers (every kind), disks, tape 
drivers, printers, telecommunication, 
network systems, modems. 
Software Operating systems, utility programs, 
diagnostic programs, application 
programs. 
Services Commercially provided services, such 
as teleprocessing, local batch 
processing, on-line processing, 
intemet access, e-mail, voice mail, 
telephone, fax and packet switch of 
data. 
Supplies Any consumable item designed 
specifically for use with equipment, 
software, service or support service. 
Personnel The salaries (compensation) and 
benefits for persons who perform 
functions, such as development, 
support, management, operation and 
analysis for running this system. 
Other resources Any not included in the above 
categories. 
Table I : Initial cost strategy (Wei et al. 2001) 
Moreover, the cost categories; equipment and hardware, software, services, supplies and 
personnel; which were mentioned in Table I , can be determined by a certain value of money. 
However, there are other types of components which cannot be quantified, such as data stored 
on disks (Wei et al. 2001). In addition, the evaluation process of the advantages of the 
deployment o f the previous components can vary according to numerous criteria. 
3.2 Management Challenges 
This section focuses on the following challenges: 
o Volume of information 
o Ensuring effective configuration 
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• Managing a heterogeneous IDS environment 
• Ongoing operational costs 
Each o f the above listed challenges wi l l be discussed in the following subsections. 
3.2.1 Volume of Information 
Usually, the deployed network sensors and host-based agents generate a large volume of data. 
As consequence, the security administrators who monitor the system have to prioritise and filter 
this amount o f information (Conti et al. 2006). Moreover, the amount information generated by 
the IDS increases the workload for the system/security administrator who has to consider it. 
Hence, the security performance is affected negatively by the time-consuming process that the 
administrators have in monitoring and manipulating unimportant information. In addition, the 
term "Information overload" is sometimes used in the field of security analysis as meaning a 
large volume of information (Conti et al, 2006). 
The problem o f the information overload is expressed by real numbers through a life example 
which is Georgia Institute o f Technology's campus network. As (Conti et al. 2006) 
demonstrated in their paper that the number o f the students, staff and employees who use the 
campus network is roughly 20,000 persons. The numbers of computers that are or can be 
connected to the network is approximately 35,000. The estimated amount o f the transmitted 
data is 4 terabytes per day. This example raises the issue of dealing with this amount 
information o f information without considering the type of information. The important question 
now is i f this amount o f data is 100% free of intrusions or not. To answer this question all of 
this amount data need to be examined. In the case that there are no intrusions, the 
administrators wil l be exhausted for nothing but i f they detect any intrusions or any suspicious 
activity an alert wil l be launched which was the case in Georgia campus where roughly 50,000 
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alerts were generated every day from the IDS. The large number of alerts is another IDS 
challenge which wi l l be discussed later in this chapter. 
3.2.2 Ensuring Effective Configuration 
It is difficult to tune the intrusion-detection system to minimize false alarms, without increasing 
the risk of missing attacks, and a balance needs to be struck between the two (Cavusoglu et al 
2005). Hence, the aim of the IDS configuration is to reduce both of the false positives and false 
negatives rates while considering effective strategies to make the cost as minimum as possible. 
(Salour and Su 2007) 
Some organizations do not completely trust the IDS when the organizations decide to deploy 
them. Therefore, the organizations try to identify the state of the organization before deploying 
the IDS and after the deployment. Usually, the organization uses the default configuration at 
the first period of the deployment until they start to be aware of how the system works. During 
the default period, the administrators in the organization become aware of the weakness and the 
strengths of the default configuration (Cavusoglu et al 2005). Hence, they work toward 
adjusting the configuration to make the IDS more powerful. 
Moreover, knowing and understanding the environment where the IDS is deployed is important 
to avoid the occurrence of any problem that could raise i f the previous experience of the current 
system administrator is related to another environment. Hence the configuration and the 
reconfiguration of the IDS are very important to make it more efficient (Goodall et al. 2004). 
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3.2.3 Managing a Heterogeneous IDS Environment 
In the case o f deploying multiple IDSs from different vendors, problems of interoperability 
might occur. Some of these differences might be in the way IDSs report alerts, their rule set, 
etc. 
Practically, i f the size of the network is large the deployment o f more than one IDS is usually 
necessary and sufficient, to protect the system and to detect any sort o f malicious event that 
might occur (Perdisci et al. 2006). Moreover, the deployment of one IDS might not cover the 
whole network that need to be protected, and it would not be able to detect distributed attacks 
such as DDoS. However, the alert formats in multiple generated IDS might be different. 
Therefore, the initial step to analyze these IDS alerts is to translate and unify their different 
formats to one understandable format i f possible. Moreover, the process o f having a standard 
format for the IDS alerts is called "format normalization" (Xiao, M . and Xiao, D. 2007). 
Another side of the problem of the IDS heterogeneous environment is the analysis of the 
heterogeneous events it produces. These heterogeneous events require an effective method to 
correlate them to detect the intrusions, especially, in the case o f multistage attacks. Therefore, 
the development o f new strategies to correlate the variant heterogeneous neUvork events 
enhances the performance o f the existing IDS (Mathew et al. 2006). 
It worth to mention that, because of the increase in the number o f intrusions and the diversity o f 
the methods that the attackers use, many heterogeneous IDS have to be deployed beside other 
security controls. Signature matching is one of the most effective methods in manipulating 
with the heterogeneous IDS alerts for discovering the multi-stage attacks. 
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As an example of how to deal with heterogeneous events (Carey et al. 2003) used Intrusion 
Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) to manipulate with the received alerts from the 
heterogeneous IDS and other system controls such as firewalls. The reason of using IDMEF 
was because its ability to identify the alerts is greater than individuals IDS. Hence, the use of 
the IDMEF increases the possibly of detecting more attacks. 
3.2.4 Ongoing Operational Costs 
In the network security field, the increase in the capabilities o f the IDS is associated with the 
increase o f its cost. An IDS is useless i f the cost o f the deployment is more than the damage 
cost caused by the expected attacks. Researcher's investigations of the components that make 
the IDS cost-effective are very important in the process of improving the existing IDS. The cost 
of maintaining IDSs can be significant, as it requires skilled staff to manage it, analyze and 
respond to the security alerts that are generated. 
There are many factors which contribute to the ongoing operational costs: 
First, the detection cost (i.e. the sensors which are placed in selected locations are responsible 
of collecting data and then as a consequence these data are forwarded to an analyzer). Second, 
the analysis cost, (i.e. the analyzer receives that data from the sensors and then investigates the 
occurrence o f the attack). Third, the reaction cost, which can be estimated by money expenses 
or human and tools consuming. Fourth, the attack impact (i.e. the caused damage i f the attack 
successes to comprise the system, the side effects caused by the attack on the affected system i f 
the IDS successes to detect the intrusion in an early stage). 
Occasionally, the money cost of responding to the security event is much higher than the 
influence of the damage. Therefore, cost of reaction should be estimated before activating the 
reaction process to avoid the cost-loss. It is worth to mention that, the cost-loss is not always 
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money but in some circumstances it can be the impact on the organization reputation (Fessi et 
al. 2007). It is worth to mention that the previous components were called cost factors in (Lee 
et al. 2000), the factors were operational cost, response cost and damage cost. 
3.3 Technical Challenges 
This section focuses on the following challenges: 
• Vulnerability to attacks 
• Difficulty in customizing and updating the IDS ruleset 
• Data collection and logging 
• Understanding and interpreting IDS data 
Each of the above challenges wi l l be discussed in the following subsections. 
3.3.1 Vulnerability to Attacks 
Currently, many organizations use IDS as a defense for their systems. Attackers suffer from the 
existence o f the IDS, so they start to launch attacks to exploit the IDS itself, which makes their 
main aim, to attack the organization systems, easier. One type of these attacks is backtracking, 
which exploits signature-based NIDS (Smith et al. 2006). 
Some attackers target the IDS itself rather than other elements in the network, with the aim of 
bypassing intrusion detection. I f attackers can take the IDS out service, further attacks can be 
launched against other targets within the network. Moreover, some IDS are built inside the 
system that they protect (Frincke et al. 2007), which means that, as the IDS is infected, the 
whole system is infected at the same time. 
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In the case of signature based IDS, the transmitted packets have to be checked by every 
signature in the database to identify i f a match exists or not. Smart attackers are aware o f the 
fact that this type of IDS is resource and time consuming. Therefore, some of them overload 
these systems with fiood of packets (i.e. DoS attack). Moreover, signature based IDS are 
useless in the case of unknown attacks (i.e. attacks which has no signature in the database), this 
type of IDS can often fail to detect variations of known attacks (Salour and Su 2007). 
3.3.2 Difficulty in Customizing and Updating the IDS Ruleset 
One of the challenges is to keep the IDS ruleset regularly updated. In addition, it is important to 
customize the set of rules, in order to effectively detect anacks in the monitored network. 
In the case of signature based IDS, to generate a signature for new attacks is not trivial. The 
signature generating process requires that the new attack had taken place and had been detected 
before. On one hand, after the detection o f the new attack, an analysis process is provided to 
create a suitable signature which matches the new attack. On the other hand, the analysis 
procedure requires the analysis of many packets to generate an efficient signature (Salour and 
Su 2007). However, system administrators usually recommend that the databases to be 
constructed of small number of signatures because that implies that the packets wi l l not be 
examined by large number of signatures. 
Another part of the dilemma is the decision of selecting the appropriate signatures of the 
existing signature database and how to sort them to detect intrusions (i.e. the sort of intrusions 
that is most possible in the current network environment) by employing an efficient strategy. 
Unfortunately, the process is usually a manual one, human experts sort the signatures according 
to their experience, enable some of the signatures while ignoring others, train the IDS until 
finally they decide to use some kind of rule set that they are satisfied with. The danger of this 
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strategy is very obvious, especially i f the disabled signatures were intrinsic in detecting the 
attacks, hence, avoiding the damage is unavoidable. Moreover, it is possible that the network be 
provided with a new protocol or service, hence, the administrators might not be able to modify 
there rule set in the immediately present time (Salour and Su 2007). 
3.3.3 Data Collection and Logging 
A secure network requires more than one layer of defense; each layer collects data in a special 
way. After collection, these data must be correlated to gain knowledge of what is really 
happening. Many sources can provide the IDS with data, which might have different formats. 
Therefore, there is a requirement to integrate these into an appropriate format for the IDS. 
Hence, data collection is the process of collecting information from different components of the 
network. The main data sources are system logs, packet headers, and packet contents. The data 
sources give us the information of the ports which are open and which are close, which IP 
address was probed, what is the objective o f an attacker. 
The IDS usually collect the required information by deploying numerous sensors in critical 
locations in the network. These sensors produce a large amount o f information; this information 
has to be organized, accessible and readable. Hence, there is a need for an effective database 
which can manipulate with this large amount of information. In addition, the structure of the 
network (i.e. the network topology) is vital in planning the locations where the sensors are 
deployed. 
It is worth to mention that even that the network topology is very important in deciding the 
suitable method to locate the sensors, there is another factor which is not less important, this 
factor is the how these information wi l l be analyzed (Fessi et al. 2007). The major problems in 
data collection process are that they are collected from different places and therefore their 
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amount is enormous. The other challenge is the weakness o f the process o f sharing standard 
information between the different defense layers implies that the human experience is vital in 
data collection and correlation (Peddisetty 2005). The latter challenge can be considered as 
separate challenge which entitled in another subsection called "requirement for skilled staff'. 
3.3.4 Understanding and Interpreting IDS Data 
There is a requirement for an efficient methodology to log the network traffic and as a 
consequence, to analyze and validate the IDS alerts, in order to determine i f actual intrusions 
are taking place. Moreover, the traffic logs and the alerts logs need to be presented in a 
meaningful and robust interface. It is worth to mention that the information in IDS alerts should 
be sufficient to conduct a valuable analysis (Xiao, M . and Xiao, D., 2007). 
As wil l be mentioned, two of the major problems in the area o f IDS are false positives and false 
negatives. Sometimes the signature is too specific which raise the problem of false negative, 
while sometimes the signature is too general which raise the problem o f false positive. 
Therefore, a thorough construction of the signature (pattern) can alleviate the appearance of the 
false rates (Yegneswaran et al. 2005), 
3.4 Detection Challenges 
This section focuses on the following challenges: 
• The large number of alerts 
o IDS can miss too many genuine attacks (i.e. false negatives) 
• IDS can raise too many erroneous alerts (i.e. false positives) 
« Determining the alert severity level 
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o Alerts correlation 
Each o f these challenges are discussed in the following subsections. 
3.4.1 The Large Number of Alerts 
IDS can produce a large number of alerts, which in turn causes information overload. This is 
especially the case when IDS are not aware o f the characteristics o f protected assets (context 
aware), resulting in the generation of superfluous alerts (Xiao, M . and Xiao, D. 2007). 
3.4.2 IDS Can Miss Too Many Genuine Attacks (I.e. False Negatives) 
The initial idea of the IDS was to detect intrusions in a very early stage. Although, most IDS 
have good performance they still have the problem of that some attacks are elusive and can 
penetrate the IDS without any sign, this is called false negative (Gong, 2002). In other words, a 
false negative occurs when the IDS fails to detect malicious network traffic, which as a result 
goes undetected ( Sommer and Paxson, 2010). 
False negatives cause more damage to the organizations than false positives (Joo et at. 2003). 
Therefore, false negatives are considered to be the damage cost o f the attacks in some articles, 
while others consider it to be a major element in the damage cost. 
3.4.3 IDS Can Raise Too Many Erroneous Alerts (i.e. False Positives) 
Most o f the IDS have the problem of accuracy, IDS treat part of the normal network traffic as 
intrusions while they are not, this is called false positive. Therefore, false positives are one of 
the major problems in the IDS field (Gong 2002). In other words, false positive refers to the 
network traffic that the IDS considers malicious but are not (Chen et al. 2009) 
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The anomaly based IDS usually encounter the problem of identifying the network traffic (i.e. 
what is normal and what is not). After wise, the process of making a decision for triggering an 
alert have done carefully otherwise the number o f false positive alarms w i l l be too high. It 
worth to mention that, making a profile for humans computing and network activities is not 
trivial. However, it is well-known that the high number of false positives is one o f major 
problems in anomaly based IDSs, which affect the performance of this kind of IDSs (Salour 
and Su 2007). Furthermore, (Xiao M . and Xiao, D., 2007) refers the high false positives alarms 
to weakness of integration process between multiple IDSs. 
3.4.4 Determining the Alert Severity Level 
There are no standard metrics for the alert severity level. Therefore, a combination of 
organization security policy and security operator experience is required in order to interpret 
and rank/prioritize the generated alerts. However, there were some attempts to state the level of 
severity for the alerts. (Koike and Ohno 2004) attempts to identify that i f the alert has one of 
the following features then the possibility o f the alert to be false positive is high, these features 
are: 
• The alarm appears consecutively, 
The alarm appears many times in the log file, 
. The alarm is not associated with any of the network services, 
• The alarm does not belong at all to the current network (i.e. i f an alarm for a network 
which is not monitored is found, it would be false positive). 
3.4.5 Alerts Correlation 
There is a requirement to study the relationship between the various IDS alerts to determine the 
occurrence o f the attack scenarios. Hence, the alert correlation process is not trivial, and is 
often not without problems. 
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The methodology in which the IDS alerts are generated was discussed previously and the 
challenge o f encountering the large number of the generated alerts was discussed as well. This 
section is focusing on how to deal with these alerts. Initially, it is very important to gather the 
alerts with the same message and merge them into one alert i f possible. Meanwhile a 
complementary method to reduce the rate o f the large number of IDS alerts is to combine alerts 
into smaller number of high-level alerts, the process o f combinations varies according to 
various criteria (e.g. the incident which cause the alerts have the same source, the incident 
which causes the alerts have the same destination, the alerts have has the same main features, 
the alerts have a common pattern matching, etc.) (Xiao, M . and Xiao, D. 2007). 
Alert correlation is the process o f finding a relation between some of the generated IDS alerts. 
This relation usually is how each of these alerts (i.e. the incidents which generated these alerts) 
is dependable on each other. This sort o f relations is well-know in the academic articles by the 
term "anack scenario" which clarifies the sequence of attacks, step by step, until the ultimate 
attack is in process .The methodology of performing the alert correlation varies from system to 
another. For instance, some systems initially start with an alert verification process, to assess 
the level of accuracy of an alert (Xiao, M . and Xiao, D. 2007). 
3 . 5 Response Challenges 
The aim of IDS is to detect the intrusion in an early stage and send an alert to the security 
administrator to decide what the best response is in this case. In reality, according to the large 
number o f alerts, sometimes the response is too late, or it is not powerful enough. Therefore, 
the trend of research is Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) which has the aim of preventing the 
system from the attacks (Gong 2002). There are many ways to categorize the response process. 
However, one of the recent papers (Stakhanova et al. 2007 b) proposed an intrusion response 
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taxonomy which classified the response depending on two measures: firstly, the activity o f the 
response, secondly, the degree of automation in the response. 
According to the first measure, the response can be active or passive. Unfortunately, most of 
the IDS are passive, they just report the damage caused by an attacker and provide the 
administrator with the gained information. Examples o f an active response are terminating the 
session or blocking the traffic. 
Meanwhile, the second measure categorizes the response to two major components manual and 
automatic response. Moreover there are other subcategories such as: 
a- Static or dynamic: most o f the systems are static, in the case o f the static response, the 
response action does not change until the detected attacked is finished, while in the case o f the 
dynamic response, the response action has the ability to vary according to the situation. 
b- Reactive or proactive: most of the systems are reactive, in the case o f the reactive response, 
the response action occurs after the intrusion is detected, while in the case of the proactive 
response, the proactive action has the ability to in charge before even the attacks happened. 
Even though the trend o f the research is having automated response systems, the researchers 
realize that this aim in all the cases wi l l need a human expert. 
This section wi l l focus on the following challenges: 
• Requirement for skilled staff 
• The potential for inappropriate and harmful responses 
• Effectiveness of the IDS response 
38 
Each of the above challenges wi l l be discussed in the following subsections, 
3.5.1 Requirement for Skilled Staff 
The requirement of highly skilled staff is the core of the IDS process. Without staff to manage 
the IDSs and analyze / validate considerable numbers of IDS alerts, the purpose o f having an 
IDS becomes less and less useful. 
i t was discussed previously that IDS generates a large number of alerts and produces high rate 
of false positives (Xiao, M . and Xiao, D. 2007). Therefore, the manipulation of these problems 
requires high skilled analysts (i.e. to analyze IDS alerts and validate which is true and which is 
false). Moreover, there is a need for a high skilled response manager (i.e. to activate a 
previously prepared response plan or modify the response plan or even trigger a new response 
according to life circumstances) 
There is a trend to have completely automated IDS but this is not going to happen so soon. 
Some IDS do have automating monitoring and analysis, but this type o f analysis still needs 
high level analysis done by human experts. It is very dangerous to let these systems have a 
completely automated response. 
There are few human experts in the IDS field as this science started from about two decades. It 
is not easily to find one of them to employ and their salary is very high (Peddisetty 2005). 
Moreover, they should be up-to-date of what is happening in the field of security to secure their 
systems. 
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In addition, one of the challenges in the IDS community is that sometimes experts detect 
intrusions by experience and, when they are asked about the methodology that was used to 
detect the attack, they cannot give a straightforward answer (Goodall et al. 2004). Another 
problem is that there are vulnerabilities in the systems that some commercial vendors had 
solved, but they do not give their experience to the IDS community for commercial reasons. 
Some others do not declare the vulnerability that they detect because they are afraid that it w i l l 
be used by attackers before that IDS community finds a suitable solution for it. Some of the 
challenges might not be an intrinsic challenge to the IDS itself, but they aflect the efficiency of 
the humans who use them. Hence, these challenges affect IDS as well. 
3.5.2 The Potential for Inappropriate and Harmful Responses 
Responses may cause harmful effects i f issued on the basis of false positives (Stakhanova et. al. 
2007 a). For instance, normal traffic might be blocked or a normal network session be 
terminated. 
IDS alerts usually contain a small amount o f information about the event that causes the trigger 
of these alerts. Therefore, the information within the alert alone is not sufficient to gain an 
overall knowledge of that event. Moreover, that event might be just a genuine event but have 
one or more of the features of the real attack. Therefore, it is worth mentioning that not all the 
IDS alerts have the same level of certainty. 
One of the methods that are used to categorize the intrusion response system (IRS) is its ability 
to adjust (Stakhanova et al. 2007 b). The ability to adjust category has two subcategories: 
• static and 
• adaptive. 
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On one hand, the static response suffers from that it some sometimes produces inappropriate 
responses because the response system does change its reaction during the period of the attack. 
The responses are usually updated by the human expert according to some criteria such as a 
time table or the detecting o f high level threat. In summary, the static response relies on the 
manual efforts, which is not quick enough to respond to the intrusions or suspicious events in 
real time, and as a result this causes inappropriate responses in some circumstances. 
On the other hand, the adaptive response suffers from that it some sometimes produces harmful 
responses because the response system is able to change its reaction during the period of the 
attack. The responses are usually updated automatically without the inference o f any human 
expert according to a preprepared set of responses. In summary, the adaptive response does not 
rely on the manual efforts, which let it more vulnerable to perform harmful responses especially 
i f the appropriate response was not in the preprepared list. 
3.5.3 Effectiveness of the IDS Response 
Many IDSs are passive, they just report the damage caused by an attacker and provide the 
security operator with the collected information. Automatic response is cost-effective but most 
of the IDS responses are still manual, even though manual response is time consuming. 
Existing IDSs have the ability to detect security events but they still lack in implementing an 
active response to make the protected systems more secure (Fessi el al. 2007). On one hand, 
reactive IDS requires a thorough knowledge of the detected security event, while on the other 
hand it requires the awareness of the system environment (i.e. operating systems, servers, 
services provided by these servers, ports opened or closed, etc.). Moreover IDS can never 
guarantee 100% the occurrence of the attack, it only triggers an alert that some kind of security 
event happened, which might be a false positive. Hence, many existing IDS are only passive 
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because they do not trust IDS alerts to perform a reactive response and even when some of 
them perform a reactive response usually this reaction wi l l not be severe. 
Passive Active 
Admiwstrator mtifjcatioii: 
generate alami 
(through email, oitline/pagei- nofificatiou, etc.) 
generate report 
(can contain information about an intnision snch 
as attack target, criticaUt}\ thne, source IP/user 
accotmt, description of suspicious packets, etc, as 
well as intrusion statistics for some period of time 
such as number of alarms from each IDS. attack 
targets grouped by IP, etc.) 
Other responses: enable additional IDS 
enable local/remote/network activity logging 
enable intrusion analysis tools 
backup tampered with files 
trace coimection for information gathering 
piuposes 
Host-based response actions: 
deny fiill/selective access lo file 
delete taiiq^ered with file 
allow to operate on fake file 
restore tampeied witii file fi-om bacbip 
restrict user activity 
disable user account 
shutdown compromised service/Iiost 
restan suspicious process 
temiinate suspicious process 
disable compromised services 
abort suspicious system calls 
delay suspicious system calls 
Network-based response actions: 
enable/disable additional firewall mles restart 
targeted system 
block suspicions incoming/outgoing netAvork 
connection block ports/IP addresses 
trace comiectiou to perfoiiu attacker 
isolation/quarantine create remote decoy^ 
tBonrowed fi-om (Wang, Reeves and \Vu, 2001). 
Table 2: List of common passive and active intrusion responses 
Table 2 provides a list of the common passive and active intrusion responses. The aim of this 
table or any other similar table in other paper is to have an overview of the strength and the 
weakness in these response processes. Even though it was mentioned previously that 
sometimes there is a lack in understanding the meaning of the IDS concepts, it is worth to 
indicate that the same problem exists with the intrusion response terminology. Therefore, some 
researchers tend to give more description to the term to avoid confusion and misunderstanding 
(Stakhanova et. al. 2007 b). 
3.6 Summary 
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No. The IDS Challenges List Section 
Deployment Challenges 
1 Scalability constraints 3.1.1 
2 Switched Networks 3.1.2 
3 Packet dropping and high speed network traffic 3.1.3 
4 Encrypted traffic and IPv6 3.1.4 
5 Initial deployment cost 3.1.5 
Management Challenges 
6 Volume of information 3.2.1 
7 Ensuring effective configuration 3.2.2 
8 Managing a heterogeneous IDS environment 3.2.3 
9 Ongoing operational costs 3.2.4 
Technical Challenges 
10 Vulnerability to attacks 3.3.1 
11 Difficulty in customizing and updating the IDS ruleset 3.3.2 
12 Data collection and logging 3.3.3 
13 Understanding and interpreting IDS data 3.3.4 
Detection Challenges 
14 TTie large number of alerts 3.4.1 
15 IDS can miss too many genuine attacks (i.e. false negatives) 3.4.2 
16 IDS can raise too many erroneous alerts (i.e. false positives) 3.4.3 
17 Determining the alert severity level 3.4.4 
18 Alerts correlation 3.4.5 
Response Challenges 
19 Requirement for skilled staff 3.5.1 
20 The potential for inappropriate and harmful responses 3.5.2 
21 Effectiveness of the IDS response 3.5.3 
Table 3: IDS Challenges List 
This chapter demonstrates the challenges encountered by the users o f the IDS, trying to 
describe these problems sufficiently. The chapter includes five categories of challenges: the 
deployment challenges, the management challenges, the technical challenges, the detection 
challenges and finally the response challenges. Each o f these categories has its own 
components. A list of all the challenges discussed in this chapter is illustrated in Table 3. The 
outcome challenges of this chapter wi l l be the source of information for a questionnaire about 
IDS challenges that wi l l be the topic o f the next Chapter. The motive o f addressing the 
challenges through a questionnaire is to evaluate how far the challenges based on the literature 
review match those encountered by the organizations in practice. Moreover, the descriptions of 
the challenges in this chapter wi l l be used to extract a brief definition for each o f them to be 
43 
guidance for the respondents of the questionnaire, because some of terminologies might have 
various interpretations. 
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Chapter 4 
Practitioners View of IDS Challenges 
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4 Practitioners View of IDS Challenges 
This chapter continues the investigation of the challenges that encounter by IDS in practice 
through a conducted questionnaire based on the points which were discussed in the previous 
chapter, to evaluate how far the challenges from the literature match those encountered by the 
organizations in practice. On one hand, the most appropriate participants to the questionnaire 
are those who are (or have previously been) in a position to make IDS deployment decisions, 
while, on the other hand, the participation of those who have experience with IDS solutions in 
their organization or others who feel able to offer an informed opinion, were also appropriate. 
Chapter 4 clarifies the reason behind selecting the questionnaire as a method to inquire 
information. Moreover, the web design of the web-based questionnaire is demonstrated. 
Furthermore, the results of the questionnaire are revealed and illustrated by the figures. Finally, 
a fu l l analysis of the responses is provided based on various adopted methodologies for ranking 
the challenges to obtain more benefits for the responses. 
4,1 Research Methodology 
The questionnaire method is one o f the efficient methods to collect data for the topic under 
research and to evaluate the participants' responses. However, this is not the only method to 
collect the data. These data can be collected through focus groups, interviews and even phone 
calls. At this stage of the research it was desirable to select the questionnaire method as a first 
choice for different reasons. These reasons vary according to the location where the research is 
conducted and the early stage of the research itself (i.e. the difficulty of finding many local 
experts in the field of IDS to interview). Therefore, the questionnaire method was selected to be 
the initial method to obtain the required information. Moreover, according to the results of the 
questionnaire, it wi l l be decided i f there wi l l be an actual need for the other methods (i.e. 
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interviews and small groups) or whether the results wi l l be sufficient for the next step o f the 
research. 
4.2 Survey Design 
The aim of this section is to present the design o f the questionnaire af)er it was selected to be 
the source o f collecting the data. The context wi l l be based on the provided information in 
Chapter 3, which gathered the IDS challenges according to a variety o f prior published works 
(i.e. no single paper had previously gathered all these IDS challenges in it), each o f which only 
focused on one or a few challenges, without mentioning anything about the others. 
However, the questionnaire process begins with a trial hard copy questionnaire which were 
conducted and given to some Master and PhD students who are conducting research in network 
and network security. A l l o f these students were examined in the subject of network security 
and attended or still attending a course in IDS. Hence, they are the available and appropriate 
next best group to assess their responses to the preliminary questionnaire. 
The aims o f this procedure were the following: 
o to measure the required time to finish the questionnaire, 
o to determine the clarity o f the questions; to identify i f the structure o f any o f the 
questions are misleading the participant and therefore, need to be written again to avoid 
misinterpretation. 
Actually, the responses which were received from the previous participants were valuable and 
they were considered in improving the quality o f the second stage of questionnaire (i.e. web-
based questionnaire). Therefore, according to the results of the preliminary questionnaire, it 
was decided to decrease the time span o f the questionnaire by decreasing the number o f 
questions and leave the questions that focus on the main aim of the questionnaire, which are the 
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IDS challenges (i.e. the limitations that face the deployment of the IDS). Moreover, some of the 
participants complained that the title of some of the challenges were confusing and trapped 
them in a hesitating position before they made up their mind of the severity o f the challenge. 
That confusion wi l l lead to an increase in the time span of the questionnaire; hence, it was 
decided to append a brief description to each challenge, to be as guidance to the participants 
who might be hesitate onto about what it is meant by this challenge in the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire begins with an introductory page illustrates the questionnaire and the aim of 
it. The page presents the type of required participants and makes the participants aware of the 
time span needed to accomplish the questionnaire (i.e. it is mentioned that responding to the 
questionnaire wi l l consume roughly from 5 to 10 minutes). Moreover, it was important to 
inform the participants how to contact with the designer o f the questionnaire, in case that that 
they have any questions or further interest in the result of the questionnaire. Finally, at the end 
of the introductory page, the participants have the option to continue; i f they are related to 
subject and is interested to support this research with their contribution, by clicking on the 
"next" button or the option of exiting the questionnaire by clicking on "Exit and Clear Survey". 
4.3 Survey Results 
It is worth to mention that, the link o f the web-based questionnaire was sent to more than 2000 
persons who are related to the network security field. These persons were selected through 
adapting a collection o f various methods; one of the methods was advertising the web-based 
questionnaire through the British Computer Society (BCS), another method was by having 
contacts with persons working in large organizations (i.e. banks, hospitals, universities and 
telecommunication). Moreover, there was the chance to meet some persons who are working 
with IDS solution or used to, hence, it was a chance to give the link of the questionnaire. 
Actually, the latter category was very helpful even that some of them volunteer to send the link 
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to some of their colleagues. Many of them recommended trying to reach the participants 
through a person who knows them, hence, they might be interested in responding. Usually, they 
are not interested in responding to this type o f questionnaires because, in most o f the cases, do 
not add value to their work and most o f them are poor in their design and lime consuming. 
However, af^er the first list was constructed and sent, the responses were very few. Hence, new 
lists were generated until the number o f persons exceeds 2000. Unfortunately, only 41 of them 
answered the questionnaire completely. Therefore, it was decided to perform the analysis 
according to their responses, even that it is acknowledged that the result o f the analysis would 
be better i f the number o f participants was higher. It was noticed that some persons started to 
answer the questionnaire but they decided not to fmish it, the reason behind that might be 
because they did not suppose that the number of challenges would that high or because they 
usually focus on a special type of problems such as false positive. The questionnaire was 
organized into two major sections: 
• Demographics 
• IDS Challenges - these challenges are organized as five main sections as follows (based 
upon the categories previously identified in Chapter 3): deployment challenges, 
management challenges, technical challenges, detection challenges and finally, 
response challenges. 
4.3.1 Demographics 
The purpose of the questions in this section is to have a general view of the type of the 
participants; the organizations that they belong to, the size of their organizations, their job titles, 
and information about the participant's years o f experience in the field of IDS. Meanwhile, the 
participant's were asked to reply to a major question about, i f they are in a position to deploy 
(or taken the decision to deploy) an IDS or not. Furthermore, the type of IDS they decided to 
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use and the IDS approach that they used in detecting intrusions were of the concerns of the 
questionnaire. 
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Figure I : The sector that the participants belong to 
Figure 1 is a chart that represents the sector that the participants belong to. From the selected 
organizations list, the responses were as follows the highest number was 20 belonged to 
educational institutions, but no responses were received from persons working in finance or 
manufacturing organizations. This result was expected as the questionnaire were sent to a 
higher number of persons who are working in educational institutions Moreover, one of the 
participants who selected the "Other" category wrote that he/she is related to the defense 
organization while another one wrote R & D organization. The selected list of organizations 
covers a wide range of organizations which have diversity in the environment that the IDS are 
deployed. The fact that only 11 (out o f 41) of those that answered the questionnaire were from 
the IT sector does not affect the results as the current question asked about the organizations 
that the participants belongs to not their jobs. 
50 
Figure 2: The size of the participant's organization 
Figure 2 represents the size of the participant's organization. The chart demonstrates that the 
majority o f the participants work in organizations which employ more than 1000 employee 
which indicate that the questionnaire wi l l obtain valuable answers from this group of 
participants as they work in large organizations. 
System 
adminislraor 
Security System analyst Intnjsion analyst Security engineer 
administrator Of her 
Figure 3: The participant's role/ job title 
Figure 3 represents the participant's role/job title. The chart demonstrates that the majority of 
the participants role/job title do not belong to the questionnaire list. That does not mean that 
they are not security experts but it might mean that they have a different job title. The follow ing 
titles appears during the participation; IT security manager, IT director, CTO, design engineer. 
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R&D security, technical director, senior security architect, visualization designer, security & 
compliance group leader and of course some various academic titles such as professor and 
researcher. 
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Figure 4: The number of years that the participants work with IDS 
Figure 4 represents the number of years that the participants work with IDS. As the results 
demonstrated only four has no work experience with IDS while 6 have experiences more than 
10 years with IDS. Hence, 27 participants have experience more than 3 years which is good to 
obtain valuable results for the questionnaire. 
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Figure 5: The participant's type 
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Figure 5 represents the participant's type according to the position that they occupy in their 
organizations and whether they have deployed (or taken the decision to deploy) an IDS before 
or not. Fortunately, the majority of the participants 68% belong to the category who had been 
able or were still able to take the decision o f deploying an IDS while only 7% of the 
participants decided not to deploy an IDS. The rest 25% mentioned that they are not in a 
position to take the decision o f deploying an IDS or not but they decided to accomplish the 
questionnaire based on there opinions and other experiences in the field. 
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Figure 6: The type of IDS that the participant's prefer to deploy 
Figure 6 represents the type of IDS that the participant prefers to deploy. It is obvious from the 
results, that i f the participants have to select only between (NIDS) and (HIDS), they would 
select (NIDS), since 41.5% of the participants selected (NIDS) while only 5% selected (HIDS). 
While 41.5% of the participants decided that they prefer to use both of them. Finally, only 12% 
participants selected the answer " I do not know". The entire results indicate that 83% of the 
participants are using NIDS and 46.5% are using HIDS. Hence, the participants decided that 
NIDS have more privilege verses the HIDS in the real world but they still want to provide their 
systems with the privileges of the HIDS. 
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Figure 7: The approach that the participant's use in detecting intrusions 
Figure 7 represents the approach that the participant uses in detecting intrusions. The result 
determines thai 25% of the participants prefer to use rule-based IDS while only 17% prefer to 
use anomaly-based IDS but it was obvious that a large number of participants 49% prefer to use 
both of them. Finally, only 10% participants selected the answer *1 do not know". The entire 
results indicate that 74% of the participants prefer to use rule-based IDS and 65% prefer to use 
anomaly-based IDS. Hence, the participants decided that rule-based IDS have more privilege 
verses the anomaly-based in the real world but they still want to provide their systems with the 
privileges of the anomaly-based. It is not surprising to find in Figure 6 and Figure 7 there are 5 
and 4 persons respectively that answer ' 1 don't know" because a group o f participants are 
categorized as able to offer opinion about IDS challenges. Hence, it is not strange that some of 
the users do not know what type o f IDS is used in detecting intrusions. 
4.3.2 Deployment Challenges 
The deployment challenges section is the first one o f the five sections of the IDS challenges. 
The purpose of these sections is to focus on the core of the questionnaire and to measure the 
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participant's degree of agreement about the challenges that w i l l be applied to them through the 
questions. 
Figure 8 represents the deployment challenges that are investigated by the questionnaire. 
Moreover, each one of them was appended with a brief description to avoid misinterpretation. 
Furthermore, this methodology is applied to the rest of the challenges in Section B. 
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Figure 8: Deployment Challenges 
The deployment challenges that were investigated are as follows: 
• Scalability constraints, 
• Switched Networks, 
• Packet dropping and high speed network traffic, 
• Encrypted traffic and IPv6, and 
• Initial deployment cost. 
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Figure 9: Scalability constraints challenge 
Do rxM know 
The asked question was Scalability constraints: The size o f the network can affect the 
efficiency o f the IDS. For instance, as the size o f the network increases, the efficiency o f 
signature-based IDS decreases. The participant's responses to the scalability constraints 
challenge is shown in Figure 9. It was anticipated during the design period o f the questionnaire 
that the percentage of the participants who wi l l agree would be higher and the percentage of the 
participants who wi l l disagree would be much less. Actually, this anticipation is not only for 
this challenge but also for all the challenges in the rest o f the questionnaire. Meanwhile, the 
percentage o f the passive participants was not very strange. Therefore, there was a requirement 
for a having a look at the results in depth. Hence, it was decided to analyze the responses 
according to the participant's role in their organizations. It was found that 100% of the systems 
administrators agree. 67% of the system analysts agree while 33% did not, 17% only of the 
security engineers agree and 33% were passive while 50% did not agree, 75% of the intrusion 
analysts agree and 25% were passive and 100% security administrator agrees. Moreover, the 
responses of the other participants vary as well, hence, it was decided to do further analysis on 
the basis's of the results according to their experience (i.e. participants with more than 10 years 
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of experience), there results were 66% agree and 17% were neutral while 17% did not agree. 
Moreover, it is decided to follow the same strategy o f analysis with the following challenges. 
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Figure 10: Switched networks challenge 
The asked question was Switched Networks: In the presence o f switching technology, 
monitoring the network efficiently requires the deployment o f more IDS to inspect the 
several network segments traffic. The participant's responses to the switched networks 
challenge is shown in Figure 10. It was found that 100% of the systems administrators agree, 
67% of the system analysts agree and 33% were passive, 67% of the security engineers agree 
and 17% were passive while 16% did not agree, 75% of the intrusion analysts agree and 25% 
were passive and 100% security administrator did not agree. Moreover, the responses of the 
participants with more than 10 years o f experience results were 66% agree and 17% were 
neutral while 17% did not agree. The latter results are more acceptable to the questionnaire than 
the general participant's responses (59%) all participants results. 
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Figure 11: Packet dropping and high speed network traffic challenge 
The asked question was Packet dropping and high speed network traffic: The high speed o f 
network traffic combined with the information overload can cause packet dropping. 
Therefore, the probability o f missing attacks increases. The participant's response to the 
packet dropping and high speed network traffic challenge is shown in Figure 1 1. It was found 
that 100% of the systems administrators were passive, 33% only of the system analysts agree 
while 67% did not agree, 83% of the security engineers agree while 17% did not agree, 50% of 
the intrusion analysts agree and 25% were passive while 25% did not agree and 100% security 
administrator did not agree. Moreover, the responses of the participants with more than 10 
years of experience results were 50% agree and 17% w ere neutral while 33% did not agree. 
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Figure 12: Encrypted traffic and IPv'6 challenge 
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The asked question was Encrypted traffic and IPv6: Encrypted traffic attacks successfully 
reach the destination without being monitored by IDS. Encrypted traffic and IPv6 are 
combined together in the same question because IPv6 are encrypted. The participant's 
response to the encrypted traffic and IPv6 challenge is shown in Figure 12. It was found that 
50% of the systems administrators agree while 50% did not agree, 67% of the system analysts 
were passive while 33% did not agree, 50% of the security engineers agree and 17% were 
passive while 33% did not agree, 25% only o f the intrusion analysts agree and 50% were 
passive while 25% did not agree and 100% of the security administrators agree. Moreover, the 
responses o f the participants with more than 10 years o f experience results were 34% agree and 
33% were neutral while 33% did not agree. 
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Figure 13: Initial deployment cost challenge 
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The asked question was Initial deployment cost: Deployment costs may include the cost o f 
purchasing the IDS and the initial training for those who w i l l be responsible for managing 
it. The participant's response to the initial deployment cost challenge is shown in Figure 13. It 
was found that 100% of the systems administrators agree, 67% of the system analysts agree 
while 33% did not agree, 83% of the security engineers agree and 17% were passive, 75% of 
the intrusion analysts agree and 25% were passive and 100% of the security administrators 
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agree. Moreover, the responses of the participants with more than 10 years of experience results 
were 83% agree while 17% did not agree. The latter results are more acceptable to the 
questionnaire than the general participant's responses (76%) all participants results. 
4.3.3 Management Challenges 
The management challenges that are investigated by the questionnaire are represented in Figure 
14. The management challenges investigated were as follows: 
• Volume of information, 
• Ensuring efTective configuration, 
• Managing a heterogeneous IDS environment, and 
• Ongoing operational costs. 
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Figure 14: Management Challenges 
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Figure 15: V olume of Information challenge 
The asked question was Volume o f information: The amount information generated by the 
IDS increases the workload for the system/security administrator who has to consider it. 
The participant's response to the volume o f information challenge is shown in Figure 15. It was 
found that 100% of the systems administrators agree, 100% of the system analysts agree, 100% 
of the security engineers agree, 75% of the intrusion analysts agree while 25% did not agree 
and 100% of the security administrators did not agree. Moreover, the responses of the 
participants with more than 10 years of experience results were 83% agree and 17% were 
neutral. 
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Figure 16: Ensuring effective configuration challenge 
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The asked question was Ensuring effective configuration: It is di f f icul t to tune the intrusion-
detection system to minimize false alarms and missed attacks. The participant's response to 
the ensuring effective configuration challenge is shown in Figure 16. It was found that 50% of 
the systems administrators agree while 50% did not agree , 33% only of the system analysts 
agree while 67% did not agree, 83% of the securit>' engineers agree while 17% did not agree. 
75% of the intrusion analysts agree while 25% did not agree and 100% of the security 
administrators agree. Moreover, the responses o f the participants with more than 10 years of 
experience results were 50% agree while 50% did not agree. 
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Figure 17: Managing a heterogeneous IDS environment challenge 
The asked question was Managing a heterogeneous IDS environment: In the case o f 
deploying multiple IDSs from different vendors, problems o f interoperability might occur. 
Some o f these differences might be in the way IDSs report alerts, their ruleset. etc. The 
participant's response to the managing a heterogeneous IDS environment challenge is shown in 
Figure 17. It was found that 50% of the systems administrators agree and 50% were neutral. 
67% of the system analysts agree and 33% were passive, 67% of the security engineers agree 
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and 33% were neutral, 75% of the intrusion analysts agree and 25% were neutral and 100% of 
the security administrators agree. Moreover, the responses of the participants with more than 10 
years o f experience results were 50% agree and 50% were passive. Therefore, the analysis w il l 
consider managing a heterogeneous IDS environment as a challenge. 
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Figure 18: Ongoing operational costs challenge 
The asked question was Ongoing operational costs: The cost o f maintaining IDSs can be 
significant, as it requires skilled staff to manage it. analyze and respond to the security 
alerts that are generated. The participant's response to the ongoing operational costs challenge 
is shown in Figure 18. It was found that 100% of the systems administrators did not agree, 
100% of the system analysts agree, 83% of the security engineers agree while 17% did not 
agree, 75% of the intrusion analysts agree and 25% were neutral and 100% of the security 
administrators did not agree. Moreover, the responses o f the participants with more than 10 
years of experience results were 83% agree while 17% did not agree. 
4.3.4 Technical Challenges 
The technical challenges that are investigated by the questionnaire are represented in Figure 19. 
The technical challenges that were investigated are as follows: 
• Vulnerability to attacks, 
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Difficulty in customizing and updating the IDS ruleset. 
Data collection and togging, and 
Understanding and interpreting IDS data. 
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Figure 19: Technical Challenges 
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Figure 20: Vulnerability to attacks challenge 
The asked question was Vulnerability to attacks: Some attackers target the IDS itself rather 
than other elements in the network, with the aim of bypassing intrusion detection. I f 
attackers can take the IDS out service, further attack can be launched against other targets 
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within the network. The participant's response to the vulnerability to attacks challenge is 
shown in Figure 20. It was found that 100% of the systems administrators agree, 100% of the 
system analysts agree, 83% of the security engineers agree and 17% were neutral, 100% of the 
intrusion analysts agree and 100% of the security administrators did not agree. Moreover, the 
responses o f the participants with more than 10 years of experience results were 83% agree and 
17% were neutral. The latter results support the (81%) the all participant's responses. 
Therefore, the analysis wi l l consider vulnerability to attacks as a challenge. 
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Figure 21: Difficulty in customizing and updating the IDS ruleset challenge 
The asked question was Dif f icu l ty in customizing and updating the IDS ruleset: One o f the 
challenges is to keep the IDS ruleset regularly updated. In addition, it is important to 
customize the set o f rules, in order to effectively detect attacks in the monitored network. 
The participant's response to the difficulty in customizing and updating the IDS ruleset is 
shown in Figure 21. 0% of the participants selected any of the disagree options. It was found 
that 100% of the systems administrators agree, 100% of the system analysts agree, 67% of the 
security engineers agree and 33% were neutral. 100% of the intrusion analysts agree and 100% 
of the security administrators were neutral. Moreover, the responses of the participants w ith 
more than 10 years of experience results w ere 100% agree. The latter results support the (81%) 
65 
the all participant's responses. Therefore, the analysis wi l l consider the difficulty in 
customizing and updating the IDS ruleset as one of the top challenges. 
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Figure 22: Data collection and logging challenge 
The asked question was Data collection and logging: Many sources can provide the IDS 
with data, which might have different formats. Therefore, there is a requirement to integrate 
these into an appropriate format for the IDS. The participant's response to the data collection 
and logging is shown in Figure 22.It was found that 50% of the systems administrators agree 
while 50% did not agree, 100% of the system analysts agree, 50% of the security engineers 
agree and 33% were neutral while 17% did not agree, 100% of the intrusion analysts agree and 
100% of the security administrators agree. Moreover, the responses o f the participants with 
more than 10 years of experience results were 66% agree and 17% were neutral while 17% do 
not agree. 
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Figure 23: Understanding and interpreting IDS data challenge 
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The asked question was Understanding and interpreting IDS data: There is a requirement for 
an efficient methodology to log the network traffic and as a consequence, to analyze and 
validate the IDS alerts, in order to determine i f actual intrusions are taking place. Moreover, 
the traff ic logs and the alerts logs need to be presented in a meaningful and robust interface. 
The participant's response to the understanding and interpreting IDS data is shown in Figure 
23. It was found that 100% of the systems administrators agree, 67% of the system analysts 
agree and 33% were neutral, 67% of the security engineers agree and 33% were neutral, 100% 
of the intrusion analysts agree and 100% of the security administrators agree. Moreover, the 
responses o f the participants with more than 10 years of experience results were 100% agree. 
The latter results support the (88%) the all participant's responses Therefore, the analysis wi l l 
consider understanding and interpreting IDS data as one of the top challenges. 
4.3.5 Detection Challenges 
The detection challenges that are investigated by the questionnaire are represented in Figure 24. 
The detection challenges that were investigated are as follows: 
• The large number of alerts, 
• IDS can miss too many genuine attacks (i.e. false negatives), 
• IDS can raise too many erroneous alerts (i.e. false positives), 
• Determining the alert severity level, and 
• Alerts correlation. 
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Figure 25: The large number of alerts challenge 
The asked question was The large number o f alerts: IDS can produce a large number o f 
alerts and can therefore require significant effort to monitor. The participant's response to the 
large number of alerts is shown in Figure 25. It was found that 50% of the systems 
administrators are neutral while 50% did not agree, 67% of the system analysts agree and 33% 
were neutral, 67% of the security engineers agree and 17% were neutral w hile 16% did not 
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agree, 75% of the intrusion analysts agree and 25% were neutral, and 100% of the security 
administrators are neutral. Moreover, the responses o f the participants with more than 10 years 
of experience results were 50% agree and 33% were neutral while 17% do not agree. 
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Figure 26: False negatives challenge 
The asked question was IDS can miss too many genuine attacks (i.e. false negatives): A 
false negative occurs when the IDS fails to detect malicious network traffic, which as a 
result goes undetected. The participant's response to the false negatives is shown in Figure 26. 
It was found that 50% of the systems administrators agree while 50% did not agree, 67% of the 
system analysts agree and 33% were neutral. 83% of the security engineers agree and 17% 
were neutral, 100% of the intrusion analysts agree, and 100% of the security administrators are 
neutral. Moreover, the responses of the participants with more than 10 years of experience 
results were 33% agree and 50% were neutral while 17% did not agree. 
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Figure 27: False positives challenge 
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The asked question was IDS can raise too many erroneous alerts (i.e. false positives): A 
false positive refers to the network tratTic that the IDS considers malicious but arc not. The 
participant's response to the false positives is shown in Figure 27.It was found that 50% of the 
systems administrators agree and 50% were neutral, 67% of the system analysts agree and 33% 
were neutral, 67% of the security engineers agree and 33% were neutral, 100% of the intrusion 
analysts agree, and 100% of the security administrators are neutral. Moreover, the responses o f 
the participants with more than 10 years of experience results were 33% agree and 50% were 
neutral while 17% did not agree. 
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Figure 28: Determining the alert seventy level challenge 
The asked question was Determining the alert severity level: There are no standard metrics 
for the alert severity level. Therefore, a combination o f organization security policy and 
security operator experience is required in order to interpret and rank/prioritize the 
generated alerts. The participant's response to determining the alert severity level is shown in 
Figure 28. It was found that 100% of the systems administrators agree, 100% of the system 
analysts agree. 67% of the security engineers agree and 17% were neutral w hile 16% did not 
agree, 50% of the intrusion analysts agree and 50% were neutral, and 100% of the security 
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administrators agree. Moreover, the responses of the participants with more than 10 years of 
experience results were 50% agree and 17% were neutral while 33% did not agree. 
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Figure 29: Alerts correlation challenge 
The asked question was Alerts correlation: There is a requirement to study the relationship 
between the various IDS alerts to determine the occurrence o f the attack scenarios. Hence, 
the alert correlation process is not tr ivial , and is often not without problems. The 
participant's response to the alerts correlation is shown in Figure 29. It was found that 100% of 
the systems administrators agree, 33% of the system analysts agree and 67% were passive, 83% 
of the security engineers agree and 17% did not agree, 75% of the intrusion analysts agree and 
25% were neutral, and 100% of the security administrators are neutral. Moreover, the responses 
of the participants w ith more than 10 years of experience results were 66% agree and 17% were 
passive while 17% did not agree. 
4.3.6 Response Challenges 
The response challenges that are investigated by the questionnaire are represented in Figure 30 
represents. The response challenges which were investigated are as follows: 
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Requirement for skilled staff. 
The potential for inappropriate and harmful responses, and 
Effectiveness of the IDS response. 
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Figure 30: Response Challenges 
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Figure 31: Requirement for skilled staff challenge 
The asked question was Requirement for skilled staff: The requirement o f highly skilled 
staff is the core o f the IDS process. Without staff to manage the IDSs and analyze / validate 
considerable numbers o f IDS alerts, the purpose o f having an IDS becomes less and less 
useful. The participant's response to the requirement for skilled staff is shown in Figure 31. It 
was found that 100% of the systems administrators agree, 100% of the system analysts agree, 
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50% of the security engineers agree and 17% were neutral while 33% did not agree, 75% of the 
intrusion analysts agree and 25% were neutral, and 100% of the security administrators are 
neutral. Moreover, the responses of the participants with more than 10 years o f experience 
results were 83% agree while 17% did not agree. The latter results support the (78%) the all 
participant's response. 
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Figure 32: The potential for inappropriate and harmful responses challenge 
The asked question was The potential for inappropriate and harmful responses: Responses 
may cause harmful effects i f issued on the basis o f false positives. For instance, normal 
traffic might be blocked or a normal network session be terminated. The participant's 
response to the potential for inappropriate and harmful responses is shown in Figure 32. It was 
found that 50% of the systems administrators were neutral while 50% did not agree, 33% of the 
system analysts agree and 67% were neutral, 83% of the security engineers agree and 17% 
were neutral. 100% of the intrusion analysts agree, and 100% of the security administrators 
agree. Moreover, the responses of the participants with more than 10 years of experience results 
were 83% agree and 17% were neutral. The latter results support the (73%) the all participants' 
responses. 
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Figure 33: Effectiveness of the IDS response challenge 
The asked question was Effectiveness of the IDS response: Many IDSs are passive, they just 
report the damage caused by an attacker and provide the security operator with the 
collected information. Automatic response is cost-effective but most o f the IDS responses 
are still manually even though manually response is lime consuming. The participant's 
response to effectiveness of the IDS response is shown in Figure 33. It was found that 100% of 
the systems administrators agree, 33% of the system analysts agree and 67% were neutral, 50% 
of the security engineers agree and 33% were neutral while 17% did not agree, 100% of the 
intrusion analysts agree, and 100% of the security administrators were neutral. Moreover, the 
responses o f the participants with more than 10 years o f experience results were 66% agree and 
17% were neutral while 17% did not agree. 
4.3.7 The Challenges Rate 
The current results of the questionnaire are sufficient to mention that all the composed 
challenges (i.e. the selection o f the challenges within the questionnaire which were based 
originally on the academic published papers) are challenges that encounter practitioners in their 
organizations in reality. Hence, there is a requirement to rank these challenges based on various 
criteria. Therefore, the results in the previous sub-sections (4.3.2-4.3.6) wi l l be the bases for the 
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various methods which wil l be described among the current sub-section and the rest of the 
chapter. 
In order to provide a clear view, of the participants answers and to summarize some of the 
provided results. Figure 34 represents the challenges that the participants were strongly agree 
with, the figure clarifies that 39% of the participants strongly agree that the volume of 
information is a major challenge which implies the difficulty in the process of manipulating 
with them. Therefore, as a result it was obvious that the large number of alerts challenge 
appears as the second challenge that the participants strongly agree with. Moreover, the 
answers of the questions in the previous sub-sections (4.3.2-4.3.6) reveal that some of the 
challenges are considered to be a very serious challenge to at least some of the participants 
while others were not very significant such as determining the alert severity level, and the 
effectiveness o f IDS response. However, Figure 34 gives an overall view, in percentages, of 
the challenges that were selected by the strongly agree option. 
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Figure 34: Challenges that participant "Strongly Agree' 
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Figure 35: ( hallenges that participant '*Agree*' + **Strongly Agree** 
Another method was adopted to have the advantage of the responses o f the participants who 
only agree and their agreement was not a strongly agreement. Hence, it was decided to sum the 
results of the participants who only agree and those who strongly agree, as variant method to 
rank all the challenges. In contrast to the previous method. Figure 35 illustrated that the volume 
of information is still the challenge with the highest agreement while understanding and 
interpreting IDS data moved upwards to share the same level with 88% of agreement while it 
was in the third level in the previous method. Furthermore, the encrypted traffic and IPv6 
moves downwards to be considered the less sever challenge. For the completeness of this 
demonstration, it worth to mention that the percentage of agreement for the two challenges 
which were considered to be the less severe ones in the previous method have raised 
significantly as can be shown from Figure 34 and Figure 35, 
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Figure 36: The positives and negatives weighted method 
The previous two methods focused only on the positive responses but the negative results were 
not considered. However, these negative should be considered in ranking the challenges and 
their impact on the overall severity of the challenges. Therefore, Figure 36 represents a 
weighting method which combines the positive and the negative responses that wi l l be 
implemented. The weighting method is a simple and wi l l be applied by giving the value 2 to the 
'^Strongly Agree", the value I to "Agree", the value (-1) to '"Disagree" and the value (-2) to the 
"Strongly Disagree", while the value of "Neutral" and " I do not Know" wi l l be zero. As shown 
in Figure 35 and Figure 36, the main aspects of the two methods arc almost the same. The 
complete findings o f the previous three methods arc presented in Appendix A. 1 -Table A. 
The previous three methods of ranking were based only on the answers of the questions in the 
previous sub-sections (4.3.2-4.3.6) (i.e. the responses to the already prepared list of IDS 
challenge). Therefore, it was decided to give the opportunity to the participants to add other 
challenges that might were absent or ignored in the questionnaire and worth to be mentioned in 
the survey. Hence, the question that was appended to give more freedom to the participants to 
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add any further challenges. Unfortunately, a few participants respond to that question (for more 
information have a look at Appendix A.2), may be one of the reasons is that the question was 
optional. 
Figure 37 represents the construction of the question which was given to the participants to 
select the five Top challenges of the challenges which were mentioned in the previous sub-
sections (4.3.2- 4.3.6). The purpose o f the question is to rank severity of these challenges from 
the participant's perspective. The list of the questionnaire challenges which were repented at 
the beginning of this sub-section wil l appear to the participants as a drop down list: 
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Figure 38 illustrated not only the responses of all the participants but also the paiticipants who 
deploy IDS. Hence, the highest rank of the challenges which the whole participants selected as 
the Top 1 challenge is as follows. 
• Understanding and interpreting IDS data, 88% of the whole participants selected it as a 
challenge and 12% were passive. Meanwhile, the responses of the participants with 
more than 10 years o f experience results were 100% agree that it is a challenge. 
• IDS can raise too many erroneous alerts (i.e. false positives), 78% o f the whole 
participants selected it as a challenge and 17% were neutral. Meanwhile, the responses 
of the participants with more than 10 years of experience results were 33% agree and 
50% were neutral while 17% did not agree. 
It is obvious from Figure 38 that some o f the challenges were not selected at all as the first 
selection. Hence, the current assumption is that these challenges might appear in the Top 2 
challenge selections. However the ones that were not selected in the current stage are the 
following challenges: 
• Ensuring effective configuration, 
• Data collection and logging, 
• IDS can miss too many genuine attacks (i.e. false negatives), 
• The potential for inappropriate and harmful responses, and 
• Effectiveness of the IDS response. 
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The results of the Top 2 Challenge question demonstrated that the highest selection went 
towards: 
o Requirement for skilled staff, 78% of the whole participants selected it as a challenge 
and 15% were neutral. Meanwhile, the responses o f the participants with more than 10 
years o f experience results were 83% agree while 17% did not agree. 
Even that some of the challenges that were not selected in the Top 1 challenge are currently 
selected in the Top 2 challenge question but the following challenges are still not selected by 
any of the participants: 
o Ensuring effective configuration, 
o The potential for inappropriate and harmful responses, and 
o Effectiveness of the IDS response. 
The results of the Top 3 Challenge question demonstrated that the highest selection went 
towards: 
o The volume of information, 88% of the whole participants selected it as a challenge and 
7% were passive. Meanwhile, the responses of the participants with more than 10 years 
of experience results were 83% agree and 17% were neutral. 
By the end of the Top 3 challenge selection question all the presented challenges were selected 
by at least one participant, as one of the Top 1, Top2 or Top 3 challenges. 
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It was remarkable in the Top 4 Challenge question that the highest selection went towards the 
understanding and interpreting IDS data challenge which was selected before to have the 
highest rank in the Top I Challenge question. 
Finally, the results of the Top 5 Challenge question demonstrated that the highest selection 
went towards: 
• Determining the alert severity level, 7 1 % of the whole participants selected it as a 
challenge and 22% were neutral. Meanwhile, the responses o f the participants with 
more than 10 years of experience results were 50% agree and 17% were neutral while 
33% did not agree. 
• Effectiveness of the IDS response, 68% of the whole participants selected it as a 
challenge and 22% were neutral. Meanwhile, the responses of the participants with 
more than 10 years of experience results were 50% agree and 17% were neutral while 
33% did not agree. 
However, the responses to the categories Top I challenges. Top 2 challenges. Top 3 challenges, 
Top 4 challenges and Top 5 challenges are available in Appendix A . I - Table B. 
4.3.8 False Positives Problem 
In the field o f the IDS research, it is well-known that the high rates of false positives are a 
nightmare to the administrators. Therefore, there was no doubt that the participants wi l l select it 
among the five Top challenges. Actually, they select it to be one o f the two highest ranks in the 
Top 1 challenge question. 
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The results of the false positive rate question are represented in Figure 39. It was not strange to 
find that 19.5% of the participants did not know the answer, which is normal because many of 
the participants are not in a position to provide this type o f information. Otherwise, the rest o f 
the participants provide a variety of answers depending on their experience with the IDS that 
they use. Figure 39 is constructed to illustrate the responses of the whole participants, then, the 
participants who have more than 3 years experience, the participants who have more than 6 
years experience and fmally the high level experts, the participants who have more than 10 
years experience. Moreover, their answers depend on the traffic environment that they monitor 
and the efficiency of the configuration of these IDS. 
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Figure 39: The expected proportion of IDS to be false positives 
4.4 Analysis and Discussions 
The previous sections discussed the web-based questionnaire design and how did the 
participants respond to it. Furthermore, charts expressing the data and also some analysis were 
provided. The final question within the questionnaire was an optional one to give the 
participants the opportunity to provide their suggestions of how to improve the performance o f 
the IDS and to have the chance to append any further comments. We received some valuable 
feedback to that question, however, one suggests modifying the design of the questionnaire to 
have more valuable results while another comment was a sort of joke such as "do not connect 
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the computer to the network", even that it is a trivial solution but is not practical. Moreover, all 
the comments are included in Appendix A.3. 
CKallenge Nur : 
Figure 40: Top Challenges by using a weighting method 
One of the most important concerns in this research is to determine and evaluate the severity of 
the IDS challenges. Hence, the aim of this questionnaire is to obtain the answers based on the 
participant's responses. Previously, the severity of the challenges was ranked in section (4.3.7) 
by three difTerent methods. Furthermore, another method was adopted which was manipulating 
the results of each of the five questions o f the Top five challenges separately. Therefore, it was 
decided to employ other methods to rank the challenges. One o f the adopted methods was to 
weight the challenges in each of these five classes in the previous method (i.e. the challenges 
which were selected in Top I Challenge class have the weight 5, the challenges which were 
selected as Top 2 have the weight 4, the challenges which were selected as Top 3 have the 
weight 3, the challenges which were selected as Top 4 have the weight 2 and the challenges 
which were selected as Top 5 have the weight 1). The results of classifying the challenges 
based on this strategy are represented in Figure 40. The remarkable notice is that the highest 
weighted challenge selected by the whole participants was the "alerts correlation", even that it 
was not selected as the top choice in any of the previous five Top Challenges classes. It was 
obvious from Figure 40 that the results of the whole participants and the participants who 
deploy IDS went towards the following challenges: 
• Alerts correlation, 
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• Understanding and interpreting IDS data, 
• Requirement for skilled staff, 
• IDS can raise too many erroneous alerts (i.e. false positives), 
• The large number o f alerts, 
• DifTiculty in customizing and updating the IDS ruleset, 
• Volume of information, 
For ease o f reference, the top-ranked challenges are summarised in Table 4, showing the 
order o f the four most challenging aspects as identified across the whole respondent group 
and within the subset that had IDS deployment experience. 
Rank All respondents Respondents deploying I D S 
1 Alert correlation (52) Alert correlation (41) 
2 Understanding and interpreting IDS data(49) Requirement for skilled staff (41) 
3 Requirement for skilled staff (48) IDS can raise too many erroneous alerts (i.e. 
false positives)(34) 
4 IDS can raise too many erroneous alerts (i.e. 
false positives)(42) 
Understanding and interpreting IDS data(31) 
Table 4: Top-ranked I D S challenges 
The numbers in Table 4 represent the sum o f each challenge after using the weighting 
method as shown in Figure 40. 
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The third suggested method was to rank the whole challenges according to the size o f the 
organizations. Figure 41 is constructed to illustrate the responses o f two categories participants 
belong to organizations employ beUveen (1-999) persons and participants belongs to 
organizations employ more than 1000 persons. The purpose o f this methodology is to 
determine i f there is any significant variation in the challenges that encounters these 
organizations. Moreover, it was preferred to have the advantage of the latter weighted method 
to obtain the challenges severity which wil l be based on the organizations size. It was 
remarkable that the alerts correlation challenge and the requirement for skilled staff challenge 
were selected to be of the highest selected challenges in the both classes. Moreover, for clarity, 
the highest challenges in organizations with (1-999) employees are as follows: 
• Alerts correlation, 
• IDS can raise too many erroneous alerts (i.e. false positives), 
• The large number o f alerts, 
• Requirement for skilled staff, 
• Difficulty in customizing and updating the IDS ruleset 
While the highest challenges in organizations with (1000+) employees are as follows: 
• Understanding and interpreting IDS data, 
• Volume of information, 
• Requirement for skilled staff, 
• Alerts correlation. 
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Figure 42: Top Challenges based on the participants experience 
The fourth suggested method was to rank the whole challenges according to the participant's 
level of experience. Figure 42 is constructed to illustrate the responses the participants who 
have more than 3 years experience, then the participants who have more than 6 years 
experience and finally the high level experts (i.e. the participants who have more than 10 years 
experience). Moreover, it was preferred to have the advantage o f the previous weighted method 
to obtain the challenges severity which wi l l be based on the participant's level of experience. It 
was remarkable that the three previous classes of experts selected alerts con'elation to be the 
largest problem that encounters IDS technologies. Moreover, for clarity, the highest challenges 
in 3+ years experience class are as follows: 
Alerts correlation. 
Volume of information. 
The large number of alerts, 
IDS can raise too many erroneous alerts (i.e. false positives). 
Requirement for skilled staff. 
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The f i f th suggested method was to rank only the challenges that had no negative responses 
from the whole participants o f the questionnaire. Moreover, during the investigations through 
the responses it was found that none o f the participants claimed that the following three 
challenges are not a challenge, their responses varied between positive and passive but none of 
them were negative. It was preferred to consider the weighted method during sorting these 
challenges. Hence, these challenges are sorted, in order, as follows: 
• Understanding and interpreting IDS data, approximately 88% of the whole participants 
selected understanding and interpreting IDS data as a challenge and 12% responses 
were passive. 
• Difficulty in customizing and updating the IDS ruleset, approximately 80% of the 
whole participants selected it as a challenge and 20% responses were passive. 
• Managing a heterogeneous IDS environment, approximately 68% of the whole 
participants selected managing a heterogeneous IDS environment as a challenge and 
32% responses were passive. 
Finally, it was noticed that there are five o f the challenges that all participants are aware of (i.e. 
none responded with *do not know'). Therefore, it is worth to highlight these challenges and to 
investigate the correlation between them and the previous methods o f ranking the challenges. 
Hence, these challenges are as follows: 
• Ensuring effective configuration, 
• Ongoing operational costs, 
• The large number of alerts, 
• IDS can raise too many erroneous alerts (i.e. false positives), 
• Requirement for skilled staff. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Several methodologies were adopted in Chapter 4 to determine the severity of the IDS 
technologies challenges. From these methods, the focus wi l l be on four o f them, the two 
weighted methods, ranking based on the organization size and ranking based on the level of 
experience. However, the analysis o f these methods provides valuable results, from these 
results it was found that alert correlation is almost the most dominant challenge in even that it 
was not selected as the lop choice in the Top 1 Challenge question. The dominance of alert 
correlation and some other challenges was very obvious in Table 4 (i.e. understanding and 
interpreting IDS data, requirement for skilled stafT, and false positives). However, there was 
some variation in the level of severity of challenges when the various methods were applied. 
These variations are illustrated in the figures but this variation was very remarkable in the 
ranking based on the organization size, specially, the volume of information challenge. 
Moreover, in the Response Challenge category the requirement for skilled staff was the main 
challenge that participants were interested with while the other challenges did not have much 
interest which might imply that the participants consider IDS major purpose is to detect 
intrusions and the response to intrusions is a minor activity for it. 
It was found from the results o f the current chapter, that the requirement for skilled staff, based 
on the various methodologies used for ranking, is one o f the challenges which scores high 
values. The solution of employing skilled staff for every system is out o f discussion. This 
solution is not available in reality, especially, for small organizations. Moreover, the case of a 
normal end-user has to be considered because it is not possible to let all the network users^ 
experts in manipulating with intrusions. Therefore, the aim of the next stage o f the research wil l 
be to perform an efficient analysis to the received IDS alerts and provide the end-user with the 
results in a simpler form through meaningful graphical user interface (GUI). The purpose of 
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this GUI is to inform the user about an intrusion or a suspicious event when it occurs in his 
system and to provide him with an appropriate response. 
The initial aim of designing the IDS challenge survey was discovering and identifying the other 
major IDS challenges apart of false positives, from a practitioner perspective. As it was 
anticipated that the false positive problem wi l l score the highest rate, as it is the most widely 
mentioned challenge in the IDS literature. Therefore, the research concern during designing the 
structure o f the survey was to confirm the priority o f the false positive challenge and to 
determine what is the next IDS challenging problems. The combination o f the highest 
challenges would be the basis of the future research. The findings of the survey did not exactly 
match the expectations, especially in the results related to the false positive challenge. 
However, the findings reveal and direct the attention to remarkable issue which is that the 
major correlation o f the top IDS challenges are the human-being side o f the security process. It 
is considered that solving and alleviating the impact o f these challenges wil l reduce the amount 
o f false positive. Therefore, the rest o f the study wi l l focus on integrating Human Computer 
Interaction (HCI) and Security. 
Observing the problem o f IDS in a workplace scenario i t would seem reasonable to suspect 
that the challenges facing end users in smaller organizations or even domestic scenarios 
(i.e. where no expert help is available) w i l l be even more acute. On this basis the research 
now moves to consider the usability issues that may exist in the security tools targeting 
these audiences. 
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Chapter 5 
Establishing Usability Criteria for End-User Security Tools 
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5. Establishing Usability Criteria for End-User Security 
Tools 
The previous chapter determined that the top IDS challenges are related to the human skills. 
Therefore, it is important to consider the security interfaces that are presented to end-users. 
Hence, to further explore the challenge at this level, this chapter focuses on home users and 
how could they manipulate with IDS alerts. The focus wi l l be on the Human Computer 
Interaction (HCI) and how it contributes in alleviating the IDS challenges encountered by 
end-users. The ultimate aim is to establish an adequate set o f design/evaluation criteria to 
develop enhanced security user interfaces that meet the security conditions; meanwhile 
matching the expectation o f a wide range o f end-users, from a security and usability 
perspective. It is anticipated that the novel criteria w i l l lead to better-designed user 
interfaces. The popularity o f the internet and all the services it provides has driven the 
demand for computers in the home. Unfortunately, these home users typically represent a 
group o f users who are generally poorly educated about the dangers and threats that exist 
when connected to the Internet. To this end, security vendors have provided a variety o f 
integrated security solutions that provide Anti-Virus, Firewalls and Intrusion Detection 
Systems to enable home users to become better protected. However, the need to rely upon 
users to make decisions about potential threats they have little or no information about is 
concerning at best. A n analysis o f user interfaces that relate to security have shown they 
frequently lack in providing usable interfaces that users are able to make informed 
decisions from (West, 2008). The aim o f the chapter is to support these home users by 
proposing a set o f novel design criteria to enable the development o f usable security alerts 
that are triggered by their security mechanisms. Drawing from literature, the criteria that 
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are proposed take into account the unique usability issues that exist when dealing with 
information security: explicit and useful information, the ability to make a timely response 
and a consistent presentation o f information. A walkthrough using a potentially problematic 
dialog from Norton 360 is used as a case study to highlight the current issues with the 
interfaces and to evaluate the proposed criteria. The findings o f the evaluation reveal that 
the novel criteria are promising and the assessment o f other security tools are required to 
make consistent and valuable recommendations. 
Sometimes end-users encounter usability problems while performing their normal computer 
tasks. Frequently, these problems are not in performing the primary intended tasks, but 
relate to alerts and warning messages triggered by other software, such as security tools. 
Arguably some novice users w i l l get annoyed, particularly in the case when the system is 
bombarding alerts at the them; which causes them to subsequently decide to uninstall the 
security software after a short time (i.e. hours or days) leaving them insecure (Herzog and 
Shahmehri, 2007), A significant inconvenience to the user is the inability to make an 
informed decision, with factors such as, lack o f security knowledge and poor interface 
design hindering the decision making process. This can result in them often guessing as to 
whether to allow or deny a particular alert or action. This problem is amplified because 
security notifications rarely form part o f the primary activity the user is engaging with on 
the system and are therefore merely considered an inconvenience. 
The ability to understand the alert notifications that many modem security applications use 
is no simple task. Prior research looking into what issues exist for commercial Intrusion 
Detection Systems identified skilled staff as a key element to an effective system, as shown 
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in Chapter 4. Obviously, however, the idea o f skilled staff within a home user context is 
simply not feasible. Therefore, it is imperative that security tools for home users must 
interface wi th the home user in such a manner to provide sufficient information for the user 
to make an informed decision in a timely manner but at the same time provide an interface 
that is friendly and usable. The purpose o f this chapter is to enhance the home user 
experience and provide the ability to deal with the security alerts effectively by proposing 
novel usability design criteria. 
5.1 Usability Criteria for End-User Security Tools 
This section focuses upon the related research including security criteria for designing a 
usable graphical user interface (GUI). Many studies have been completed in the field o f 
(HCI) and the use o f the term HCI is widely aligned with the term usability in the research 
discipline. Jacob Nielsen developed ten usability criteria which many subsequent studies 
have used as a basis o f their work (Nielson, 1994; Nielsen, 2005). Shneiderman and 
Plaisant (2005) presented a refined version o f eight usability criteria, based upon the 
authors experience over more than two decades. For the study purposes, the limitation o f 
both these studies is that they are general usability criteria and the authors did not consider 
the impact o f security in their design. Chiasson et al. (2006), Chiasson et al. (2007), 
Garfinkel (2005), Johnston et al. (2003), Whitten and Tygar (1999), Yee (2002) and Zhou 
et al. (2004), have all presented alternative guidelines that consider security. Whitten and 
Tygar (1999) seminal HCI-SEC paper ' W h y Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation 
o f PGP 5.O.' is considered to be one o f the most established studies in the usable security 
research area. They conducted a case study to evaluate the usability o f the email encryption 
by assessing the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). Another example is Johnston et. al. (2003) 
who developed a set o f six HCI criteria suitable for security and introduced a new term is 
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the usable security field, called HCI-S. The term was defined as, 'the part of a user 
interface which is responsible for establishing the common ground between a user and the 
security features of a system. HCI-S is human computer interaction applied in the area of 
computer security.' The authors kept the Visibility of the System Status criterion f rom 
(Nielsen, 2005) and appended a new criterion entitled Convey Features (which shows users 
the availability o f security features in the system, whereas the 'v is ib i l i ty ' o f features refers 
to their current status). Chiasson et al. (2007) in particular propose a set o f design 
guidelines for designing security management interfaces. Whilst the study looks to design 
them with respect to administrators they can be usefully applied to home-users. Herzog and 
Shahmehri (2007) proposed more sophisticated guidelines for applications that set a 
security policy. The authors are interested in the limitation o f some current security policies 
and the dif f icul ty that novice users encounter when using it; especially for the first time. 
Figure 43 summarizes some o f the well-known usability guidelines. 
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Based upon the prior literature, the fol lowing 16 guidelines were developed: 
1- Interfaces Design Matches User's Menial Model 
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The designer of alert interfaces should attempt to think as home-users to develop alert 
interfaces matches the users mental model. Initially, the user who receives a security alert wi l l 
need to know the name of the security tool which triggered that alert. The user also needs to 
know how to respond correctly to that alert as fast as possible. Finally, the user who failed to 
respond or/and could not understand the response options, w i l l need more help. In summary, 
the main interface of the alert should consist o f four sectors: the alert detector sector, the alert 
description sector, the alert response sector and the alert support sector. 
In general, the criteria of Chiasson et al. (2006), Chiasson et al. (2007), Herzog and Shahmehri 
(2007) Johnston et al. (2003), Nielsen (2005), Shneiderman and Plaisant (2005, Whitten and 
Tygar (1999) and Yee (2002) guides to the current criterion, Interfaces Design Matches User's 
Mental Model. 
2- Aesthetic and Minimalist Design 
Irrelevant or rarely needed information should not be displayed in the security alert. The alert 
interface design should determine the cause o f the alert and impose the available response 
options to support the user to respond effectively. Bombarding the user with a lot of 
information might distract the user and force him to react randomly, just to return back to the 
indented primary task. Some alert interfaces manage to have a minimalist design but they do 
not have an aesthetic design. The current criterion is quoted from Nielsen (2005). 
3- Vis ibi l i ty of the Alert Detector Name 
The appearance of the security tool name, which triggers the alert, is useful, specially, with the 
existence o f more than one installed security tool on the home-use machine. This feature might 
guide the user to adjust the security settings of this particular tool. The reader should notice that 
the current criterion is not the same as the Visibility of System Status (Nielsen, 2005) criterion 
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but perhaps a subset of it. Even though this criterion seems to be a subset o f criterion one, it 
was preferred to write it as a standalone criteria. 
4- Establish Standard Colours to Attract User Attention 
Users are most often attracted by the use o f colours in the interfaces. Therefore, it is very 
important to focus on the use o f colours as a major usability criterion. In general, the use o f red 
and yellow colours in security alert interfaces are fairly standard, for example, the red colour 
informs the user that the alert severity is high; while the (orange or yellow) colour informs the 
user that severity of the alert is low. Moreover, we can consider this criterion as a subset o f the 
Visibility of the System Status (Nielsen, 2005) criterion. 
5- Use Icons as Visual Indicators 
Users are most often affected by the use of pictures and icons in the interfaces. Therefore, it is 
very important to utilise this human feature to enhance the criteria. Muftoz-Arteaga et al. (2008) 
usefully utilised the image of the traffic light to declare the security situation. This also 
supports the previous criterion. Establish Standard Colours to Attract User Attention. Finally, 
we can describe the icon and the previous colour criteria together as an implementation o f the 
recognition feature from Recognition Rather than Recall guidelines (Nielsen, 2005). 
6- Explicit Words to Classify the Security Risk level 
The use of informative colours and icons, in the security alerts, to inform the user of the 
security risk level, as demonstrated in the previous two criteria, is excellent but not arguably 
enough. The user requires written confirmation of the security risk level and that information 
must be obvious in the main alert interface, not hidden in a secondary interface. 
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7- Consistent Meaningful Vocabulary and Terminology 
The alert sentence(s) should be simple, short and informative and the words used in these 
sentence(s) should be familiar to the user. It is recommended that security terms that some 
users might be not aware of, such as the term phish'mg attack should be avoided. Moreover, i f 
possible, it would be better that each alert sector consist only o f one sentence. However, the 
current criterion includes the main features of the Neilson criteria Match Between System and 
the Real World, Consistency and Standards and Aesthetic and Minimalist Design. Moreover, 
the current criterion is similar to the criterion strive for consistency within Shneiderman and 
Plaisant (2005). 
8- Consistent Controls and Placement 
Users need to be able to fmd the security features they need in an appropriate location and in a 
reasonable time. Buttons are one of the most common user controls that are provided in 
interfaces. Unfortunately, in some security tools the appearance of these buttons reflects the 
existence o f a poor design, at least from a usability perspective. For example. Allow and Block 
buttons exists in some security alerts without providing the user with any clue about the impact 
o f this selection (i.e. the allowance or the blocking might be permanent or temporary). 
Therefore, this sort of information should be designed explicitly in the screen to give the user 
more control and freedom. 
9- Learnability, Flexibility and Efficiency of Use 
The security alert should be flexible and efficient to use, and enhance the user ability to leam 
the required security basics. The current criterion stresses on the use o f explanatory tooltips for 
concepts or/and security terms which appears in the alert window to enhance the system 
flexibility, while providing links to access a built-in library or/and an Intemet web page, in 
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some other cases to increase the system efficiency. Leamability is an explicit criterion within 
Johnston etal. (2003). 
10- Take Advantage of Previous Security Decisions 
This criterion consists of two parts as follows: 
o The home user alert history: only the user*s previous experience with the alert: The user 
deserves to obtain information about the triggered alert. This information reports 
whether this type of alert has occurred before or not, and how the user previously 
reacted to it. The use of simple statistics which summarize this information wi l l also be 
very helpful for the user in the decision making process. Moreover, these statistics 
should also be available to the user to give them the chance to investigate later, to 
evaluate the effect o f his decision. 
o Social feedback: other home-users previous experience with the alert: Develop a 
process by where users are able to benefit from other users' experiences. For instance, a 
security software database could receive reports o f the user responses for every alert 
generated in the home user's machines. A l l users should have access to that database as 
soon as one of these alerts is triggered in the user machine. The existence of the 
criterion increases the home-user iearnability, one of Johnston et al. (2003) HCI-S 
criteria. Moreover, the criterion is an enhancement of (Nielsen, 2005) Help Users 
Recognize, Diagnose, and Recover from Errors criterion. 
11- Online Security Policy Configuration 
The security tool designers should develop an efficient default configuration for the security 
policy. The aim of the criterion is in guiding the user to adjust the security settings to avoid, i f 
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possible, any conflict between the intended primary tasks and the security configuration (i.e. for 
instance, to avoid the triggering of frequently low level security alerts). It is anticipated that the 
current criterion would enhance (Johnston et al. 2003) HCI-S criterion Convey Features, 
12- Conf i rm / Recover the Impact of User Decision 
The security alert interfaces should be designed carefully to prevent home user errors. 
Sometimes, user errors are inevitable and vary from simple mistakes to dangerous errors, as 
follows: 
• The user might press a button or click a link unintentionally by mistake. 
• The user might respond randomly to the security alert and feels later that he/she made a 
mistake. 
• The user decision might have an unanticipated impact on the configuration. 
• The user decision might have a vital impact that seriously affects the security of the 
machine. 
Therefore, the user should receive a confirmation message after performing any response which 
wi l l affect the security o f the system. The confirmation message should contain information 
about the possible impact o f the decision. This facility gives the user the chance to recover the 
error, modify the response, extract a rough evaluation o f the reaction and make a more 
informed decision. Moreover, the current criterion, to some extent, match Nielsen (2005) 
criterion Help users recognize, diagnose, and recover from errors, 
13- Awareness of System Status all the Time 
The user deserves to obtain a simple report declaring the state of the system as a result o f the 
home user response to the alert. This report could be raised immediately after the user responds 
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to the security alert or/and could be saved, where the user can access it after performing his 
intended task. 
14- Help Provision and Remote Technical Support 
The security alert should be designed to let the users be seif-sufilcient; however, some wi l l still 
require further support. Tools should therefore provide built-in help and remote technical 
support. In this chapter the term "help" means providing the user with extra information at the 
time of the alert and advice on an appropriate response. In practice, information in the 
accompanying help is not always sufficient to enable the user to respond correctly. Therefore, 
they can use the "remote technical support" facility as a final attempt to solve the security 
problem via support from the security vendor. The current criterion, to some extent is similar to 
Nielsen (2005) criterion Help and documentation. 
15- OfTer Responses that Match User Expectations 
Home-users usually make security decisions based upon factors such as the security alert 
feedback, the response options available, and their own hypothesis of the impact that the 
response would have. However, the actual impact o f the available alert responses options does 
not always match the user's expectation. Therefore, good alert design is not only what is 
required to obtain a secure system but also to ensure the user's correct comprehension and 
understanding. 
16- Trust and Satisfaction 
Home-users typically trust the security tool on their computers until the occurrence of a 
performance failure. Unfortunately, the lack of understanding or/and the inability o f some 
home-users to react correctly to some alerts can have a strong influence on the trust or/and 
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satisfaction factors. In some cases, such events might lead them to improve their security 
knowledge (i.e. they still trust the security tool), but others might prefer to uninstall the 
software and thereby avoid further inconvenience. 
Proposed Criteria 
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1 Design Interfaces Match User Mental Model • • - • • • • • • 
2 Aesthetic and minimalist desiqn - • - • • • • - • 
3 Visibility of the Alert Detector Name - - - • - • • - -
4 Establish standard colours to attract user attention • • - -
5 Use icons as visual indicators - - - • • • • - -
6 Explicit Words to Classify the Security Risk level - - - • - - - - • 
7 Consistent Meaninqful Vocabulary and terminology - - • - • • • - • • 
8 Consistent Controls and Placement - - • - - - • - • 
9 Learnabillty. Flexibility and Effldency of Use - - - • • • • - - • 
10 Take Advantage of Previous Security Decisions - • 
11 Online Security Policy Configuration - • • • - - - - • 
12 Confirm / Recover the impact of User Decision • - • - • • • 
13 Awareness of System Status all the Time • - - • • • - • • 
14 Help Provision and Remote Technical Support - - - - • • - - • 
15 Offer Responses Match User Expectations • • • - - - • - • 
16 Trust and Satisfaction • - - - • - • • -
Table 5: Comparing the proposed criteria against existing usability guidelines 
Table 5 presents a comparison between the proposed criteria and some established usability 
guidelines (note: the guidelines are referenced via the names o f lead authors listed in the 
References section, with a year added in cases where multiple papers from an author have 
been listed). The main purpose o f this comparison is to demonstrate the real-world 
requirement to develop usability criteria specifically for security alerts. The findings 
suggest that the criteria have a role to play, in the sense that no individual example from the 
established guidelines covers the fu l l range o f issues. The current criterion match to some 
extent Johnston et al. (2003) criterion Satisfaction. 
5.2 Assessing Alerts in Practice 
This section presents a detailed assessment o f a typical security alert, and a walkthrough o f 
the process that a user might take in order to understand it. The example is taken from 
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Norton 360; a package that is widely recognized and popular among end-users. The choice 
is not intended to imply that Norton 360 usability is worse than others in its class, and 
indeed it has actually scored highly on ease o f use in comparative evaluations (Which, 
2009). Therefore, it is expected some of the limitations mentioned here might also exist in 
some other well-known products. Indeed, the Norton case represents one example from a 
wider study being undertaken by the authors, and is intended to be illustrative o f the 
problems that can be encountered in practice rather than being presented as a significant 
finding in its own right. 
The analysis presented here uses a simple alert that many users would have encountered. 
Having installed Mozilla Firefox and started the application for the fist time, an alert 
appeared, as illustrated in Figure 44. This is a trivial case compared to others that might 
occur, but is notable in that it may still confuse some users (particularly novices), and cause 
them to devote time to an event that actually would not cause any harm to their system. 
I Norton 360 Alert 
Hctn Suppon 
A pfOfpam Is anef nptbig to a c c e s s the tntei I K I 
Should Norton 360 allow this access? 
ShowDewil? 
Figure 44: A real example of Norton 360 security alert 
The events and thought processes from this point are documented from the perspective o f the 
user. The first comment is that the main interface provides no information about the cause o f 
the alert and there are no explanatory tooltips (the cause was relatively obvious in this case, 
because the user had intentionally launched Firefox immediately beforehand, but other cases 
102 
may be less clearcut). Arguably therefore, the main interface of the alert did not achieve the 
Learnability, Flexibility and Efficiency of Use criterion. Moreover, it is clear that the user's 
mental model was not completely considered during designing o f this alert. 
Assuming that the user decides to read the rest of the content (rather than investigating the Help 
and Support links), the alert wording is direct and simple, which satisfies the proposed seventh 
criterion. The user can assume that the exclamation mark icon and the yellow colour indicate 
only a warning case, which increases assurance that there is no high risk. This confirms the 
importance the proposed fourth and f i f th criteria Establish Standard Colours to Attract User 
Attention and Use Icons as Visual Indicators, respectively. Nonetheless, the summary view of , 
the alert did not mention explicitly, by words, the risk level status, which represents a design 
limitation, from the usability perspective. 
At this stage, the user has a general idea about the alert and is presented with an explicit 
question, "Should Norton 360 allow this access? " (consequently managing to mention Norton 
360 for a third time in the same dialog, while other relevant information is missing). The user 
may assume that the Show Details link w i l l give more guidance about how to respond, but this 
actually reveals more details about the cause of the alert (see Figure 45). This consequently 
reveals a minor conflict with the Consistent Controls and Placement criterion, as the link has 
been placed at a point in the dialog where the user is making a response rather than 
understanding the alert. 
Looking at the consequence of selecting Show Details (Figure 45), it can be noted that all of the 
terms are mentioned without any further links. The user can now see the Name of the 
executable program that raised the alert, and the related Path. Moreover, further down the list, 
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the user is given an explicit indication of the Risk Level. However, o f the eight items listed, 
these are likely to be the only ones that wi l l be meaningful to a wider audience. The inability to 
get any further description (e.g. via tooltips) wi l l mean that many users are confused rather than 
informed by items such as the Remote t/r/. Protocol and Direction. No links in the Show 
Details interface is a remarkable limitation. In fact, even items such as the Name could merit 
further assistance. While the user might well be expected to recognise it in this example, other 
cases may not be so readily obvious and having a lookup to reference the names of known 
applications could be beneficial. 
©Norton 360 
Norton 360 Alert 
H«tp Support 
A ptooram Is anemjitbQ to access t i n biteinet 
Should No/ton 360 allowiWs access? 
Hi'JePgtg'is 
Name: flrefm 
Path: CltProgram FitesUtozilta FtreftDAfliefaxeis 
LotalUH: 192.168.1.110:1358 
Remote Urt: 74.12579.103:80 
PnDtocol: TCP ^ 
©.Norton 360 
Norton 360 Alert 
Hetp Support 
A pf ogiani is aneinptkid to access the fmettiet 
Should Norton 360 allow this access? 
"Remote Ui i : 74.125J9lO3fi0" Ul 
Protocol: TCP 
Direction: Outbound 
Alert Type: IP 
Rtsk Level: Low 
Figure 45: The expanded view of the alert, having selected the Show Details link 
Let US assume the user felt stuck at this point, and still wanted to obtain more information about 
exactly what was causing the alert. The use of Norton 360 Help is shown in Figure 46. The user 
wrote the terms Firefox and firefox.exe separately in the Index but failed to provide any result. 
Next, the user wrote the same terms in the Search but the user did not find any useful 
information. 
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IE 
Figure 46: Norton 360 Help 
Trying another route, the user may select the Support option from Figure 44. Selecting Search 
Solution Library yields the dialog shown on the right hand side of the Figure 47. Once again 
the user typed the term Firefox^ the results focused upon the cause of the alert but only 
indicated Internet Explorer web browser and requested the user to check whether it is the 
default web browser or not. Hence, the user may assume that the cause of the alert was related 
to a default web browser issue, which is a computer setting rather than a security issue. 
N o r t o n 360 ' Support 
w « i c o m » to Support 
o n n ^ m m w m c n e « n M w««Ari m 
m s M n v ( w t e n i a . 
O u K k k n M to • asy I 
Norton 3GO Support 
Figure 47: Norton 360 Support - main interface and search 
From this point, the user only has one further line of investigation within the tool; namely to 
select the Contact us link shown at the bottom of Figure provide the user with three options to 
obtain Norton technical support; live chat, e-mail and phone calls, as shown in Figure 48. 
Although each of these are likely to yield a satisfactory result (especially in the case of this 
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specific example), it seems a rather long way for the user to have to go in order to obtain a 
fairly baseline level of clarification. 
Norton 3GO Support 
Figure 48: Norton 360 Contact us 
The findings of this walkthrough suggest that some home-users who receive such alerts wi l l 
require more help. The alert dialog provides three options which are Help, Support and Show 
Details. Unfortunately, they do not provide the user with the sort o f information that might 
support a decision (for instance, there are no tooltips or links to more information). We applied 
the proposed criteria on this example and summarised the findings in Table 6. 
No Novel Criteria Evaluation 
1 
Design Interfaces Match User Mental Model Yes to some extent (the interface consists of the 
suggested four sectors but the contents does not match 
the user mental model) 
2 Aesthetic and Minimalist Design Yes (minimalist, but not aesthetic) 
3 Visibility of the Alert Detector Name Yes 
4 Establish Standard Colours to Attract User 
Attention 
Yes (e.g. Yellow - Low Risk Severity) 
5 Use Icons as Visual Indicators Yes (e.g. exclamation mark = Warning) 
6 
Explicit Words to Classify the Security Risk 
level 
Yes but in a secondary interface 
7 
Consistent Meaningful Vocabulary and 
Terminology 
Yes 
8 
Consistent Controls and Placement Yes (but there is no indication of whether the effects of 
selecting an option are permanent or temporary) 
9 Leamability, Flexibility and Efficiency of Use No (no tooltips or links to web sites) 
10 
Take Advantage of Previous Security 
Decisions 
No 
11 Online Security Policy Configuration No 
12 Confirm / Recover the Impact of User Decision No 
13 Awareness of System Status all the Time 
No (Norton 360 provides only a general status for the 
whole system) 
14 Help Provision and Remote Technical Support Yes ("Help" is not useful & ''Support" is useful but 
time-consuming and sometimes costs money) 
15 Offer Responses Match Expectations No 
16 Trust and Satisfaction Medium 
Table 6: Evaluating a real Norton 360 security alert using the proposed criteria 
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As an example of the proposed criteria in use, Figure 49 represents the same alert with some 
simple modification. The design helps the user to follow the scenario o f the alert from the top 
to the bottom without distracting him to look at every single location in the security interface 
all the time. The user wi l l be able to scan the alert without the need to go backward and forward 
to be sure that the user did not miss vital information. It is also worth mentioning that the alert 
was not overly serious in this example and the user was almost aware o f what caused the alert. 
The user was not performing an important or an urgent task. The user was therefore not 
panicked and had the opportunity to investigate and confirm what had caused the alert and how 
to respond to it. The reader can imagine how painful the case would be i f the user receives an 
alert, has no basis to understand what triggered it and does not have the time to investigate it. 
®.Horlon360 
Norton 360 Alert 
A pi OQt dm is ancmptmg to access U« imcifiet; 
ShouM rtorton 360 altowthts access? 
Figure 49: A simple modification on Norton 360 security alert 
The proposed alert, in Figure 49, enhanced the original alert in at least two criteria Design 
Interfaces Match User Mental Model and Consistent Controls and Placement. The 
enhancement occurred by locating the Help and Support at the bottom o f the alert interface, 
this location is better because the user w i l l reach the help button after investigating the alert 
dialog which match the mental model for an average user. Moreover, the current design 
claims that Show Details location is in an appropriate place in which asking the user to 
know more information about the program that is attempting to access the Internet, perform 
a response. Meanwhile, the location o f Allow and Block buttons next to the question o f 
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allowing the access is more appropriate and better than locating them at the bottom of the 
alert interface. 
5.3 Conclusions 
Home users require an efficient security tool to protect them. Unfortunately, the analysis 
performed in this study has illustrated that the interfaces provided by such tools are not always 
sufficient to enable users to make intelligent and informed decisions. The criteria developed in 
this chapter are an attempt to rectify the problem; utilising existing HCI based design criteria 
and applying them specifically to the problem of security software. The Norton 360 example 
illustrates the nature of the problems that can be encountered, even in the case of a baseline, 
low risk alert. 
The proposed criteria were deduced by investigating the established usability criteria in 
mentioned the above literature and including the personal opinion as well. First, the research 
started with focusing on the literature, then subjective analysis against a well-known security 
product (i.e. Norton 360) and finally examined a list o f security products in the next chapter. 
Additional research wil l be undertaken to validate the proposed criteria, through focussing upon 
a number of security interfaces across the most common security tools. Using this evaluation, 
the criteria wi l l be re-evaluated and subsequently applied to software to ensure they are 
appropriate and robust criteria to be utilised more widely within the security industry for 
designing systems. 
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Chapter 6 
Assessing the Usability of End-Users Security Tools 
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6 A s s e s s i n g the Usability of E n d - U s e r s Secur i ty T o o l s 
Home users are more vulnerable to Intemet threats than those who work in organizations. Most 
home-users know to install anti-virus (AV) and today most home-user security products come 
in the form of an Intemet security tool that combines several countermeasures in one. From a 
previous study we have determined that commercial security products can suffer from a 
usability perspective, lacking the necessary attention to design in relation to the security alert 
interface. Therefore, the aim of the chapter is to assess the usability of alerts in the some of the 
leading Intemet security packages, based upon a related set of usability criteria. The findings 
reveal that the interface design combined with the home user's relative lack of security 
knowledge are two major challenges that influence their decision making process. The analysis 
of the alert designs showed that four of the criteria are not addressed in any of the selected 
security measures and it would be desirable to consider the user's previous decisions on similar 
alerts, and modify alerts accordingly to the user's previous behaviour. 
Network security experts are aware of the risk that home users encounter during network 
connection sessions. For instance, the Symantec Intemet Security Threat Report reveals that 
during the first half of 2007, 95% of Intemet attacks were directed towards home-users 
(Symantec, 2007). Therefore, expert's recommendations always aim to convince home-users to 
install effective security solutions. For several years, home users could rely upon basic anti-
vims (AV) as a sufficient security tool, at least from the home-users perspective. Unfortunately, 
standalone A V is no longer enough to protect end-users from security threats (House o f Lords, 
2007). Therefore, the deployment o f other advanced solutions such as Firewalls, Intmsion 
Detection Systems (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) becomes more necessary. 
Meanwhile, the management and manipulation o f these types o f security solutions usually 
requires an appropriate and high level of IT literacy and security knowledge, which is likely to 
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be unavailable for the majority of home-users. The findings of Chapter 4 validate the 
requirement for high skilled staff to mange IDS in organizations, and it can easily be 
recognized that home users w i l l face more diff iculty in this respect. I n recent years, security 
vendors have moved towards integrated A V , firewall and IDS tools, which are commonly 
marketed as Mntemet Security' solutions (Lai and Wren, 2009). However, although the 
combination o f tools can provide users with a convenient and comprehensive solution, this does 
not necessarily guarantee attention to improving the usability. Chapter 5 proposed a set of 
novel HCI-S usability criteria and applied them to the evaluation o f a typical alert raised by 
Norton 360. Even from a single example, this served to highlight a number of potential 
usability issues, and was considered sufficient to justify a wider evaluation o f other tools 
against the same criteria. The current chapter therefore investigates and assesses the usability of 
security alert across a wider range of end-user security software. 
6,1 Assessing Security Tools Alerts 
This section outlines the selection of the Internet Security tools against which the usability 
criteria were applied, along with the method by which the tools themselves were tested in order 
to generate the required security alerts. To my knowledge there is no similar HCI-S case study 
for comparison. 
6.1.1 Tool selection 
Having already identified Norton 360 as part o f the eariier study, a further nine popular Internet 
Security suites were selected in order to establish a wider basis for evaluation. The selections 
were made on the basis of products recommended in a related review (Top Security Software, 
2009), plus the addition of products f rom F-Secure and Kaspersky (which are also popular 
options within the home and small business user communities). A further criterion was that 
each product should incorporate an intrusion detection or/and prevention capability (so as to 
provide the capability to detect the type o f attack to which it would be exposed). 
The resulting list of tools was as follows (noting that free trial versions were used in some 
cases): 
• BitDefender Internet Security 2009 
• CA Internet Security Suite Plus 2009 
• F-Secure Internet Security 2009 
• Kaspersky Intemet Security 2009 
• McAfee Intemet Security 2009 
• Norton 360 Version 2.0 
• Panda Intemet Security 2009 
• Security Shield 2009 
• Trend Micro's Intemet Security Pro 2009 
• Webroot's Intemet Security Essentials 
The resulting set is considered to represent a sufficient and a real sample of the available 
security measures within the market. However, it should be noted at this point that the aim of 
the evaluation (and indeed this chapter) is not to identify the best product, but rather to 
determine the extent to which usability issues can be identified across a wider base of software. 
6.1.2 Alert generation 
Network scanning represents the initial step in many types of network intmsions, penetrations 
and attacks (Bamett and Irwin 2008). Attackers use the obtained information about the targets, 
such as the operating system and the open ports, to launch the subsequent attack, which then 
has higher possibility of success without being detected. Many tools can be used to perform 
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network scanning, for instance Nessus (2010) and Nmap (2010), which are two of the top 
network assessment tools. This study adopts the default profiles o f Nmap command lines 
within Zenmap GUI (2010) to investigate the design of the alert interfaces that are triggered as 
a consequence of the scanning techniques. The evaluation experiments were held in a closed 
test bed environment consisting of two computers running Windows XP. Scanning processes 
were performed from the attacker computer running Zenmap GUI against the victim computer 
running the candidate security products. Table 7 illustrates the Zenmap GUI profiles and the 
correspondence Nmap command lines that are tested. 
Zenmap GUI Profile Nmap Command Line 
I Intense scan nmap -PE -PA21,23,80.3389 -A -v -T4 192.168.1.146 
2 Intense scan plus UDP nmap -PE -v -PA21,23.80.3389 -sU -A -T4 192.168.1.146 
3 Intense scan, all T C P ports nmap -PE -v -p 1 -65535 -PA21 ^ 3.80.3389 -A -T4 192.168.1.146 
4 Intense scan, no ping nmap-A - v - P N - T 4 I92.I68.1.I46 
5 Ping scan nmap -PE -PA21,23,80,3389 -sP 192.168.1.146 
6 Quick scan nmap-T4-F 192.168.1.146 
7 Quick scan plus nmap-T4 -version-liftht -sV - F - O 192.168.1.146 
8 Quick Iraceroute nmap -p22,23.25,80,3389 -traceroute -PN 192.168.1.146 
9 Regular scan nmap 192.168.1.146 
10 Slow comprehensive scan nmap - P E -v -PS21,22,23,25,80,113,31339 -scripi=all -PO -
PA80,113,443,10042 -sU -PP -A -T4 192.168.1.146 
Table 7: Zenmap G U I profiles and the associated Nmap command lines 
6.2 Analysis of End-Users Security Alerts According to HCI-S 
Criteria 
During the evaluation alerts were generated by all of the tools apart from McAfee Intemet 
Security 2009, which did not issue any visible responses to the scanning attempts (note: this is 
not to suggest that they were undetected, but rather that the user was not explicitly notified in 
real-time). The reason behind McAfee's behavior is beyond the aim of the research in this 
chapter and the variety of alerts generated via the other security products satisfies the aim of the 
study in this section. Indeed, the attempts to scan the victim computer in the test bed generated 
several types of alerts. The rest of the section focuses upon analyzing some key examples of 
these, according to the HCI-S usability criteria from Chapter 5. Rather than commenting 
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extensively against each tool, the discussion is structured according to the criteria headings, 
with examples being drawn from across the tools to illustrate significant issues. 
6.2.1 Interface Design Matches User's Mental Model 
Of the tools that explicitly notified the user o f detecting a suspicious activity, all but Webroot's 
issued a response to the intrusion on behalf o f the user. As shown in Figure 50, Webroot's was 
the only alert that did not provide the user with any explicit words to indicate whether the 
product had managed to handle the detected intrusion or not, nor give the user any further 
interaction options. 
Firewall Alert 
Firewall has detected an XMAS scan, 
Firewall Alert 
Firewall has detected an NULL scan. 
Figure 50: Webroot's Internet Security Essentials alert interfaces 
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Figure 51: Norton 360 interactive alert interface 
It is likely that alerts issued to home-users would be more usable through the occurrence o f a 
user response sector in the bottom of the alert interface. For instance, Norton 360 (i.e. Figure 
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51) and Trend Micro are considered to be the only two products that match the current criterion 
as they implicitly identified that the perceived intrusion access is blocked and provides a user 
response sector consists basically of an Allow and Block buttons. Hence, the user has the benefit 
o f both the automatic security response and the user feature to adjust and/or confirm the 
response. 
By contrast. Figure 52 illustrates a different example of Norton's alert interface which does not 
match the mental model criterion because the alert does not include a description of the cause 
o f the alert, or any links or tooltips to provide the user with more information. 
Q} Norton 360 
Norton 360 blocked oh intrusion attempt; 
Portsark 
Figure 52: Norton 360 notification intrusion alert 
6.2.2 Aesthetic and Minimalist Design 
It is desirable that the design of the alerts should be aesthetic and minimalist. However in some 
cases they are too minimalist, with examples from Security Shield and BitDefender shown in 
Figure 53. In these cases the source of the intrusion should be identified to the novice in a 
more meaningful manner (as they are unlikely to be greatly informed by the IP address), the is 
could take place by adding a tooltip identifying the meaning of the IP address to novice user, 
whereas more informed users may be interested in additional options (such as the opportunity 
to suppress further notifications). 
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Security Shield 2009 
2^ Portscan blocked 
^ Rom: 192.168.1.119>' " . 
Your ccmpiAet ha> been rrfoteaed! 
BitDefender 
J ^ Portscan Mocked 
>V' From: 192.168.1.119 • , ' 
Yair computei has been piotected! 
Figure 53: Security Shield & BitDefender alerts interfaces 
6.2.3 Visibility of the Alert Detector Name 
With the exception of Webroot, all o f the security tools provide the name of the detector in the 
head of their alert interfaces. Instead of indicating the name of the product suite (i.e. the thing 
that the user may most likely recall installing or recognise that they are running), Webroot's 
alert is attributed to the firewall, as shown in Figure 50. Of course, many of the Internet 
security suites consist o f integrated security solutions based on underlying components such as 
anti-virus, anti-spyware and firewall, and so it is perhaps not surprising that alerts appear under 
the name of these components rather than that of the wider suite. However, it would still be 
useful for the vendor name to appear so that the user has a basis for making the association 
back to the product they recognise. This, for example, is the approach with the CA product, 
where rather than indicating *CA Internet Security Suite Plus' the alert identifies 'CA Personal 
Firewall', as shown in Figure 54. From the current criterion perspective, the advantage o f the 
CA alert is that the name of the vendor is visible to the user, whereas in the Webroot alert the 
vendor name is completely absent. The problem with the rather anonymous alerts shown in 
Figure 50 is that the user may wonder i f they were caused by something else (e.g. issued by the 
Windows firewall or faked by malware). 
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Figure 54: CA alerts interfaces 
6.2.4 Establish Standard Colours to Attract User Attention 
The use o f standard colours to express information to home-users in a simple and rapid way 
should be considered and addressed better to improve the design o f home-users alerts. With the 
exception o f the traffic light colours, there are almost no other standard colours to represent the 
alert severity. Therefore, most likely, the use of the green colour indicates that the system status 
is secure, the use o f the yellow colour indicates a low risk level and the red colour indicates a 
high risk level. The methods for adopting colours to support the message of the alert vary 
among the evaluated products such as the colours within icons, the border and the background 
colours. For instance, Norton 360 and F-Secure used yellow in the exclamation icon to indicate 
the risk level of the detected activity. In contrast. Panda used the red colour within the 'No 
Entry* symbol to indicate that an intrusion attempt is blocked. However, it is noticed that the 
border colour of most of the studied alerts are blue apart o f Norton and Webroot's that are 
yellow and green, respectively. The use o f the blue border could be significant in case that 
these products are adapting a standard colour-coding such as the Homeland Security Advisory 
System (HSAS), where a wider range of colours are adopted (i.e. green, blue, yellow, orange, 
or red) to determine the severity of the threat level (Siraj and Vaughn, 2007). Finally, despite 
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Webroot's serious alert limitations (as it does not use any explicit words to determine what 
happen after the detection o f the scan activity), it is arguable that the green colour provides a 
secure impression to the home-user. Therefore, it is recommended to design home-users alerts 
that have an appropriate border colour as an indicator to the threat level, and to avoid 
insignificant and misleading ones. 
6.2.5 Use Icons as Visual Indicators 
The use o f icons as visual indicators should be essential, relevant and significant. Likely, home-
users receive the primary alert message through the colours and icons. Then, the message 
requires explicit words within the alert interface to confirm the acquired message. For instance, 
both F-Secure and Norton 360 (i.e. Figure 51) use an exclamation mark icon as a visual 
indicator to indicate an intrusion attempt. Most likely, the yellow colour used within the icons 
indicates a low threat level. Unlike F-secure, Norton 360 alert confirms that indication 
explicitly through assigning Risk Level: Low within a secondary alert interface. Meanwhile, 
Panda does not use the exclamation icon but instead it uses the 'No Entry' symbol aligned with 
a padlock icon, as shown in Figure 55, to indicate that an intrusion attempt is detected and 
blocked. However, it is suggested to deploy appropriate icons that does not contradict criterion 
4, Establish Standard Colours to Attract User Attention. Furthermore, Security Shield, 
BitDefender and Trend Micro, use the information mark icon at the top-lift o f the main alert 
interface. Arguably, there is no significant benefit from using this icon as an indicator. 
Therefore, it is recommended not to use unnecessary icons that contradicts criterion 2; Aesthetic 
and Minimalist Design. 
The former metaphors demonstrate several instances o f accommodating icons on the top-left o f 
the main alert interface. Icons could also be located in other position within the alert, CA uses 
the question mark icon aligned with the word Help as an indicator. The accommodation of the 
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icon at the bottom of the alert should be relevant as the home-user already scanned the alert 
content and hence the user might seek for help. Unfortunately, the result of the Help link is not 
as expected because the link provides no specific information relevant to the present alert. 
Hence, as although having such a visual indicator could be useful for the user, it could also be 
misleading. Finally, as shown in Figure 55, Panda is the only product that uses nvo methods for 
deploying icons in the alert interface; the information mark icon is used within the content of 
the alert next to the technical term Denial of Service to indicate that there is more information i f 
required. The use of this icon is relevant and it would be more usable i f the icon colour is more 
visible such as blue. 
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Figure 55: Panda Internet Security 2009 alert interfaces and tooltips 
6.2.6 Explicit Words to Classify the Security Risk Level 
This criterion identifies one of the remarkable limitations within the design of the studied alerts. 
With the exception of Norton and Trend Micro, none of the evaluated products explicitly 
classify the security risk level. Norton 360 (i.e. Figure 51) determined the security risk level 
information in a complementary interface. The information is obtained through selecting the 
Show Details link within the main alert interface and the security risk level is declared as Risk 
Level: Low. Meanwhile, Trend Micro is more explicit by determining the security risk level in 
the main alert interface as the Risk is declared to be Safe. However, assigning the risk in the 
current alert to be 'safe' raises a question of the benefit of issuing the alert in the first place. 
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From the usability perspective, addressing the optimal location for assigning the security risk 
level is required. Therefore, it is recommended to present the risk level explicitly in the alert 
main interface, and then offer the associated reason for assigning this classification within a 
secondary interface. 
6.2,7 Consistent Meaningful Vocabulary and Terminology 
In general, the sentence(s) in most o f the security alerts are simple and short, but there is no 
guarantee that the words used in these sentence(s) are familiar to the user. For instance. Panda 
used the term 'denial o f service' in the main alert interface aligned with a tooltip, but the 
provided information is neither a description nor a definition for the technical term. Firstly, as 
most o f the products make security decisions on behalf o f the user, the user's main concern is 
likely to be whether the product that raised the alert has managed to deal with the problem or 
not. The words 'denied' and 'protected' are used in a few alert interfaces to describe the 
product's response, but the most dominant word is 'blocked' (as in ^Intrusion attempt 
blockedr) and the use o f the exclamation mark at the end of the sentence to emphasize the 
content is pleasant. However, the methodology of locating the former instance as the first 
sentence in the alert body content as shown in Figure 55, would satisfy an amount o f novice 
users who might decide not to run through the rest of the alert. In contrast, BitDefender and 
Security Shield alerts use the sentence 'Your computer has been protected!' to emphasize that 
the product had successfully protected the user from a security threat but the location o f the 
sentence was in the bottom of the alert. Secondly, the focus of analyzing this criterion was upon 
assessing the terminology within the alerts that requires the user interaction. It was found that 
the terminology within those alerts. Trend Micro's and Norton 360 (i.e. Figure 51 ) , does not 
impede the home-user from making a security decision. Finally, from a scientific perspective, 
CA as shown in Figure 54 is the only product which does not completely satisfy the current 
criterion mainly because it is strange that the victim IP address is classified as a remote address 
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in the alert interface (i.e. a serious mistake), while the attacker is classified correctly as a 
remote address within the Log Viewer o f the product. 
6.2.8 Consistent Controls and Placement 
Most o f the alert interfaces do not supply users with explicit control features. F-Secure provides 
buttons that enable the home-user to investigate the alert. Meanwhile, the alert interfaces 
generated from Norton 360 (i.e. Figure 51) and Trend Micro consists of feasible control 
components located at the bottom of the alert interface. The location o f the response buttons 
(Allow and Block) is appropriate as a logical assumption that the user reaches the buttons after 
running out through the alert content. The main limitation o f these buttons is that there is no 
indication o f whether the impact of the user action is temporary or permanent. One solution 
could be appending another two buttons to alert design and assign explicitly the impact on the 
buttons such as Allow Once and Allow Always. A further solution is to make benefit of criterion 
5, Use Icons as Visital Indicators, and criterion 9, Learnability, Flexibility and Efficiency of 
Use, via appending a small information mark icon next to each button and that icon access an 
explanatory tooltip that clarify the impact o f the button. 
6.2.9 Learnability, Flexibility and Efficiency of Use 
The use o f explanatory tooltips for concepts that appears in the alert window and/or the 
adoption o f links to Internet web page are rare among the evaluated security alerts. For 
instance, the Panda alert interfaces from Figure 55 include the terms 'Port scan' and 'Denial of 
service', both of them are linked with an explanatory tooltips but neither of them provides 
detailed information o f the nature of the attack and instead o f that they determine the protocol, 
the remote IP address and the ports used in the attack. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 56, 
Kaspersky includes the link View report within the bottom of the main alert interface, but 
the report does not provide the user with extra information and the report only includes the 
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same information of the main alert in a more organized style. The alert interfaces of Kaspersky 
and Panda share the same feature of having a drop list in the title bar at the top-right of the 
main alert interface. Kaspersky provides the user with a drop list consists o f three options 
Disable this notification. Disable all notifications and Settings.... Meanwhile, Panda's list 
consists of two elements. Help and Non-serious message settings, with the Help option guiding 
the user to access a general built-in help and its introductory interface explains that the 
intrusion attempt is blocked via the built-in firewall. Therefore, relocating these features from 
the drop list to a better location within the alert interface (such as the bottom o f the alert) would 
be more visible and useful. 
K a s p e r » k y . Internet 'Securi ty, 
KehwfcattacfcScar.Generfc.TCP: TCP from 192.168.1.119 to 
bed port ^899. &o&cd. Attoddng computer has been btocfced. 
^ V i e w r e p o r t 
. ' You a re ustrtg a t r i a l ve rskm. '' 
I t is recommended t o nurchiKe a commerc in l version. 
Figure 56: Kaspersky Internet Security alert interface 
6.2.10 Take Advantage of Previous Security Decisions 
While all of the previous criteria were addressed by at least some of the evaluated security 
alerts, none of the products explicitly enabled users to leverage previous decisions to help them 
cope with the current alert. Therefore, the focus is upon assessing the alerts that required the 
user interaction such as Trend Micro's and Norton 360 (i.e. Figure 51). These products do not 
impede the home-user from making a security decision as the products already perform a 
blocking decision, identify the security risk level and provide response buttons. The novice user 
who does not have an experience with the cause o f the present alert and does not have any 
further advice to call upon might find it more secure to implement the alert default response as 
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these products did not specify any explicit recommendation to follow, such as accompanying 
the Block button with the word (recommended).Therefore, it is worth establishing an alert 
history that stores the user's previous decisions, to provide a source of reference i f a similar 
alert arises in the future. Furthermore, it is suggested that the use of the social navigation 
method (Chiasson et al. 2007), would enrich the alert and to some extent support the user. 
Social navigation is considered to be a promising method in guiding novice users to make 
security decisions based on relevant individual decisions from those who have previously 
encountered similar alerts in their own environments. 
6.2.11 Online Security Policy Configuration 
This criterion is interested with integrating security policy features within the design of the alert 
itself. There are some attempts to provide this feature within some of the evaluated security 
products. For instance, CA and F-Secure provide a check box alongside text to the effect of 
'Don V show this alert dialog again \ Meanwhile, the Trend Micro alert, as shown in Figure 57, 
is more specific in using a check box aligned with the text; Stop warning about this program. 
Since the name of the program occurred in the main alert, the user's decision is clearly 
affecting future events involving this program whatever the source IP address, while in the 
previous alerts it is not clear whether the decision affects the program or the IP address or the 
port or all the alerts. Another advantage o f the Trend Micro version is that the checkbox is 
ticked by default, so that the product is giving an explicit recommendation to the novice user. 
In contrast. Panda and Kaspersky adopt a different type of online configuration by providing a 
drop list contains the element Non-serious message settings option which consists of a variety 
of checkboxes to adjust the events that pop-up the alerts. Moreover, Kaspersky provides the 
options Disable this notification. Disable all notifications and Settings..., but the impact of the 
first option is unexplained to the user. As such, they may be unclear about whether the impact 
o f selecting this option is to disable the future similar alerts (i.e. with the same details), to 
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disable all alerts associated with the same type of attack regardless o f the source, or to perform 
some other action. The previous examples are not the expected level o f online security policy 
configuration and need to be enhanced as the exact impact of some options were not completely 
clear to users and some other options were irrelevant (i.e. related to configuring other types of 
notifications that are not correlated to the current alert) which overloads the user with 
unnecessary secondary security issues at an inappropriate time. However, they are the only 
available examples in this study and one of the suggestions to make this criterion valid is 
providing an option in the alert to avoid triggering o f frequently low level security alerts. 
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Figure 57: Trend Micro Pro alert interface 
6.2,12 Confirm / Recover the Impact of User Decision 
Confirming and recovering the impact o f home-users decisions is the second HCI-S usability 
criterion that is not addressed amongst the evaluated products. The absence o f this criterion is 
illustrated by assessing Norton 360 (i.e. Figure 51) and Trend Micro, which provide control 
buttons that implement user's responses immediately without warning or reminding the user of 
the response impact, neither before nor after making the decision. Furthermore, there is no 
obvious method that informs the user of how to recover from wrong or inappropriate decisions. 
It is suggested that the security measure should issue a confirmation message after the user 
performs the response decision. The objective of the message is to display the user current 
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decision and the perceived impact, and whether the user prefers to proceed accomplishing the 
decision or retum back to main alert interface to alter the response. However, the current 
suggestion combines both the benefit o f confirming the user decision and a primary recovery 
method. Moreover, in some cases the user might perform inappropriate decision that affects the 
functionality of their intended tasks. Therefore, developing usable methods to recover from 
undesired decisions is a requirement. A suggested solution is to make benefit o f criterion 10, 
Take Advantage of Previous Security Decisions, where all the previous user decisions are 
stored to be used when required. Hence, the user could access the recently issued alerts and the 
corresponding decisions, and attempt to change a previous decision i f possible (e.g. i f the user 
subsequently wishes to allow a program that was previously blocked by mistake). Furthermore, 
embedding an icon within the Windows notification area, next to the product icon in the tray, 
could be a primary method to access the recent alerts. Finally, the product can make use from 
criterion 4, Establish Standard Colours to Attract User Attention, and decrease the possibility 
of the recovery situations by appending a green border around the recommended response 
button. 
6.2.13 Awareness of System Status all the Time 
This is the third HCNS usability criterion that is not ful ly addressed through the evaluated 
products. Most likely, home-users who installed security measures within their personal 
computers presume that the security situation is under control and there is no need to worry 
until they receive a security alert. When that happens, most of the evaluated security alerts 
declare that an intrusion attempt is detected and blocked. Hence, this is the type of awareness of 
the system status that these products provide to the user who wi l l subsequently believe that 
he/she is protected. Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier, the McAfee product did not issue any 
alert during the evaluation, even though that the logs confirmed that it managed to detect the 
incoming traffic from the attacker computer. Hence, the user is not aware of the system status 
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based on McAfee security policy. It is noticed that some products, such as Security Shield and 
BitDefender, pop up alerts that disappear quickly without the user's permission. Hence, there is 
a high possibility that the users would not notice the occurrence o f the threat, especially i f they 
were not looking at the screen at the time. I f it is considered acceptable for users to miss them, 
then it questions the necessity of displaying the alerts in the first place. Furthermore, Norton 
360 (i.e. Figure 51) and Trend Micro, which provide a response capability, do not inform the 
user with the impact of the response issued by the user. The user ought to receive a message 
informing him about the real impact o f his response. Therefore, the awareness of the system 
status all the time is not available. For instance, i f the user decided to use criterion 11, Online 
Security Policy Configuration, and disabled the appearance of all alerts, it would be useful to 
get the product icon in the notification area to produce yellow, orange, red pulses as the 
occurrence of low, medium, red security risk levels, respectively. 
6.2.14 Help Provision and Remote Technical Support 
The generated alerts by most o f the security tools do not need real help provision or remote 
technical support; not because of their completeness, but because o f the lack of user decision 
responsibility. Meanwhile, Panda and F-Secure provide a built-in help which might be useful to 
enhance user knowledge but it does not support the user response since there are not any 
response controls in the alert interface. In addition, the location o f the help in Panda is not 
appropriate since it is embedded in a drop-down list, in the title bar, in the top-right of the main 
alert interface. In addition, CA uses the question mark icon as a visual indicator aligned with a 
help link to attract the user but the link provides no specific information relevant to the present 
alert. The assessment of the alerts generated by Trend Micro and Norton 360 (i.e. Figure 51), 
the two products that provide control features, reveals that no help or remote support is 
provided within Trend Micro apart o f the explicit risk level is determined as Safe. Meanwhile, 
Norton 360 is considered to be the only product that satisfies the criterion, as it provides a 
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variety of help provision and remote support to the user. From a usability perspective, the main 
limitation is in the location of the options. For further details, an extensive discussion of Norton 
360 is available within Chapter 5. 
6.2.15 Offer Responses that Match User Expectations 
This is the final criterion that is not fu l ly addressed through the evaluated products. Firstly, 
most the security tools in the evaluation do not provide a user response component in the alert 
interface. Arguably, a portion o f users would find it appropriate to have response options within 
the alert design. Secondly, Norton 360 (i.e. Figure 51) and Trend Micro are the only two 
products which satisfy this feature and the assessment o f the generated alerts reveals that there 
is no obvious method provided for the user to assess whether the response matches their 
expectation or not. Those users who have the privilege to respond to the alert perform their 
actions based upon their individual understanding. It is suggested to raise an explicit message 
af^er the user response to identify the real impact of the response. Hence, the user wi l l be able 
to determine whether the response has achieved what they expected. 
6.2.16 Trust and Satisfaction 
In all likelihood, security products that managed to address most of the former HCI-S usability 
criteria are also able to satisfy and obtain the trust o f users. Looking at specific factors that may 
improve this potential, we can consider whether the user is likely to feel they are getting the 
extent of information and feedback that seems convincing. For example, the design of the 
security alerts o f Norton 360 and F-secure provide users with a level of satisfaction because of 
the amount o f relevant information they attempt to provide. For instance, as shown in Figure 
58, the main interface of F-Secure provides Details » button which let the user access more 
information about the cause of the alert and the user can access the alert logs through the Show 
Alert log button in a secondary detailed interface. 
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Figure 58: F-Secure Internet Security 2009 Firewall Alert 
6.2.17 Summary results 
Table 8 summarizes the findings across the ful l set o f tools and criteria. During the evaluation, 
Norton 360 generates two different types o f alerts. Therefore, the results of the assessment o f 
the two interfaces are illustrated in two rows aligned with each usability criterion, whenever 
that is required, the first row represents the assessment of the alert represented in Figure 52 and 
the second one is related to the alert in Figure 51 . 
The findings reveal a remarkable limitation that choosing the High setting o f the firewall 
alerts within the CA product bombards the home-user with hundreds o f alerts and the 
maximum number o f alerts that are accessible in the alert interface is 500, as shown in 
Figure 54. Most likely, the home-user w i l l dismiss these alerts instead o f suspending the 
intended task to investigate the massive amount o f alerts. From a usability perspective, it is 
impractical to overwhelm the user, in one second, with this amount o f alerts specially that 
they only vary in detailed information o f hundreds o f local and remote ports used during 
the penetration. From the usability perspective, although the use o f the Show Details link 
within Norton 360 (i.e. Figure 51) is usable, it would be more preferable to avoid using the 
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vertical scroll bar within the complementary interface. Finally, the chapter demonstrated to 
what extent the HCI-S usability criteria are addressed through the evaluation o f collection 
o f home-users security products. The findings reveal the strength and the weakness within 
the design o f the issued alerts and some primary solutions are suggested as an attempt to 
resolve these weakness. It is anticipated that integrating the adequate features o f the 
evaluated alerts, avoiding their limitations, and implementing the unaddressed HCI-S 
usability criteria, w i l l enhance the alert design and make it more usable for home-users. 
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1 Ocsign Interfaces Match User Mental Model 
K X X X X 
• 
X X • X 
2 Aesthetic and Minimalist Design 
X • X X 
• 
• X • X 
3 Visibility of the Alert Detector Nome • • • • • • • • X 
4 Establish Standard Colours to Attract User Attention X X • X • • X X X 
5 Use Icons as Visual Indicators • X • X • • X X 
6 Explicit Words to Classify the Security Risk Level 
X X X X X 
• 
X X • X 
7 
J 
Consistent Meaningful Vocabulary and Terminology • X • • • • • • • 
8 Consistent Controls and Placement 
X X X X X 
• 
X X • X 
9 L.eamability. Flexibility and Efficiency of Use 
X X • • X 
• 
• X • X 
10 Take Advantage of Previous Securitv Decisions X X X X X X X X X 
11 Online Security Policy Configuration X • • • X • X • X 
12 Confirm / Recover the Impact of User Decision X X X X K X X X X 
13 AvN-areness of S>'stem Status all the Time X X X X X X X X X 
14 Help Provision and Remote Technical Support 
X X X X X 
• 
X X X X 
15 OITcr Responses Match Expectations X X X X X X X X X 
16 Trust and Satisfaction X X • X • X X X X 
With the exception of the terminology that requires the assistant and the adoption of criterion 9 in some instances, 
the current criterion is rated according to the meaningful vocabulary to the end-user. 
Table 8: The usability aspects of the security software 
From the current study it is possible to adjust a primary ranking for the HCI-S usability 
criteria into groups (Low, Medium, and High) as shown in Table 9. Criteria rated as Low as 
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those that mainly relate to the user's ability to feel comfortable using the tool . Meanwhile, 
Medium-rated criteria are those affecting the user's ability to understand status and events. 
Finally, High represents those factors that influence the user's ability to make the right 
decisions; i f they get this wrong it is the bit that has the most adverse impact on the actual 
security o f their system. 
Low 
Aesihetic and Minimalist Design 
Visibility of the Alert Detector Name 
Establish Standard Colours to Attract User Attention 
Use Icons as Visual Indicators 
Trust and Satisfaction 
Medium 
Design Interfaces Match User Mental Model 
Consistent Meaningful Vocabulary and Terminology 
Consistent Controls and Placement 
Leamability, Flexibility and Efliciency of Use 
Online Security Policy Configuration 
Awareness of System Status all the Time 
High 
Explicit Words to Classify the Security Risk t^vel 
Take Advantage of Previous Security Decisions 
Confirm / Recover the Impact of User Decision 
OITcr Responses Match Expectations 
Help Provision and Remote Technical Support 
Table 9: H C I - S Usability Cri ter ia Ranking 
In addition to the primary considerations listed above, the categorization o f individual 
criteria may also be influenced by secondary considerations such as prioritising those issues 
that the user w i l l encounter most frequently, or which could have the biggest adverse 
impact on their ability to use a product correctly. For example, the fact that it w i l l be an 
ever-present issue could elevate the Trus t and Satisfaction' point from being ranked Low 
to being ranked as Medium. 
6.3 Conclusions 
This chapter investigated the usability of security alerts issued via a range of security products. 
These alerts are triggered as a result of performing a penetration test conducted within a test-
bed environment using the network scanner Nmap. The findings reveal that the trend of most o f 
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the security software vendors is to respond to the security threat on behalf o f the end-user. This 
is understandable, especially as end-users might not have the relevant security background to 
make informed decisions, or they might prefer to focus on their primary intended tasks instead 
of secondary security ones. The analysis of security tools according to the HCI-S usability 
criteria showed that four of the HCI-S usability criteria (10, 12, 13, 15) are not addressed in any 
of the selected security measures. 
Specifically, none of the evaluated tools address criterion 10, to Take Advantage of Previous 
Security Decisions. Therefore, it would be desirable for a system to consider the user's 
previous decisions on similar alerts, and modify alerts accordingly to account for the user's 
previous behaviour. For example, i f the user has consistently overridden the recommended 
option in a particular type of alert, the system can change the default option to the user's 
previous choice, or it can offer the user the option to repeat their decision in future occurrences, 
without the need for an alert. In order to give users this level o f flexibility, it is important to 
enable them to make informed decisions, and to be able to recover from them i f needed. 
Therefore, it is important to address criteria 12, 13, 15 as well (namely Confirm / Recover the 
Impact o f User Decision, Awareness o f System Status all the Time, and Offer Responses Match 
Expectations). Therefore, the next chapter focuses upon addressing these missing HCI-S 
usability criteria and increasing the end-user's opportunity to customize the security measure. 
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Chapter 7 
Enhancing the Usability of End-Users Security Tools 
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7 Enhancing the Usability of End-Users Security Tools 
The aim of this chapter is to address the four missing HCI-S usability criteria that were not 
ful ly covered by the investigated security products in the previous research. This chapter begins 
by suggesting solutions to address these criteria and then presents a case study experiment to 
assess the proposed solutions from the end user perspective. Actually, there are other several 
benefits could be obtained from the case study apart from assessing the proposed solutions for 
the unaddressed HCI-S usability criteria by the previously investigated security products. It wi l l 
be a valuable opportunity to assess and validate the whole proposed HCI-S usability criteria, 
from the end user perspective, through a practical implementation. 
7.1 Addressing HCI-S Usability Criteria 
In this section a new security alert is designed to meet the requirements o f the HCI-S usability 
criteria especially those who were not addressed in the previous chapter. The new design is an 
attempt to address the limitations within the selected set o f security products evaluated in the 
previous chapter. The new design is not a ful ly functional system, but rather an operational 
prototype that was designed with the specific aim of allowing users to interact with particular 
features and provide feedback about them. The new design managed to also enhance some of 
the other criteria. For instance, as shown in Figure 60, the yellow border o f the main alert 
interface alerts the user that the risk level is not high which support criterion 4; Establish 
Standard Colours to Attract User Attention. Meanwhile, Explicit Words to Classify the Security 
Risk Level, criterion 6 is satisfied in the main alert interface and supports the user to click on 
the recommended response. Block Once, which has the green colour. The current section 
focuses on enhancing the usability o f security alerts that end-users face in a real environment. 
The nature o f the project is that the user faced alerts in different scenarios and was asked to 
make decisions on how to handle them. The user responses were saved for further analysis, to 
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determine the benefits o f the proposed interface. The project aims to evaluate some o f the 
proposed solutions that make the security alert more usable for the end user. 
The participants were briefed about the purpose o f the study and then they were asked to 
answer a series of questions, which are grouped into the following 3 sections: 
1- Demographic questions 
2- End-user perception of security 
3- Assessing the usability of new security interface 
The above three groups are explained in the following sections. 31 participants volunteered to 
share in the case study. The demographic questions reveal that the gender of the participants is 
83% Male and 17% Female. Meanwhile the age o f the participants was in the range from 18 to 
40 years old. The level o f education they have already obtained is 13% Post 16 Education (e.g. 
A-levels, NVQ),17% Bachelor,70% Masters. The next question was about the numbers o f years 
they had been using Internet and varies between 4 and 15. Only three participants mentioned 
that there experience is over 15 years. The participants were asked about their security 
expertise. The participant's answers were 3% Excellent, 53% Good, 33% Average, 3% Fair, 
7% Poor. Moreover, the participants were asked about the rate o f the current security solution 
on their computer. The participant's answers were 7% Excellent, 63% Good, 23% Average, 3% 
Fair, 3% Poor. 
7.1.1 End-user perception of security 
The participants received a questionnaire consisting o f several questions starting with asking 
the user of selecting the types of security software that they use in their systems. 42% selects 
Integrated Security products (combining Antivirus, firewall, intrusion detection, etc.), 5 1 % 
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Antispyware, 58% firewall, 3% None, 0% I do not know. The vast majority 74% use Antivirus 
product on there PC while only 19% use intrusion detection. The final result indicates that 
average users tend to use an Antivirus rather than intrusion detection. Arguably, Antivirus is 
more desirable because the ease of use o f Antivirus products. 
The second question interested with which Internet application do they use. 32% selects Peer to 
peer software (e.g. Gnutella. Kazaa. BitTorrent, etc), 83% Instant Messaging (e.g.Windows live 
messenger) 93% Email (e.g.Outlook), 100% Web browser (e.g. Internet Explorer, Safari, etc). 
The findings indicate that the user always needs a security product that protects him/her from 
malicious website as the users use a web browser on a regular basis. 
10 
very Average Very UnulB Not Sure 
Figure 59: How safe do users feci their computers are against security breaches 
The third question asks about how safe do they feel their computers are against security 
breaches. The participants answers were 0% Very Safe, 5 1 % Safe, 38% Average , 6% Unsafe , 
3% Very Unsafe , 0% Not Sure. Although the high number of security threats that counter the 
end-users every day. Figure 59 shows that more than half of the participants declared that they 
are safe. 
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The fourth question asks about how often do they encounter security alerts. The participants 
answers were 19% Daily, 19% Weekly, 13% Monthly, 45% Rarely, 3% Never. 
The sixth question asks about the type o f information that they think security alerts should 
have. The participants answers were 55% Log details of activity, 7 1 % Information about the 
origin of the event, 90% Explanation for incident. The proposed alert attempts to provide this 
explanation in a simple method in the first sector of the alert interface, namely. Delected. 
The seventh question asks about the participant's ability to configure the settings o f their 
security software. The participants answers were 3% Excellent, 45% Good, 29% Average, 9% 
Fair, 13% Poor. 
The eighth question asks i f they experienced any security breaches in the past 5 years. The 
participants answers were 6 1 % Yes, 32% No , 6% Not sure. Those who answered with 
'Yes' received another question to identify the type o f incident that they encountered. The 
participants answers were 6 1 % Infection with malicious software (e.g. virus, Trojan, 
spyware, etc), 29% Adware, 3% Stolen password, 6% Stolen credit card details, 3% Denial 
of service, 3% Scan for vulnerable services. Although, the participants were randomly 
selected at least one o f them experienced one o f the selected security breaches. Hence, 
more research need to be done on protecting end-users and this research is a step towards 
achieving this aim as follows in the next sections. 
7.1.2 Security Alert Encountered by End-user (Task One) 
This is considered to be task I that the user had to accomplish. The participants were told that a 
security alert, as shown in Figure 60, would be displayed after a few seconds and they were 
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asked to respond to the alert as they would do in a real environment. Then the participants 
received a questionnaire and they have to answer the questions. 
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Figure 60: C S C A N main alert interface 
Questions SA A N D SD 
Overall, did you feel the security alert was understandable? 6% 55% 22% 16% 0% 
Do you feel the use of explicit words to determine the alert 
risk level is useful? 
26% 58% 13% 3% 0% 
Is the use of the colour border a good indicator to identify the 
alert risk level? 
42% 42% 3% 13% 0% 
When busy, would you feel safe to minimize and postpone 
dealing with this alert? 
3% 32% 19% 39% 6% 
Are the tooltips helpful in providing extra information in a 
flexible manner? 
13% 48% 32% 6% 0% 
Did you feel that the impact of the response options 'Allow 
Once' and 'Block Once' were understandable? 
22% 64% 0% 13% 0% 
Did the 'Allow Once' and 'Block Once' tooltips reveal and 
clarify the impact o f the response buttons? 
19% 39% 22% 19% 0% 
Table ID: Task 1 questions 
Table 10 represents the questions that were asked to the participants during Task 1 (note that 
the columns are headed as follows: SA - strongly agree; A - agree; N - neutral; D - disagree; 
SD - strongly disagree) and there was another question that is not in the table that asks the 
participants to identify the risk level of the displayed security alert. The participants answers 
were 0% Very High, 3% High, 9% Medium, 84% Low, 0% Very Low, 3% Not Sure. 
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During task 1 only one participant selected the option dismiss the alert (i.e. click the ' x ' in the 
main alert interface). When the participant was asked about the reason of the behaviour, the 
answer was 'Because I hate these messages and several times I have run into fakes messages!'. 
The vast majority of the participants selected Block Once button. The green colour of the button 
attracts the users and could be the reason behind this behaviour. 
Meanwhile the participant were not told to select the Help And Support option, it was noticed 
that during they were investigating the facilities that are provided by the security product 
interface, three participants select the Help And Support link at the bottom of the main alert 
interface. A l l of them mentioned that they prefer the occurrence of the three provided options 
live chat, email and phone as they give the user the opportunity to gain more information of the 
threat and how to deal with it. 
It was noticed that few participants did not assign the risk level as low but instead one of them 
select the risk level to be medium and when the participant was asked about the reason he/she 
mentioned that the threat type is port scan which he/she consider it as medium risk not a low 
risk. Another one considered the risk as high, arguably assuming that i f the security product 
triggers an alert then it should be serious. 
Strongly AgrM A ^ w NmM Osavw arongty I 
Figure 61: The colour border as a good indicator to identify the alert risk level 
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Figure 61 shows that the colour of the border of the security plays an important role to the vast 
majority o f the participants in determining the risk level o f the alert, 
7.1.3 Security Alert Encountered by End-user (Task Two) 
The same security alert that the participants experienced during Taskl was displayed again 
after a few seconds. The participants were told to try to find out more details about the cause o f 
the alert. Then seek how other individuals managed to counter the same alert. Next search for 
other alternative responses that might match the participants expectations. Then respond to the 
alert after they discover the previous aspects. Then the participants received a questionnaire and 
they have to answer the questions. 
The user can click on the link View More Details^ i f he/she requires more information about the 
cause o f the alert. Then, the user receives this information as shown Figure 62. 
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Figure 62: C S C A N - V i e w More Details 
In some situations the end-users counter security alerts but not able to deal with it. The purpose 
of the current criterion is to provide the user with tools that help the user to make a security 
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decision. The security product provide the View Community Decisions button, the users can 
click on it i f they require information about how other individuals who managed to interact 
with the same alert in the past. For instance, the user could receive this information as shown 
Figure 63. This option satisfies criterion 10; Take Advantage of Previous Security Decisions. 
The solution is useful i f the user had not receive this alert before. The limitation of this feature 
is that it could be vulnerable to attacks i f an attacker runs the tool and allow the attack 
automatically several times. The current solution to avoid this sort of attack is that the allow 
option is provided with the perceived impact statement which states that the attacker managed 
to determine the operating system and the open ports. 
The database o f View Community Decisions could be updated centrally via a vendor or 
local centralisation (e.g. within the organization). The user response could be gathered and 
saved by the security product vendor to make benefit from it as source o f information to 
others individuals who might counter a similar alert in the future. In the case o f 
organizations the alert o f each employee could be gathered by a security administrator who 
attempts to solve the problem from the core. However, the responses o f the new users are 
collected to make benefit o f them to end users. 
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Figure 63: C S C A N - Community Decisions 
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In some situations, the security alert does not offer responses that match user expectations. 
Therefore, they do not know what action to take. The current criterion is an attempt to help the 
user to perform the right action. The alert main interface, as shown in Figure 60, represents the 
initial provided user response explicitly with a clear verbose as Allow Once and Block Once 
buttons. The colour Block Once button is green to attract the user and to emphasize that the 
current button is the recommended option by the security product. 
C.A 
Figure 64: CSCAN-More Options 
Moreover, Figure 64 illustrates an attempt to provide more response options than that was 
provided in Norton 360 and Trend micro is the previous chapter. This figure can be obtained i f 
the user clicked on More Options button within the alert main interface. 
Questions SA A N D SD 
Do you feel that some of the information provided by the 
'View More Details' link, needs to be in the main interface? 
3% 64% 13% 16% 3% 
In general, do you like the guidance provided within the 
'Community Decisions' interface? 
32% 52% 9% 6% 0% 
Is it useful to include the charts within the 'Community 
Decisions' interface? 
35% 42% 19% 3% 0% 
Do you feel that the impact of the response options within the 
'Community Decisions' interface was clear? 
32% 58% 3% 6% 0% 
Did you find the additional responses within 'More Options' 
interface useful? 
25% 7 1 % 3% 0% 0% 
Did you find the charts within the 'More Options' interface 
useful? 
25% 58% 9% 6% 0% 
Do you feel that the impact of the response options within the 
'More Options' interface was clear? 
25% 74% 0% 0% 0% 
Was it easy to find the additional response options within the 
'More Options' interface? 
29% 48% 16% 6% 0% 
Table 11: Task 2 questions 
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Table 11 represents the questions that were asked to the participants during Task 2. There is 
another two questions that is not in the table, the first asks i f there arc ways in which the 
information within 'View More Details' could be better presented or improved. One of the 
participants respond to this question by '1 think it is important to remember that terms like 
protocol, remote port, local port, and even pathway mean very little to most users. Websites 
must have info, as often there is a link but no knowledge on the specific threat type.'. The other 
question asks the participants i f there are ways in which this infomialion could be better 
presented or improved. One participant wrote M do not see the point o f block once and blocked 
always, i f it is a threat it should be blocked, this shows to me that the software that i m using is 
not sure about the threat and wants me to take responsibilty for an action that means nothing to 
me". During answering this questionnaire the participants were advised to refer to the 
accompanying screenshots for reference i f required. 
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Figure 65: The guidance provided within the 'Community Decisions' interface. 
Task2 is addressing criterion 10, Take Advantage of Previous Security Decisions, and criterion 
15, Offer Responses that Match User Expectations. Criterion 15 is enhanced by providing the 
user with several options to response to the alert. Moreover it was noticed that only one 
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participant recognizes the benefit of the information icons in front Threat Type: Port scan and 
Program: ntoskrnl.exe as they guide the user to webpages which provide the user with more 
information. The results appear that the majority of the participants want more detailed 
information to appear in the alert main interface. Moreover the majority of participants like the 
Community Decisions interface which meets the requirement of criterion 10 as shown in Figure 
65 . In addition, the majority of participants like the More Options interface which meets the 
requirement of criterion 15 as shown in Figure 66. 
30 
10 
25 
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Figure 66: The additional responses within 'More Options' interface is useful. 
7.1.4 Take Advantage of Previous Security Decisions (Task Three) 
The following is an attempt to propose a useful feature to the users who already countered the 
alert in the past. In this case, the main interface wi l l have the looking as shown in Figure 67, 
instead of the main interface shown in Figure 60. 
I f the users click on View Your Previous Decisions button, they wi l l obtain Figure 68. This wi l l 
let the user know his previous response lo the alert and the impact of the user response on his 
computer. 
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Figure 67: C S C A N - U s e r Previous Decisions 
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Figure 69: View Alert History 2 
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I f the users click on View Alert History button, they wil l obtain Figure 69. which is an interface 
that contains more information about the threats that were detected previously. 
A security alert that differed slightly from the security alert that the participants experienced in 
the previous task was displayed after a few seconds from running the task. The participants 
were told to assume that this is the second time to counter this type o f alert and to assume that 
their previous response was 'Block Once'. Next they were told to try to find out more 
information about what was claimed to be their previous response. Then they were told to 
respond to the alert after they discover the previous aspect. Then the participants received a 
questionnaire and they have to answer the questions. 
Questions SA A N D SD 
Was the ability to view your previous decisions useful? 32% 52% 3% 13% 0% 
Did you find the 'View Alert History' option useful? 22% 65% 9% 3% 0% 
Did you find the charts within the 'Your Previous Decisions' 
interface useful? 
26% 55% 9% 9% 0% 
Table 12: Task 3 questions 
Table 12 represents the questions that were asked to the participants during Task 3. There is 
another question that is not in the table asks the participants i f there are ways in which the 
participants feel that the 'Your Previous Decisions' interface could be improved or any other 
comments that they wish to make. One of the participants wrote 'have a simplified version for 
basic users, with an advanced mode for more experienced users'. 
Figure 70: The ability to view the participant previous decisions is useful 
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Task3 is addressing criterion 10, Take Advantage of Previous Security Decisions but instead of 
focusing on the decisions taken by other individuals in similar situation it focuses on the users 
decisions that they had taken previously when they had already counter similar alerts in the 
past. The results appear that the majority of the participants like the Your Previous Decision 
interface, as shown in Figure 70, which meets the requirement of criterion 10. 
7.1.5 Confirm / Recover the Impact of User Decision (Task Four) 
In some situations the end-users perform a wrong action without being warned by the security 
product. Therefore, the current criterion is an attempt to issue a security warning i f the user 
performed a wrong action. When the user clicks the Allow Once button f rom the alert main 
interface in Figure 60 and overrides the security product option the security warning wi l l 
appear to the user as shown in Figure 71. This feature warns the use that his decision might be 
wrong and gives him the chance to confirm and correct his decision. This is considering the 
first protection against the user decision. 
Vow « c U ] O f M ^ U w m y e w ewicuter . Please p r w V « # you rt^ 
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Figure 71: Security Warning 
The same security alert that the participants experienced during Task I and Task 2 was 
displayed again after a few seconds. The participants were told to try to override the security 
product recommendation, by clicking 'Allow Once'. Then the participants received a 
questionnaire and they have to answer the questions. 
Questions SA A N D SD 
Overall, did you feel that the waming that appears after 
clicking 'Allow Once' was understandable? 
29% 7 1 % 0% 0% 0% 
Do you feel this waming message would decrease the 
probability of computers being compromised? 
35% 48% 3% 13% 0% 
Do you feel that such waming messages can prevent users 
from accidentally making poor security decisions? 
45% 39% 13% 3% 0% 
Table 13: Task 4 questions 
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Table 13 represents the questions that were asked to the participants during Task 4. There is 
another question that is not in the table asks the participants i f there are ways in which the 
participants feel that this warning feature could be improved or any other comments that the 
participants wish to make. One of the participants wrote 'Some type of 'WARNING' graphic 
would probably be helpful. Prehaps even a brightly coloured border in RED/ During answering 
this questionnaire the participants were advised to refer to the accompanying screenshots for 
reference i f required. 
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Figure 72: Warning messages can prevent users from accidentally making poor security decisions 
Task 4 is addressing criterion 12, Confirm / Recover the Impact of User Decision. This task 
focuses on confirming the user action. During this task the user are told to override the security 
product, then he/she received a warning message to warn him/her the harm that could happen i f 
he/she proceed his action. The results, as shown in Figure 72, appear that the majority o f the 
participants like the warning message that warns them before proceeding a wrong action. 
7.1.6 Confirm / Recover the Impact of User Decision (Task Five) 
The second protection against the user decision is i f the user select a response option and after 
that the user realized that he/she want change the option, the user still have the chance by use 
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the feature that exists in CSCAN icon within the tray and perform a right click on Recover 
Previous Decisions, an interface wi l l appear to the user as shown in Figure 73. The user can 
selects the action that he/she wishes from User Action, then update the system. 
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Figure 73: Recovery Interface 
No security alert was displayed during this task. The participants were told to try to recover 
their previous decision by right clicking on the security product icon in the tray at the bottom of 
the screen. Then the participants received a questionnaire and they have to answer the 
questions. 
Questions SA A N D SD 
Overall, did you feel the existence o f this feature is 
understandable? 
23% 52% 9% 16% 0% 
Do you feel that this feature wi l l support the user to recover 
from previous poor decisions? 
39% 42% 13% 6% 0% 
Table 14: Task 5 questions 
Table 14 represents the questions that were asked to the participants during Task 5. There is 
another question that is not in the table asks the participants i f there are ways in which the 
participants feel that this feature could be improved or any other comments that they wish to 
make. One o f the participants wrote 'This seems like a useful feature, but when in the interface 
I was somewhat confused as to how to proceed, or even what was expected of me.' During 
answering this questionnaire the participants were advised to refer to the accompanying 
screenshols for reference i f required. 
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Task 5 is addressing criterion 12, Confirm / Recover the Impact of User Decision. This task 
focuses on recovering the user action. This task shows that in some cases the user has the 
possibility to change some security decisions that he/she made previously. The results, as 
shown in Figure 74 , appear that the majority of the participants like this feature 
Strongly A g r e e Neutral D i s a g r e e Strongly D i s a g r e e 
Figure 74: The feature will support the user to recover from previous poor decisions 
7.1,7 Awareness of System Status all the Time (Task Six) 
Figure 75: CSCAN icons 
When the end-users select the Block always no security alert appear again to the end-users i f 
the same cause of the alert occurred again which make the end-users unaware about what is 
going on their computers. Therefore, a secondary icon next to the CSCAN icon in the tray, as 
shown Figure 75, wi l l appear i f the event that cause the alert already happened before and the 
user took an action apart o f Block Once, Allow Once or dismiss the alert. For instance, as 
shown Figure 76, assume that the user previous action was Block Always^ and the cause of the 
alert occurred again, in this case the user wi l l not receive an alert. The benefit of the CSCAN 
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system is that it offer the appearance of yellow icon next to the CSCAN to inform the user that 
the an event that causes previously a security alert has occurred but no usual security alert was 
issued based on the user previous response which was Block Always. The colour of the 
secondary icon wi l l vary between yellow and red based on the severity o f the events that occurs 
during the session. 
' Tht t*bl« «ho«* me cvntn vnfkwt K u e y l^at octan m your compuiw. No I t cur ty •lert - a i i i t a r t b t e « r t » •«»n j w • •p#n»nctd LS« lor i f * 
irou rud t^ tec i r t • f w p w d torn 'Alkw Once'. Onc»" w ttsnws tr>» Alert'(i e. chck ' i ' f t w n LSt Alert Mam htefUce) 
SH«ci [ho m i s n you to opd<!e and tb«n dKV ITM button: 
Figure 76: CSCAN- Recovery & Update 
No security alert wi l l be displayed during this task and the participants were told to wait for a 
few seconds for further instructions as follows: move the mouse towards the tray at the icon 
next to Security Product One icon. Next click the icon to investigate the situation (i.e. current 
system status), then explore the displayed interface. Then click on the interface close button 'x' 
after the participants accomplish their exploration. Then the participants received a 
questionnaire and they have to answer the questions. 
The first question asks the participants i f they had noticed the waming icon in the tray before 
they were prompted to view it. The participants' answers were 70% Yes, 30% No. 
Questions SA A N D SD 
Do you think the appearance o f this icon is intrusive? 10% 13% 20% 37% 20% 
Was the icon easy to find in the tray? 33% 53% 3% 10% 0% 
Do you think that this feature helps to inform users about the 
security status of the system? 
27% 57% 13% 3% 0% 
Overall, did you feel that the whole security alert was 
understandable? 
27% 67% 6% 0% 0% 
Table IS: Task 6 questions 
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Table 15 represents the questions that were asked to the participants during Task 6. There is 
another question that is not in the table asks the participants i f there are ways in which the 
participants feel that whole alert could be improved or any other comments that they wish to 
make. One participant wrote *I think the alert could be more intrusive, although the yellow icon 
is noticeable, i think i f I was busy in a task i might not have picked up on i t . ' . During answering 
this questionnaire the participants were advised to refer to the accompanying screenshots for 
reference i f required. 
Strongly Agree AgtM Nnitral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
Figure 77: The feature helps to Inform users about the security status of the system. 
Task 6 is addressing criterion 13, Awareness of System Status all the Time. I f the user selects 
the options Allow Once or Block Once he/she wi l l receive an alert in the future i f the threat 
occurs again. But i f the user selects other option from the list o f options provided in the More 
Options interface, no alert wi l l appear to the user. Hence we provide an icon next to the security 
product icon to indicate the occurrence of the threat i f it happened again. The results, as shown 
in Figure 77, appear that the majority of the participants like this feature. 
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7.2 Conclusions 
This chapter attempts to focus on addressing the missing HCI-S usability criteria within the 
investigated security products in the port scanning case study without ignoring the rest of the 
criteria. The future work wi l l focus on covering any limitations that was revealed during the 
prototype evaluation to make the next version o f the prototype more user-friendly than the 
current one. This goal might be difficult to achieve because of the nature of the end users vary 
and the security treats are evolving and increasing in a rapid rate. However, identifying and 
developing usable design guidelines for developing and enhancing security products that meet 
end user expectations are still an evolving research discipline and it is anticipated that current 
studies wi l l success to achieve an acceptable tradeoff between usability and security in the near 
future. 
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8 Conclusions & Future Work 
This chapter concludes the thesis by summarising the achievements and the limitations of the 
research. The chapter proceeds to discuss the points were the future research could consider for 
further refinement. 
8.1 Achievements of the Research 
The objectives of the research programme have been met and the key achievements of the 
research are summarised below. 
1- Limitations of the intrusion detection systems and the challenges preventing the 
adoption of IDS have been established in Chapter 3, based on the established literature. 
Chapter 3 focuses on determining the up-to-date IDS challenges within literature. A set 
of 21 IDS challenges was identified within five different categories. These challenges 
were ranked according to the findings from the respondents. 
2- To complete this stage of the study, a web-based questionnaire was conducted to gather 
information from a range o f persons, starting with persons aware o f IDS until experts 
in the field (Chapter 4). Even though, only 43 persons ful ly participate in the web-
based questionnaire but the results were astonishing. The findings revealed that the 
correlation between the top IDS challenges is the human being themselves. Therefore, 
the second part of the thesis focuses on the tradeoff between security and usability. 
3- Investigating the relevant studies that are relevant to the thesis research reveals the 
requirement to develop novel criteria to meet the thesis goal (Chapter 5). Hence, a set 
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of 16 HCI-S usability criteria were created as basis to aid designers to develop and 
design security alerts that meet the end-user requirement, for a usability perspective. 
Norton 360 was selected as a well-known security product to implement the HCI-S 
usability criteria. 
4- Implementing the criteria on a set o f other security products was required to obtain 
solid results (Chapter 6). The findings reveal that four of the criteria were not fully 
addressed by the selected security products. Therefore, the final part o f the thesis 
managed to develop a solution for each of the four problems and to evaluate to what 
extend to they success to solve the problems (Chapter 7).The prototype evaluation was 
promising as the participants were happy, as the results reveal, with the proposed 
solutions. 
8.2 Limitations of the Research 
Although the objectives o f the research programme have been met, a number o f limitations 
could not be avoided to obtain better results. The key limitations of the research are 
summarised below. 
1- One o f the limitations in the web-based questionnaire is the small number of 
participants (Chapter 4). This number would be sufficient in case that the majority of 
them have actual experience with the deployment of IDS in practice. Unfortunately, not 
all the participants have deployed (or taken the decision to deploy) an IDS and 25% 
mentioned that they are not in a position to take the decision of deploying an IDS or 
not (but decided to complete the questionnaire based on there opinions and other 
experiences in the field). Even though the participation of the last group are not going 
to provide us with the precise up-to-date IDS challenges, it is anticipated that they 
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have the necessary knowledge to participate and confirm to the severity of the IDS 
challenges covered in the survey and to some extent are able to address these 
challenges. 
2- In the case study (Chapter 7) one of the limitations in the prototype evaluation is that 
the eye-tracker methodology was not used such as Tobii Technology A B (2010). This 
would have enabled more information to be obtained about the participants' behaviour 
during the case study. It is anticipated that the combination o f analysing the user 
answers in the questionnaire, their actions that were stored in the database, and the 
information that would be obtained by an eye tracker, would enrich the analysis and 
make the findings even more valuable. The eye-tracker methodology wi l l give the 
opportunity to know exactly where the participant was looking during the evaluation. 
This wi l l let us know better what attracts the user and how the user is thinking. The 
current prototype evaluation is unable to obtain this type o f information. 
8.3 Suggestions for Future Work 
This research programme has advanced the field o f usable security for end-users. However, 
there is more to be done in this field o f research and some related suggestions are detailed 
below: 
1- The comments that were provided by some of the participants in the case study 
(Chapter 7) were not used efficiently during the current study. The combination o f the 
thesis analysis and these comments wi l l be the basis for the future work to develop a 
security interface that is more efficient and usable as we consider the current study as 
an initial step towards enhancing a usable security interfaces. 
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2- During the case study 42% o f participants select Integrated Security products 
(combining Antivirus, firewall, intrusion detection, etc) and 19% intmsion detection. 
More study need to be done about what do end users understand about IDS and how 
can they use it. Moreover, investigating the factors that guide them to deploy IDS on 
their machines, 
3- Although the participants agreed that they like the prototype features during Task 5 and 
Task 6 (Chapter 7), it seems that more work need to be done to make it more usable for 
an average end-user. 
8.4 The Future ofHCI-S for Intrusion Management 
Intrusions and other related attacks wi l l continue to present a challenge for Internet-based 
systems. There wil l consequently be an ongoing need for associated safeguards to protect these 
systems and their users against compromise. Therefore, there is always a need for efficient 
security defensive tools. 
The current research managed to develop a set o f HCI-S usability criteria, as attempt to achieve 
powerful IDS. Arguably, based on the case study resuhs, these criteria meet the average end-
user requirements but what about the case o f novice end-users and experts. This group of 
participants should be considered and be asked i f the implementation of the HCI-S usability 
criteria is useful to them or it is just useful for average end users. 
The efficiency of the IDS is a major factor while making a decision of installing it. However, 
the focus o f the current research was to improve the efficiency of IDS not by developing a 
powerful detection method but by developing suitable HCI-S usability criteria. The 
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combination o f having an IDS with efficient detection method and meeting the requirement o f 
the HCI-S usability criteria wi l l guide the creation o f more powerful IDS solutions. 
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Appendix A 
A.1 Findings of the Participant's Response 
Table A represents the sum of the individual's responses according to each of the challenges in 
the web-based questionnaire, represented in Chapter 4 (note that the columns are headed as 
follows: SA - strongly agree; A - agree; N - neutral; D - disagree; SD - strongly disagree; DK 
- don't know; A+SA - agree + strongly agree; WMS - weighted method score). 
No. Challenge SA A N D SD DK A+SA WMS 
Deployment Challenges 
1 Scalability constraints 8 20 3 5 4 1 28 23 
2 Switched Networks 9 15 5 6 3 3 24 21 
3 Packet dropping and high speed network traffic 8 17 5 6 4 1 25 19 
4 Encrypted traffic and IPv6 7 11 6 7 4 6 18 10 
5 Initial deployment cost 8 23 6 0 2 2 31 35 
Management Challenges 
6 Volume of information 16 20 2 1 1 1 36 49 
7 Ensuring effective configuration 9 21 2 8 1 0 30 29 
8 Managing a heterogeneous IDS environment 10 18 8 0 0 5 28 38 
9 Ongoing operational costs 12 23 1 4 1 0 35 41 
Technical Challenges 
10 \/ulnerability to attacks 9 24 5 1 1 1 33 39 
11 Difficulty in customizinq and updating the IDS ruleset 9 24 5 0 0 3 33 42 
12 Data collection and logging 9 23 6 1 1 1 32 38 
13 Understanding and interpreting IDS data 13 23 4 0 0 1 36 49 
Detection Challenges 
14 The large number of alerts 15 15 8 2 1 0 30 41 
15 False negatives 12 15 11 2 0 1 27 37 
16 False positives 13 19 7 1 1 0 32 42 
17 Determining the alert severity level 2 27 8 2 1 1 29 27 
18 Alerts correlation 9 23 6 2 0 1 32 39 
Response Challenges 
19 Requirement for skilled staff 13 19 6 3 0 0 32 42 
20 The potential for inappropriate and harmful responses 10 20 9 1 0 1 30 39 
21 Effectiveness of the IDS response 4 24 7 4 0 2 28 28 
Table A: Individual assessment o IDS challenges 
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Table B represents the finial results of the individual's responses of sorting the challenges in 
the web-based questionnaire. The participants provide their opinions about the challenges that 
are considered to be of the top five challenges and rank them in order. 
No. The IDS Challenges List T o p i Top 2 Top 3 Top 4 Top 5 
Deployment Challenqes 
1 Scalability constraints 1 1 1 3 
2 Switched Networks 1 1 1 1 
3 Packet dropping and high speed network traffic 2 1 2 
4 Encrypted traffic and IPv6 2 2 2 4 
5 Initial deployment cost 2 1 
Management Challenqes 
6 Volume of information 1 2 6 4 1 
7 Ensuring effective configuration 1 3 
8 Managing a heterogeneous IDS environment 2 2 2 1 
9 Ongoing operational costs 1 2 2 
Technical Challenqes 
10 ^/ulnerability to attacks 1 1 1 1 1 
11 Difficulty in customizing and updating the IDS ruleset 3 2 3 2 1 
12 Data collection and logging 1 1 1 
13 Understandinq and interpreting IDS data 4 3 2 5 1 
Detection Chaflenj 3es 
14 The large number of alerts 3 3 4 1 
15 False negatives 4 1 2 1 
16 False positives 4 3 2 1 2 
17 Determining the alert severity level 2 1 1 4 
18 Alerts correlation 3 4 4 3 3 
Response Challen ges 
19 Requirement for skilled staff 3 6 1 2 2 
20 The potential for inappropriate and harmful responses 1 2 
21 Effectiveness of the IDS response 1 4 
Table B: Individuals highest top 5 challenges 
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A.2 The Challenges Appended by Participants 
"The success of IDS, particularly signature based IDS is partly a function of ihe range and type 
of traffic on the network. It is easier to implement in a corporate environment where 
application, services and protocols can be restricted more." 
"Lack of effective and unbiased evaluation methods" 
"Visualisation of results (particularly for correlated alert)" 
"Snort is a good open source project" 
"Other network appliances might be better" 
"polymorphic attacks" 
"encrypted attacks" 
"non-malicious, yet disruptive traffic" 
"Self-organization of various security components" 
"Guarantees of Service" 
"Distributed IDS" 
"Cooperation between different security components" 
"Detect polymorphic or 0-day attacks" 
"Lack of educators knowledge of current systems." 
"Differentiation of different generations of IDS technology." 
"IDS does not equal SNORT" 
"Integration into higher-level Security Management Systems" 
"Impact on Wide Area Networks (WAN)" 
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A.3 The Participants Comments 
"Better client protection (ie PC firewalls and anti virus software) can improve overall IDS 
performance. However, many networks now have IP peripherals (ie video servers, ip cameras, 
ip printers etc) that are essentially unprotected." 
"Do not connect a machine in a network'' 
"As stated in the earlier questions, we implemented anomaly based IDS. This was a direct 
result of identifying many of the problems raised in the survey with signature based IDS and 
which do not apply, or do not apply to the same degree, with anomaly based IDS. 031: The 
answer also depends on your definition of "false positive". With our anomaly detection system, 
those alerts that prove not to be a security issues, very often turn out to be network anomalies 
(i.e. changes in network behaviour) that are useful to know even i f not directly related to a 
security incident. On this basis, I consider false positives from our system to be quite low, as 
indicated." 
"better discrimination between real attacks which fail and real attacks which succeed" 
"- Alert correlation and fusion techniques proposed by the research community are still not 
widely implemented by IDS manufacturers. - Anomaly-based detection systems are still 
inefficient in the sense they retum a high false alarm rate." 
"Create unbiased methods to evaluate and test the IDS" 
" I wish you had comment boxes below each of the questions. There are so many cases where I 
would have strongly agreed if some condition but strongly disagreed i f some other condition. 
For example, it does cost money to maintain the IDS, but i f this system is in-line and blocking 
known and tested attacks then you are actually reducing the overall cost to maintain your 
network. The IDS will pretty much pay for itself with the reduction of infections on the 
network. I hope that any business that purchases an IDS will have first tested its scalability. If it 
scales properly then you don't have to worry if your organization grows or not." 
"FWIW, we published: Investigating New Approaches to Data Collection, Management and 
Analysis for Network Intrusion, ACMSE 2007 Winston-Salem University E. Joseph Derrick 
Radford University Department of Information Technology Radford VA 24142-6933 
(540) 831-5368 ejderrick@radford.edu Richard W. Tibbs Radford University 
Department of Information Technology Radford VA 24142-6933 (540) 831-5780 
rwtibbs@radford.edu Larry Lee Reynolds Eastman Chemical Company 100 N. Eastman Road 
BIdg. 284, Office 4186 Kingsport, TN 37662 (423) 229-2000 leer@eastman.com We have 
done a series of projects. Behind this paper is a data analysis, data fusion and data logging 
facility. We used the 1999 project from DARPA for this work.' 
"distribute the whole system to all nodes with a dynamic and adaptive management introduce 
autonomous workflows identification of problems and infected nodes" 
"Mixed anomaly/rule - based IDSs can help solving many of the problems, bud anomaly -
based IDSs still have to mature. Anomaly - based IDSs should be more specific to the type of 
monitored service (HTTP, IMAP, etc.)." 
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"Early generations of IDS technology fired aways dozens of alerts that were generally 
meaningless in the hopes of analysts and data fusion engines to determine the real from the 
chaff. Current technology is able to understand the system being attacked, its operating system 
and vulnerabilities and leverage that in concert with multiphases of attack to determine i f 
something is a threat versus a malicious packet. With these systems only valid threats are 
reported. I would hope this survey gets a little more focused on state of the art rather than 
reporting on circa 2000 enterprise fears and experience of IDS." 
"Many of the challenges, while worthwhile are being looked at by various researchers. For 
example, folks are already considering detection schemes for hi-speed networks. I personally 
have looked into dealing with inspecting VPN traffic. One other challenge that is not listed is 
the intrusiveness of the technology— if it makes your system slow and a hi false positive rate, 
the technology will not be well received in the community." 
"The questions could be improved to get better answers. 
"IDS (or IPS) should implement more abstract signatures for detecting a whole class of attacks 
(see http://www.infosys.tuwien.ac.at/Staff/tt/publications/dissertation_toth.pdf for abstract 
signatures). For evaluating the impact of responses, IPS and CMDBs should share one 
information pool to evaluate the impact of response actions. The usability of an IPS (and its 
gui) is VERY important. Not all the alerts are equally important - severity levels (as for 
example implemented in the McAfee Intrushield) can help very much in handling the generated 
results (e.g. by ignoring all the informational alerts and showing high and medium severity 
alerts only)." 
"The IDS technology has disappointed the market, due to the problems you mention in this 
questionnaire. That is why they were repackaged and re-marketed as IPS, which to my opinion 
were even a much worse solution." 
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Assessing the challenges of Intrusion Detection Systems 
T.Ibrahim, S.M.Furnell, M.Papadaki and N.L.Clarke 
Centre for Information Security & Network Research, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, 
United Kingdom 
cisnr@plymouth.ac.uk 
Abstract 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are a commonly recognised element of the Internet 
security arsenal, regularly considered alongside firewalls and anti-virus as options for 
protecting networked systems. However, despite the widespread availability, the actual 
deployment and use of IDS is considerably less than these other technologies, suggesting that 
practical factors are potentially constraining their adoption. This paper seeks to further 
investigate this issue, drawing upon prior literature to identify the range of challenges that 
may be posed by IDS, and then mounting a survey to determine their relative significance. A 
web-based questionnaire was used to solicit information and opinion from IDS users and 
other IDS-aware respondents. A total of 41 responses were obtained, which (although 
limited) was sufficient to reveal a notable finding in the overall response. Specifically, while 
the received wisdom suggests that the most pressing challenge of IDS is the volume of false 
positives, the survey results indicated that a number of human-related aspects (relating to 
understanding, skills and ability to correlate information) were actually more prominent 
problems. 
Ke>^'ords: Intrusion Detection Systems, Security, Challenges 
1. Introduction 
In the face of a wide range of online attacks. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) represent a 
potentially valuable safeguard to identify and combat the problems. However, despite the 
fact that a variety of commercial and open source solutions are available across a range of 
operating system and network platforms, it is notable that the deployment o f IDS is often 
markedly less than other well-known network security countermeasures. Evidence for this 
claim is provided by the CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey 2007 (Richardson, 2007), 
which shows that while anti-virus and firewall protection are used by 98% and 97% of 
respondents respectively, the adoption of IDS sits at a more modest 69% (with the 
percentages based upon a group of 484 respondents, two thirds of whom were from large 
organisations with 500+ employees). The point is further supported by findings from UK-
based industry analysts Freeform Dynamics, as illustrated in Figure 1, which show IDS to 
enjoy a significantly lower level of implementation than other security technologies. 
Such findings raise questions about why IDS are less prominent than other well-known 
countermeasures, including many that have appeared in the marketplace more recently and 
had less time to establish themselves. One possible reason could, of course, be that the 
threats that IDS seek to combat are not as prominent or significant as those targeted by the 
other, more popular countermeasures. However, given that IDS can actually assist in dealing 
with many of the same threats as firewalls and anti-virus, this would not be a valid 
conclusion. Similarly, another possible argument is that they may not represent an effective 
solution, and therefore many organisations chose not to use them. However, i f this was the 
case then one would instinctively expect the level of penetration to be even lower. As such, it 
appears likely that other factors are also coming into play, with potential users facing 
challenges that ultimately prevent IDS from being adopted. 
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Figure 1 : Implementation of security measures (Source: Freeform Dynamics) 
With the above in mind, this paper seeks to further explore the challenges posed by IDS 
technologies, drawing upon a literature-informed assessment of the potential problem areas in 
order to mount a siu^^ey amongst IDS users and others in a position to deploy the technology. 
The next section presents a summary of the potential challenges, with section 3 then 
proceeding to outline the survey methodology and the findings that were observed. The 
results suggest that the problems encountered in practice are somewhat different to the issues 
that tend to appear dominant in the literature and industry coverage, and resultant conclusions 
are drawn in the final section of the paper. 
2. Challenges posed by Intrusion Detection Systems 
In terms of challenges, one of the most commonly identified issues in relation to IDS is the 
problem of false alarms, resulting from situations in which legitimate and harmless activity is 
falsely judged to represent an attack. Indeed, the perceived problems of false positives (e.g. 
the consequent time wasted by investigating them, or the potential for genuine alerts to be 
overlooked in the noise) have led to significant changes in the marketplace, with the 
emergence of Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) technologies occurring as a direct response 
to this issue and the negative press surrounding IDS (Gartner, 2003). Having said this, false 
positives are far from the only issue that can present problems, and a review of IDS literature 
reveals that challenges may be faced at a number of levels, fi-om constraints during the initial 
rollout of the technology through to its effectiveness in ongoing use. Experience of the 
problems (or perceptions of them based upon received wisdom) may prevent IDS adoption 
from occurring, or lead to solutions being abandoned as unworkable. 
For the purposes of this investigation, a total of 21 potential issues were identified, which 
were then grouped into five broad categories to reflect the nature of the problems and/or the 
point in the process at which they occur. These are discussed in the sub-sections that follow, 
with the brief descriptions provided in each case mirroring those that were used in the 
questionnaire study described later in this paper. 
2.7 Deployment Challenges 
The challenges here relate to problems that may be faced in terms of deploying an IDS in the 
first instance, and depending upon their severity may prevent further progress to an 
operational phase (Peddisetty, 2005; Salour and Su, 2007; Wei et al. 2001). 
• Scalability constraints 
The size of the network can affect the efficiency of the IDS. For instance, as the size 
of the network increases, the efficiency of signature-based IDS decreases. 
• Switched networks 
In the presence of switching technology, monitoring the network efficiently requires 
the deployment of more IDS to inspect the several network segments traffic. 
• Packet dropping and high speed network traffic 
The high speed of network traffic combined with the information overioad can cause 
packet dropping. Therefore, the probability of missing attacks increases. 
• Encrypted traffic and IPv6 
Encrypted traffic attacks successfully reach the destination without being monitored 
by IDS. 
• Initial deployment cost 
Deployment costs may include the cost of purchasing the IDS and the initial training 
for those who wi l l be responsible for managing it. 
Having been deployed, a number of further challenges may then be faced during the ongoing 
operation and use of IDS technology. 
2.2 Management Challenges 
Once deployed, the IDS represents another element of the IT infrastructure that needs to be 
managed and maintained. As such, there are a number of difficulties that can potentially 
arise from this direction (Cavusoglu et al. 2005; Conti et al. 2006; Teo and Ahn, 2007). 
• Volume of information 
The amount information generated by the IDS increases the workload for the 
system/security administrator who has to consider it. 
• Ensuring effective configuration 
It is difficult to tune the intrusion-detection system to minimize false alarms and 
missed attacks. 
• Managing a heterogeneous IDS environment 
In the case of deploying multiple IDSs from different vendors, problems of 
interoperability might occur. Some of these differences might be in the way IDSs 
report alerts, their ruleset, etc. 
• Ongoing operational costs 
The cost of maintaining IDSs can be significant, as it requires skilled staff to manage 
it, analyze and respond to the security alerts that are generated. 
2.3 Technical Challenges 
Beyond the general maintenance of the IDS platform, a number of specific issues need to be 
considered in terms of ensuring that it can operate correctly and be used effectively (Salour 
and Su, 2007; Smith et al. 2006; Xiao and Xiao, 2007). 
• Vulnerability to attacks 
Some attackers target the IDS itself rather than other elements in the network, with 
the aim of bypassing intrusion detection. I f attackers can take the IDS out service, 
further attack can be launched against other targets within the network. 
• Data collection and logging 
Many sources can provide the IDS with data, which might have different formats. 
Therefore, there is a requirement to integrate these into an appropriate format for the 
IDS. 
• Difficulty in customizing and updating the IDS ruleset 
One of the challenges is to keep the IDS ruleset regularly updated. In addition, it is 
important to customize the set of rules, in order to effectively detect attacks in the 
monitored network. 
• Understanding and interpreting IDS data 
There is a requirement for an efficient methodology to log the network trafilc and as a 
consequence, to analyze and validate the IDS alerts, in order to determine i f actual 
intrusions are taking place. Moreover, the traffic logs and the alerts logs need to be 
presented in a meaningful and robust interface. 
2.4 Detection Challenges 
The challenges here are those that arise directly as a result of the IDS performing its analysis 
and generating alerts (Joo et al. 2003; Koike and Ohno, 2004; Xiao and Xiao, 2007). There is 
a clear relationship between some of these points and those already highlighted under the 
•management" category (e.g. the issue of effective configuration and the subsequent effect 
upon false positives and false negatives). 
• The large number of alerts 
IDS can produce a large number of alerts and can therefore require significant effort 
to monitor. 
• IDS can miss too many genuine attacks (i.e. false negatives) 
A false negative occurs when the IDS fails to detect malicious network traffic, which 
as a result goes undetected. 
• IDS can raise too many erroneous alerts (i.e. false positives) 
A false positive refers to the network trafTic that the IDS considers malicious but are 
not. 
• Determining the alert severity level 
There are no standard metrics for the alert severity level. Therefore, a combination of 
organization security policy and security operator experience is required in order to 
interpret and rank/prioritize the generated alerts. 
• Alert correlation 
There is a requirement to study the relationship between the various IDS alerts to 
determine the occurrence of the attack scenarios. Hence, the alert correlation process 
is not trivial, and is often not without problems. 
2,5 Response Challenges 
The final group of challenges essentially relate to the ability to handle the alerts that an IDS 
has generated (Goodall et al. 2004; Peddisetly, 2005; Stakhanova et al. 2007). 
• Requirement for skilled staff 
The requirement of highly skilled staff is the core of the IDS process. Without staff to 
manage the IDSs and analyze / validate considerable numbers o f IDS alerts, the 
purpose of having an IDS becomes less and less useful. 
• The potential for inappropriate and harmful responses 
Responses may cause harmful effects i f issued on the basis of false positives. For 
instance, normal traffic might be blocked or a normal network session be terminated. 
• Effectiveness of the IDS response 
Many IDSs are passive, they just report the damage caused by an attacker and provide 
the security operator with the collected information. Automatic response is cost-
effective but most of the IDS responses are still manually even though manually 
response is time consuming. 
In summary, this section has identified a variety of challenges that could have bearing upon 
IDS deployment decisions and affect their ongoing use. However, these issues are unlikely to 
have an equivalent impact in practice, and further investigation is therefore required to 
determine their relative influence. To this end, the decision was taken to survey the views of 
IDS users and other IT professionals who are familiar with the technologies, 
3. Assessing IDS challenges in practice 
In order to assess the perceptions and experiences o f IDS-related challenges in practice, a 
questionnaire was designed in order to elicit the opinions of respondents with knowledge and 
experience in the domain. Specifically, the study sought to target: 
• those who are (or have previously been) in a position to make IDS deployment 
decisions. 
• those who have experience with IDS solutions in their organization. 
• others who felt able to offer an informed opinion. 
Email-based invitations to participate in the study and complete the web-based questionnaire 
were sent over 2,000 potential respondents, taken from a mailing list of local organisations 
that was purchased to support the study. In addition, the survey was promoted via the website 
of the local British Computer Society (BCS) branch and via direct contacts with persons 
working in large organizations (i.e. banks, hospitals, universities and telecommunication). 
Unfortunately, despite the large-scale promotion, only 41 usable responses were received 
during the 2 month period in which the questionnaire was available online (over 90 people 
visited the site and began the questionnaire, but only a subset completed it f i i l ly) . The limited 
nature of the response was likely to have been influenced by the perceived sensitivity of the 
topic-matter, and the fact that participation could potentially have given insights into the 
security stance o f the respondents' organisations (albeit with the assurance on the 
questionnaire itself that the findings would be anonymous and would only be used for the 
purposes of the study). Nonetheless, the majority of responses were received fi-om 
participants who appeared to be well-placed to offer an opinion, and the results proved to 
provide useflil insights into the challenges that are faced. 
The vast majority of respondents were able to claim practical experience of IDS (Figure 2), 
with a smaller majority also having deployed them within their current organisation (Figure 
3). As such, the group as a whole was considered fairly well-placed to provide opinions. It 
is worth remembering that even those respondents without practical experience of IDS were 
able to offer relevant opinions, in the sense that they may have decided not to deploy IDS 
because o f the challenges that they perceived. 
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Figure 2 : IDS experience (years) 
30 
25 
B 20 
CD 
10 
10 
D e p o t y e d I D S D e c i d e d n o t to d e p o l y ( D S A b l e to o f f e r o p i n i o n s a b o u t I D S 
c h a l l e n g e s 
Figure 3 : IDS deployment within current organisation 
More than two thirds of the respondents came from large organisations (500+ employees), 
while a fifth came from small organisations (<100 employees). 
Having provided their background details, the respondents were asked to consider each of the 
21 issues, and indicate whether they believed it to be a challenge or not. Each issue was rated 
on a 5-poinl scale, from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree', with a further option provided 
to allow 'Don't know' responses. At this stage in the questionnaire the potential challenges 
were considered individually, with no attempt to draw comparisons between them or rate the 
actual significance of each one. The findings are presented in Table I , which shows the 
number of respondents in agreement for each issue (note that the columns are headed as 
follows: SA - strongly agree; A - agree; N - neutral; D - disagree; SD - strongly disagree; 
D K - d o n ' t know). 
Challenge SA A N D S D DK 
Deployment challenges 
1 Scalability constraints 8 20 3 5 4 1 
2 Switched networks 9 15 5 6 3 3 
3 Packet dropping and high speed 
network traffic 
8 17 5 6 4 1 
4 Encrypted traffic and IPvS 7 11 6 7 4 6 
5 Initial deployment cost 8 23 6 0 2 2 
Management challenges 
6 Volume of information 16 20 2 1 1 1 
7 Ensuring effective configuration 9 21 2 8 1 0 
8 Managing a heterogeneous IDS 
environment 
10 18 8 0 0 5 
9 Onqoinq operational costs 12 23 1 4 1 0 
Technical challenges 
10 Vulnerability to attacks 9 24 5 1 1 1 
11 Data collection and logging 9 24 5 0 0 3 
12 Difficulty in customizing and updating 
the IDS mleset 
9 23 6 1 1 1 
13 Understanding and interpreting IDS 
data 
13 23 4 0 0 1 
Detection challenges 
14 The large number of alerts 15 15 8 2 1 0 
15 IDS can miss too many genuine 
attacks (I.e. false negatives) 
12 15 11 2 0 1 
16 IDS can raise too many erroneous 
alerts (I.e. false positives) 
13 19 7 1 1 0 
17 Determining the alert security level 2 27 8 2 1 1 
18 Alert correlation 9 23 6 2 0 1 
Response challenges 
19 Requirement for skilled staff 13 19 6 3 0 0 
20 The potential for inappropriate and 
harmful responses 
10 20 9 1 0 1 
21 Effectiveness of the IDS response 4 24 7 4 0 2 
Table 1 : Individual assessment of lDS challenges 
Respondents were also able to suggest other challenges in addition to the pre-defmed set. In 
the majority of cases, no flirther suggestions were forthcoming, and thus those responses that 
were received would not usefully feed forward to influence the overall results. For the 
record, however, examples of the further issues flagged here included problems posed by 
polymorphic and zero-day attacks (which could arguably be linked to the issue of false 
negatives already listed as challenge 15). and problems of visualising alerts (which can link 
to the challenges 14 and 18 from the table). 
An examination of the table as a whole clearly reveals strong levels of agreement across the 
majority of the potential challenges. Indeed, this aspect is further illustrated by Figure 4, 
which presents the aggregate levels of response across the whole set and can therefore be 
taken as an overall measure of the degree to which respondents agree that IDS pose a 
challenge. It is clear from the overall volume of agreement-related responses that IDS are 
perceived as being far from problem free. 
S*^^"9'y Don-t K n o w 
Disagree 30/ 
Disagree 30/^  -^ ^^  
7% 
Strongly 
Agree 
24% 
Neutral 
14% 
Figure 4 : Overall perception of whether IDS pose a challenge 
Looking by category within Table 1, it is interesting to note that the highest levels o f strong 
agreement are scored in relation to 'management' and 'detection" challenges, and with factors 
such as volume of information, the large number of alerts, and the occurrence of false 
positives drawing the highest scores across the set and a clear relationship able to be drawn 
between them. By contrast, the "deployment" challenges categor>' is most notable for the 
highest levels of disagreement, again tending to suggest that it is the ongoing operation of 
IDS rather than the initial establishment that poses the more significant challenge. 
Having been asked about each of the challenges individually, the respondents were also asked 
to rate them relative to each other, by nominating a ranked list of the top 5 challenges. It is at 
this stage that the significance of the issues becomes more apparent, and it is notable that 
some points that were widely accepted as being challenges (e.g. the volume of information) 
no longer feature when the respondents were asked to consider them in this context. Figure 5 
presents the results of this exercise, with the numbering of the challenges corresponding to 
the earlier list from Table 1. 
41 
1 
9 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Challenge Number | Q A I I Participants S D e p l o y l D S 
Figure 5 : Weighted ranking of top challenges 
For ease of reference, the top-ranked challenges are summarised in Table 2, showing the 
order of the four most challenging aspects as identified across the whole respondent group 
and within the subset that had IDS deployment experience. 
Rank All respondents Respondents deploying IDS 
1 Alert correlation Alert correlation 
2 Understanding and interpreting IDS 
data 
Requirement for skilled staff 
3 Requirement for skilled staff IDS can raise too many erroneous 
alerts (i.e. false positives) 
4 IDS can raise too many erroneous 
alerts (i.e. false positives) 
Understanding and interpreting IDS 
data 
Table 2: Top-ranked IDS challenges 
An examination of the results here reveals an interesting characteristic, in the majority of 
these issues can be related back to the effectiveness of people rather than the effectiveness of 
the technology. Specifically, the only factor from Table 2 that relates to the capability of the 
IDS is the issue of false positives. Meanwhile, alert correlation relies upon the ability of the 
IDS administrator to identify relationships and draw conclusions from the data, which in turn 
links to the challenges of understanding the data and the requirement for skilled stall. These 
findings are significant, in the sense that they are somewhat contrary to the received wisdom 
that the main impediment to the use of IDS is posed by the problem of false positives. 
Although it is still ranked much higher than many other potential issues, it does not emerge as 
the dominant issue that might otherwise be supposed. Of course, this is not to suggest that 
there is not a relationship between false fx)sitives and the other factors (e.g. with a larger 
volume of false positives there are more alerts to correlate, and thus more data to be 
understood by suitably skilled staff), but at the same time i f we accept the likelihood that 
some level of false positives are always likely to remain, then focusing attention towards 
reducing the other challenges would be a desirable approach. 
4, Conclusion 
From a conceptual perspective, IDS have the potential to provide a valuable contribution to 
the security of Internet-based systems. However, it is clear from the findings presented in 
this paper that they are considered to present a variety of challenges - the extent of which (or 
at least people's perception of them) could represent an obstacle to IDS being deployed at all. 
Although there were significant levels of agreement for all o f the suggested challenges when 
considered in isolation, it was interesting to observe the predominance of people-orienled 
issues when they were considered in a weighted ranking. Given that problems of skills and 
understanding were dominant even within a respondent group primarily composed from large 
organisations (i.e. where one would expect skilled staff to be available, or at least able to be 
hired), it can be assumed that the situation facing SMEs or end-users running IDS on personal 
systems would be even more severe. 
The high placement of the people-related issues should not be interpreted to mean that 
technical challenges are insignificant or more easily resolved, but it would certainly be fair to 
say that greater attention has already been devoted towards addressing the technology issues. 
Consequently, what the findings here would suggest is a need to balance this with attempts to 
mediate the IDS and simplify the user experience. As such, these emerge as recommended 
areas for fiiture research. 
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Abstract. From a previous study we have determined that commercial security 
products can suffer from a usability perspective, lacking the necessaiy attention to 
design in relation to their alert interfaces. The aim of the paper is to assess the 
usability of alerts in some of the leading Internet security packages, based upon a 
related set of usability criteria. The findings reveal that the interface design 
combined with the user^ s relative lack of security knowledge are two major 
challenges that influence their decision making process. The analysis of the alert 
designs showed thai four of the criteria are not addressed in any of the selected 
security measures and it would be desirable to consider the user's previous decisions 
on similar alerts, and modify alerts according to the user's previous behaviour. 
Keywords: Security, Usability, Human Computer Interaction (HCI), Home Users, 
Intrusion Detection Systems, Security Software, Network Scanning 
1 Introduction 
Until relatively recently, home users could rely upon basic anti-virus (AV) as a sufficient 
level of protection for their systems. However, with evidence suggesting that as much as 
95% of Internet attacks are directed towards home users [1], AV alone is no longer 
enough to protect against the range o f threats [2]. Therefore, the deployment of other 
advanced solutions such as Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Intrusion 
Prevention Systems (IPS) becomes necessary. Meanwhile, the management and 
manipulation of these solutions may require a level of IT literacy and security knowledge 
that many home users may not possess. The findings of [3] validate the requirement for 
high skilled staff to mange IDS in organizations, and it can easily be recognized that home 
users will face more difficulty in this respect. In recent years, security vendors have 
moved towards integrated AV, firewall and IDS tools, which are commonly marketed as 
Internet Security solutions [4]. However, although the combination of tools can provide 
users with a convenient and comprehensive solution, this does not necessarily guarantee 
attention to improving the usability. Ibrahim et al. [5] proposed a set of novel Human 
Computer Interaction - Security (HCI-S) usability criteria and applied them to the 
evaluation o f a typical alert raised by Norton 360. Even from a single example, this served 
to highlight a number of potential usability issues, and was considered sufficient to justify 
a wider evaluation o f other tools against the same criteria. The current paper therefore 
investigates and assesses the usability of alerts across a wider range of security software. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief description of 
our pre-proposed HCI-S usability criteria for end-user security tools. Section 3 then 
describes the approach that was used to generate alerts within the difTerent tools, in order 
to yield a basis for evaluation. Section 4 then analyses and assesses the usability of the 
resulting alerts according to the HCI-S usability criteria. Finally, Section 5 presents 
conclusions about the findings and future directions of the research. 
2 Usability Criteria for End-User Security Tools 
Many studies have considered criteria for Human Computer Interaction (HCI). For 
example, Nielsen [6], [7] proposed a set of usability heuristics that are widely accepted 
and adopted. However, while numerous studies have addressed the issues of HCI and IDS 
individually, relatively little has been done to combine HCI and security together, and 
there is still an opportunity to integrate and extend the research in both disciplines to 
better support end users. For instance, Johnston et al. [8] modified Nielsen's criteria and 
proposed a new set of usability criteria for security interfaces designed for end-users, 
evaluated via an analysis of Windows XP's Uitemet Connection Firewall (ICF). From this 
basis and other related work. Ibrahim et al. [5] proposed a further set of HCI-S usability 
criteria addressing the interface design of security alerts issued to end-user. These criteria 
are listed and summarised as follows: 
1. Interfaces Design Matches User's Mental Model: Alert designers should attempt to 
think as users to develop interfaces match their mental model. 
2. Aesthetic and Minimalist Design: Irrelevant or rarely needed information should 
not be displayed in the security alert. 
3. Visibility of the Alert Detector Name: The appearance of the security tool name, 
which triggers the alert, is useful, specially, with the existence of more than one 
installed security tool on the user's system. 
4. Establish Standard Colours to Attract User Attention: In general, the use of red 
and yellow colours in security alert interfaces is fairiy standard. The red indicates a 
high severity alert; while the (orange or yellow) indicates a low severity one. 
5. Use Icons as Visual Indicators: Users are most often affected by the use of pictures 
and icons in the interfaces. 
6. Explicit Words to Classify the Security Risk Level: The user requires written 
confirmation of the security risk level and that information must be obvious in the 
main alert interface, not hidden in a secondary interface. 
7. Consistent Meaningful Vocabulary and Terminology: The alert senience(s) should 
be simple, short and informative and the words used in these sentence(s) should be 
familiar to the user. 
8. Consistent Controls and Placement: The Allow and Block buttons exists in some 
security alerts without providing the user with any insight about the impact o f this 
selection (e.g. the allowance or the blocking might be permanent or temporary). 
9. Learnability, Flexibility and Efficiency of Use: The current criterion stresses the 
use of explanatory tooltips for concepts or security terms that appear in the alert to 
enhance the system flexibility, while providing links to a built-in library or/and an 
Internet web page, to increase the system efTiciency. 
10. Take Advantage of Previous Security Decisions: This criterion consists o f two 
parts as follows: the user's own alert history (i.e. his previous responses to the alert) 
and community decisions (i.e. responses of other individuals to the alert). 
11. Online Security Policy Configuration: Designers should develop an efficient 
default configuration for the security policy. The aim of the criterion is in guiding the 
user to adjust the security settings to avoid, i f possible, any conflict between the 
intended primary tasks and the security configuration. 
12. Confirm / Recover the impact of User Decision: Sometimes, user errors are 
inevitable and vary from simple mistakes to dangerous errors. Therefore, the user 
should receive a confirmation message af^er performing any response, which wil l 
affect the security of the system. 
13. Awareness of System Status all the Time: The user requires a simple report 
declaring the state of the system as a result of their response to the alert. 
14. Help Provision and Remote Technical Support: The alert should be designed to let 
the users be self-sufficient; however, some novice users will still require further 
support. Tools should therefore provide built-in help and remote technical support. 
15. Offer Responses that Match User Expectations: The actual impact of the available 
alert responses options does not always match the user's expectation. Therefore, good 
alert design is not only what is required to obtain a secure system but also to ensure 
the user's correct comprehension and understanding. 
16. Trust and Satisfaction: Users' lack of understanding and/or inability to react 
correctly to alerts can strongly influence their resulting trust and/or satisfaction. 
3 Assessing Security Tools Alerts 
This section outlines the selection of the Internet Security tools against which the usability 
criteria were applied, along with the method by which the tools themselves were tested in 
order to generate the required security alerts. Having already identified Norton 360 during 
the earlier study, nine fUrther Internet Security suites were selected to give a wider basis 
for evaluation. The selections were made on the basis of products recommended in a 
related review [9], plus the addition of products from F-Secure and Kaspersky (both 
popular options within the home and small business user communities). A further criterion 
was that each product should incorporate an intrusion detection or/and prevention 
capability (ensuring the ability to detect attacks against systems). The resulting list of 
tools was as follows (noting that free trial versions were used in some cases): BitDefender 
Internet Security 2009; CA Internet Security Suite Plus 2009; F-Secure Internet Security 
2009; Kaspersky Internet Security 2009; McAfee Internet Security 2009; Norton 360 
Version 2.0; Panda Internet Security 2009; Security Shield 2009; Trend Micro Internet 
Security Pro 2009; and Webroot Internet Security Essentials. The resulting set is 
considered to represent a representative sample of the available security tools. However, it 
should be noted that the aim of the evaluation (and indeed this paper) is not to identify the 
best product, but rather to determine the extent to which usability issues can be identified 
across a wider base o f software. 
Network scanning represents the initial step in many types of attacks [10]. Many tools 
can be used, for instance Nessus [ I I ] and Nmap [12]. This study adopts the default 
profiles of Nmap command lines within Zenmap GUI [12] to investigate the design of the 
alert interfaces triggered as a consequence. The evaluation experiments were held in a 
closed test bed environment consisting of two computers running Windows XP. Scanning 
processes were performed from the attacker computer running Zenmap GUI against the 
victim computer mnning the candidate security products. Table I illustrates the Zenmap 
GUI profiles and the correspondence Nmap command lines that are tested. 
Table 1. Zenmap GUI profiles and the associated Nmap command lines 
Zenmap GUI Profile Nmap Command Line 
1 Intense scan nmap -PE -PA21,23,80.3389 -A -v .T4 192.168.x.x 
2 Intense scan plus UDP nmap -PE -v .PA21,23,80,3389 -sU -A -T4 I92.168.x.x 
3 Intense scan, all TCP ports nmap -PE -v -pl-65535 -PA21.23,80,3389 -A -T4 I92.168.x.x 
4 Intense scan, no ping nmap-A-v-PN-T4 192.168.x.x 
5 Ping scan nmap -PE -PA21,23.80,3389 -sP 192.168.x.x 
6 Quick scan nmap -T4-F 192.168.x.x 
7 Quick scan plus nmap -T4 -version-lifiht -sV -F -0 192.168.x.x 
8 Quick traceroute nmap-p22,23,25.803389 -traceroutc-PN I92.168.x.x 
9 Regular scan nmap 192.168.xjc 
10 Slow comprehensive scan nmap-PE -v -PS2I,22,23,25,80,11331339 "Script=all -PC -
PA80,113,443,10042 -sU -PP - A -T4 I92.l68.x.x 
4 Analysis of End-Users Security Alerts According to HCI-S Criteria 
During the evaluation, alerts were generated by all of the tools apart from McAfee, which 
did not issue any visible responses to the scanning anempls (note: this is not to suggest 
that they were undetected, but rather that the user was not explicitly notified in real-time). 
However, the variety of alerts generated via the other products satisfies the aim of the 
study. The rest of the section focuses upon analyzing some key examples of these, 
according to the HCI-S usability criteria from [5]. Rather than commenting extensively 
against each tool, the discussion is structured according to the criteria headings, with 
examples being drawn from across the tools to illustrate significant issues. 
4.1 Interfaces Design Matches User's Mental Model 
Of the tools that explicitly notified the user of detecting a suspicious activity, all but 
Webroot's issued a response on behalf o f the user. As shown in Fig. I , Webroot's was the 
only alert that did not explicitly indicate whether the product had managed to handle the 
detected intrusion or not, nor give the user any further interaction options. 
Hrewall Alert 
R r e w a 9 hoc d e t e c t e d « n > W A S s c a n . 
Firewall Alert 
R r e w e B h a s d e t e c t e d « n NLf lJ . s c a n . 
Fig. 1. Webroot's Internet Security Essentials alert interfaces 
It is likely that alerts issued to users would be more usable through the occurrence of a 
user response sector in the bottom of the alert. For instance, Norton 360 (i.e. Fig. 2a) and 
Trend Micro are considered to be the only products that match the current criterion as they 
implicitly identified that the perceived intrusion access is blocked and present a user with 
Allow and Block options. Hence, the user has the benefit of both the automatic security 
response and the manual option to adjust and/or confirm the response. By contrast. Fig. 2b 
illustrates a different example of Norton's alert that does not match the current criterion 
because the alert does not include a description of the cause of the alert, or any links or 
tooltips to provide the user with more information. 
Norton 360 
G> Norton 3 6 0 
Nor ton SCO t d o c k e d a n tnti u s i o n o n e i n p L 
Fig. 2. Norton 360 intrusion alerts: (a) interactive (lef^) and (b) notification (right) 
4.2 Aesthetic and Minimalist Design 
In some cases alerts are too minimalist, with examples from Security Shield and 
BitDefender shown in Fig. 3. In these cases the source of the intrusion should be 
identified to the novice in a more meaningful manner (as they are unlikely to be greatly 
informed by the IP address), whereas more informed users may be interested in additional 
options (such as the opportunity to suppress further notifications). 
S c c u r t t v ettte<cl 2 0 0 Q ' 
Fig. 3. Security Shield & BilDefender alerts interfaces 
4.3 Visibility of the Alert Detector Name 
With the exception o f Webroot, all of the security tools provide the name of the detector 
in the head of their alert interfaces. Instead of indicating the name of the product suite (i.e. 
the thing that the user may most likely recall installing or recognise that they are running), 
Webroot's alert is attributed to the firewall, as shown in Fig. 1. Of course, many of the 
Internet security suites consist of integrated security solutions based on underlying 
components such as anti-virus, anti-spyware and firewall, and so it is perhaps not 
surprising that alerts appear under the name o f these components rather than that of the 
wider suite. However, it would still be useful for the vendor name to appear so that the 
user has a basis for making the association back to the product they recognise. The 
problem with the anonymous alerts shown in Fig. I is that the user may wonder i f they 
were caused by something else (e.g. by the Windows firewall or faked by malware). 
4.4 Establish Standard Colours to Attract User Attention 
The use of standard colours to express information to users in a simple and rapid way 
should be considered and addressed better to improve the design of alerts. With the 
exception of the IrafHc light colours, there are almost no other standard colours to 
represent the alert severity. Therefore, most likely, the use of the green colour indicates 
that the system status is secure, the use of the yellow colour indicates a low risk level and 
the red colour indicates a high risk level. For instance, Norton 360 and F-Secure used 
yellow in the exclamation icon to indicate the risk level of the detected activity. In 
contrast. Panda used the red colour within the No Entry symbol to indicate that an 
intrusion attempt is blocked. However, it is noticed that the border colour of most of the 
studied alerts are blue apart of Norton and Webroot's that are yellow and green, 
respectively. The use of the blue border could be significant in case that these products are 
adapting a standard colour-coding such as the Homeland Security Advisory System 
(HSAS), where a wider range of colours are adopted (i.e. green, blue, yellow, orange, or 
red) to determine the severity of the threat level [13]. Finally, it is arguable that Webroot's 
use of the green colour provides a false secure impression to the user. Therefore, it is 
recommended to design alerts that have an appropriate border colour as an indicator to the 
threat level, and to avoid insignificant and misleading ones. 
4.5 Use icons as Visual Indicators 
The use of icons as visual indicators should be essential, relevant and significant. 
Likely, users receive the primary alert message through the colours and icons. For 
instance, F-Secure and Norton 360 (i.e. Fig. 2a) use an exclamation mark icon as a visual 
indicator to indicate an intrusion attempt. Most likely, the yellow colour used within the 
icons indicates a low threat level. Unlike F-secure, Norton 360 alert confirms that 
indication explicitly through assigning Risk Level: Low within a complementary interface. 
Meanwhile, Panda uses the No Entry symbol aligned with a padlock icon, as shown in 
Fig. 4, to indicate that an intrusion attempt is detected and blocked. However, it is 
suggested to deploy appropriate icons that does not contradict criterion 4, Establish 
Standard Colours to Attract User Attention. Furthermore, Panda is the only product that 
uses two methods for deploying icons in the alert as an information mark icon is placed 
next 10 the technical term Denial of Service to indicate that there is more information 
available i f required. The use of this icon is relevant and it would be more usable i f the 
icon colour was more visible. 
Intrusion attempt blocked! 
, i i | A )5QfA 5«in: a) lytK ifrtrusioh attempt agaiBl 
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Fig. 4. Panda Intemel Security 2009 alert interfaces and tooltips 
4.6 Explicit Words to Classify the Security Risk Level 
This criterion identifies one of the remarkable limitations within the design of the studied 
alerts. With the exception of Norton and Trend Micro, none of the evaluated products 
explicitly classify the security risk level. Norton 360 (i.e. Fig. 2a) determined the security 
risk level as Risk Level: Low in a complementary interface through clicking Show Details. 
In contrast. Trend Micro is more explicit by determining the security risk level in the main 
alert as Risk: Safe. However, assigning the risk to be Safe raises a question of the benefit 
of issuing the alert in the first place. From the usability perspective, addressing the 
optimal location for assigning the security risk level is required. Therefore, it is 
recommended to present the risk level explicitly in the alert main interface, and then offer 
the associated reason for assigning this classification within a secondary interface. 
4.7 Consistent Meaningful Vocabulary and Terminology 
In general, the senlence(s) in most of the security alerts are simple and short, but there is 
no guarantee that these words are familiar to the user. For instance. Panda used the term 
Denial of Service aligned with a tooltip, but the provided information is neither a 
description nor a definition for the technical term. As most of the products make security 
decisions on behalf of the user, the user's main concern is likely to be whether the product 
has managed to deal with the problem or not. For instance, the words denied and 
protected are used to describe the product's response, but the most dominant word is 
blocked (as in intrusion attempt blocked!). However, locating this sentence at the top, as 
shown in Fig. 4 , would satisfy some novice users who might decide not to run through 
the rest of the alert. In contrast, BiiDefender and Security Shield use the sentence Your 
computer has been protected! to emphasize that the product had successfully protected the 
user from a threat, but the location of the sentence is at the bottom. Finally, it was found 
that the terminology within the alerts that requires user interaction such as Trend Micro's 
and Norton 360 (i.e.Fig. 2a ), does not impede the user from making a security decision. 
4.8 Consistent Controls and Placement 
Most of the alerts do not supply users with explicit control features. Meanwhile, F-Secure 
provides buttons that enable the user to investigate the alert. In contrast, Norton 360 
(i.e.Fig. 2a) and Trend Micro alerts consist o f {Allow and Block) buttons located at the 
bottom of the alert interface. Most likely, this location is appropriate as the user reaches 
the buttons afler running out through the alert. The main limitation of these buttons is that 
there is no indication of whether the impact of the user action is temporary or permanent. 
One solution could be appending another two buttons and explicitly defining the impact 
on the buttons such as Allow Once and Allow Always. 
4.9 Learnability, Flexibility and Efficiency of Use 
The use of explanatory tooltips for concepts that appears in the alert and/or the adoption 
of links to Internet web pages are rare among the evaluated alerts. For instance. Panda 
interfaces from Fig. 4 include the terms Port scan and Denial of Service, both of them are 
linked with explanatory tooltips but neither of them provides detailed information of the 
nature of the anack. instead, they determine the protocol, the remote IP address and the 
ports used in the attack. Furthenmore, Kaspersky includes a View report link, but the 
report does not provide the user with extra information and only includes the same 
information of the main alert in a more organized style. The alerts o f Kaspersky and 
Panda share the same feature o f having a drop list in the title bar at the top-right o f the 
alert. Panda's list consist of two elements, Help and Non-serious message settings, with 
the Help option guiding the user to access a general built-in help and its introductory 
interface explains that the intrusion attempt is blocked via the built-in firewall. Therefore, 
relocating these features from the drop list to a better location within the alert interface 
(such as the bottom of the alert) would be more visible and useful. 
4.10 Take Advantage of Previous Security Decisions 
While all of the previous criteria were addressed by at least some o f the evaluated security 
alerts, none of the products explicitly enabled users to leverage previous decisions to help 
them cope with the current alert. Therefore, the focus is upon assessing the alerts that 
required the user interaction such as Trend Micro's and Norton 360 (i.e. Fig. 2a). These 
products do not impede the user from making a security decision as the products already 
perform a blocking decision, identify the security risk level and provide response buttons. 
The novice user who does not have an experience with the cause of the present alert and 
does not have any further advice to call upon might fmd it more secure to implement the 
alert default response as these products did not specify any explicit recommendation to 
follow, such as accompanying the Block button with the word (recommended).There fore, 
it is worth establishing an alert history that stores the user's previous decisions, to provide 
a source of reference i f a similar alert arises in the future. Furthermore, it is suggested that 
the use of the social navigation method [14], would enrich the alert and to some extent 
support the user. Social navigation is considered to be a promising method in guiding 
novice users to make security decisions based on relevant individual decisions from those 
who have previously encountered similar alerts in their own environments. 
4.11 Online Security Policy Configuration 
This criterion is interested with integrating security policy features within the design of 
the alert itself There are some attempts to provide this feature within some o f the 
evaluated security products. For instance, CA and F-Secure provide a check box alongside 
text; Don't show this alert dialog again. Meanwhile, Trend Micro is more specific and 
uses a check box alongside the text; Stop warning about this program, and. since the 
program name occurs in the main alert, it would be clear that the user's decision affects 
only future events involving this program whatever the source IP address is, while in the 
previous instance it is not clear whether the decision would affect the program, the IP 
address, the port, or all the alerts. Another advantage of Trend Micro is that the check box 
is ticked by default as an explicit recommendation to the novice user. In contrast. Panda 
and Kaspersky adopt a different type of online configuration by providing a drop list. 
Panda list contains the Non-serious message settings option which allows adjustment of 
alerts. While, Kaspersky provides the options Disable this notification. Disable all 
notifications and Settings..., the impact of the first option is unexplained to the user. As 
such, they may be unclear about whether the impact of selecting this option is to disable 
the future similar alerts (I.e. with the same details), to disable all alerts associated with the 
same type o f attack regardless of the source, or to perform some other action. The 
previous examples are not the expected level o f online security policy configuration and 
need to be enhanced as the exact impact of some options were not completely clear and 
some other options were irrelevant (i.e. related to configuring other types of notifications 
that are not linked to the current alert) which overloads the user with unnecessary 
secondary security issues at an inappropriate lime. However, they are the only available 
examples in this study and one suggestion to satisfy this criterion is to provide an option 
to avoid frequent triggering of low-level alerts. 
4.12 Confirm / Recover the Impact of User Decision 
Confirming and recovering the impact of users' decisions is the second HCI-S usability 
criterion that is not addressed amongst the evaluated products. The absence of this 
criterion is illustrated by assessing Norton 360 (i.e. Fig. 2a) and Trend Micro, which 
provide control buttons that implement user's responses immediately without warning or 
reminding the user of the response impact, neither before nor af^er making the decision. 
Furthermore, there is no obvious method that informs the user of how to recover from 
wrong or inappropriate decisions. It is suggested that the security product should request 
additional confinnation, i f the user overrides the recommended option. The objective of 
the message is to display the user's current decision and the perceived impact, and 
whether the user prefers to proceed accomplishing the decision or return back to the main 
alert interface to alter the response. However, the current suggestion combines both the 
benefit of confirming the user decision and a primary recovery method. Moreover, in 
some cases the user might perform inappropriate decision that affects the functionality of 
their intended tasks. Therefore, developing usable methods to recover ftt)m undesired 
decisions is a requirement. A suggested solution is to make benefit of criterion 10, Take 
Advantage of Previous Security Decisions, where all the previous user decisions are stored 
and then recalled when required. Hence, the user could access the recently issued alerts 
and the corresponding decisions, and attempt to change a previous decision i f possible 
(e.g. i f the user subsequently wishes to allow a program that was previously blocked by 
mistake). Finally, the product can make use from criterion 4, Establish Standard Colours 
to Attract User Attention, and decrease the possibility of the recovery situations by 
appending a green border around the recommended response button. 
4.13 Awareness of System Status all the Time 
This is the third criterion that is not fully addressed through the evaluated products. Most 
likely, users who installed security measures within their personal computers presume that 
the security situation is under control and there is no need to worry until they receive a 
security alert. When that happens, most of the evaluated security alerts declare that an 
intrusion attempt is detected and blocked. Hence, this is the type of awareness o f the 
system status that these products provide to the user who wil l subsequently believe that he 
is protected. Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier, the McAfee product did not issue any alert 
during the evaluation, even though that the logs confirmed that it managed to detect the 
incoming traffic from the attacker computer. Hence, the user is not aware of the system 
status based on McAfee security policy. Furthermore, it is noticed that some products, 
such as Security Shield and BitDefender, display alerts that disappear quickly without the 
user's permission. Hence, there is a high possibility that the users would not notice the 
occurrence of the threat, especially i f they were not looking at the screen at the time. I f it 
is considered acceptable for users to miss them, then it questions the necessity of 
displaying the alerts in the first place. In contrast, Norton 360 (i.e. Fig. 2a) and Trend 
Micro, which provide a response capability, do not inform the user with the impact o f the 
response issued by the user. The user ought to receive a message informing him about the 
real impact and the consequences of his response. Therefore, the awareness of the system 
status all the time is not available. For instance, i f the user decided to use criterion 11, 
Online Security Policy Configuration^ and disabled the appearance of all alerts, it would 
be useful to get the product icon in the notification area to produce yellow, orange, red 
pulses as the occurrence of low. medium, red security risk levels, respectively. 
4.14 Help Provision and Remote Technical Support 
The alerts generated by most of the tools do not need help or remote technical support; not 
because of their completeness, but because o f the lack o f user decision responsibility. 
Meanwhile, Panda and F-Secure provide a built-in help which might be useful to enhance 
user knowledge but it does not support the user response since there are not any response 
controls in the alert interface. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the location of Panda Help 
is not appropriate since it is embedded in a drop-down list. CA's product uses the question 
mark icon as a visual indicator aligned with a Help link to anract the user but the link 
provides no specific information relevant to the present alert. The assessment of Norton 
360 (i.e. Fig. 2a) and Trend Micro - the two products that provide control features -
reveals that no help or remote support is provided within Trend Micro apart from Risk: 
Safe. In contrast. Norton 360 is considered to be the only product that satisfies the 
criterion, as it provides a variety of help provision and remote support to the user. From a 
usability perspective, the main limitation is in the location of the options. For further 
details, an extensive discussion of Norton 360 is available within [5]. 
4.15 Offer Responses that Match User Expectations 
This is the final criterion that is not fully addressed through the evaluated products. 
Firstly, most tools in the evaluation do not provide a user response component in the alert 
interface. Arguably, a portion of users would find it appropriate to have response options 
within the alert design. Secondly. Norton 360 (i.e. Fig. 2a) and Trend Micro are the only 
products that satisfy this feature and the assessment of the generated alerts reveals that 
there is no obvious method provided for the user to assess whether the response matches 
their expectation or not. Those users who have the privilege to respond to the alert 
perform their actions based upon their individual understanding. It is suggested to raise an 
explicit message after the user response to identify the real impact of the response. Hence, 
the user wil l be able to determine whether the response has achieved what they expected. 
4,16 Trust and Satisfaction 
In all likelihood, security products that managed to address most of the former HCI-S 
usability criteria are also able to satisfy and obtain the trust of users. Looking at specific 
factors that may improve this potential, we can consider whether the user is likely to feel 
they are getting the extent of information and feedback that seems convincing. For 
example, the design o f the security alerts of Norton 360 and F-secure provide users with a 
level of satisfaction because of the amount of relevant information they attempt to 
provide. For instance, the main interface of F-Secure provides a Details button that lets 
the user access more information about the cause of the alert, and then onwards to access 
the alert logs via a Show Alert Log option. 
4.17 Summary results 
Table 2 summarizes the findings across the full set of tools and criteria (note that because 
Norton 360 generated two types of alerts the associated results column sometimes 
presents differing results, with the first relating to the alert represented in Fig. 2a and the 
other relating to Fig. 2b). The findings reveal a remarkable limitation is that choosing the 
High sening o f the firewall alerts within the CA product bombards the user with hundreds 
o f alerts (up to a maximum of 500). Most likely, the user wil l dismiss these alerts instead 
of suspending the intended task to investigate the massive amount of alerts. From a 
usability perspective, it is impractical to overwhelm the user, in one second, with this 
amount of alerts specially that they only vary in detailed information of hundreds of local 
and remote ports used during the penetration. From the usability perspective, although the 
use of the Show Details link within Norton 360 (i.e. Fig. 2a) is usable, it would be 
preferable to avoid using the vertical scroll bar within the interface. Finally, the paper 
demonstrated to what extent the HCI-S usability criteria are addressed through the 
evaluation of colleaion of users security products. The findings reveal the strength and 
the weakness within the design of the issued alerts and some primary solutions are 
suggested as an anempt to resolve these weakness. It is anticipated that integrating the 
adequate features of the evaluated alerts, avoiding their limitations, and implementing the 
unaddressed HCI-S usability criteria, wil l enhance the design and make it more usable. 
Table 2. The usability aspects of end-user security software 
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1 Design Interfaces Match User Mental Model X X X X • x X X X 
2 Aesthetic and MinlmaJisl Desi^ X • • X • x • X • X 
3 Visibility of the Alert Detector Name • • • • • • • • X 
4 Establish Standard Colours to Attract User Attention X X X • • X X X 
5 Use Icons as Visual Indicators X • X • X X 
6 Explicit Words to Classify the Security Risk Level X X X X • x X X X 
7 Consistent Meaningful Vocabulary and Terminolosv' ^ X • • • • • • 
8 Consistent Controls and Placement X X X X • x X X • X 
9 Leamability, Flexibility and Efficiency of Use X X • • • x • X • X 
10 Take Advaniape of Previous Security Decisions X X X X X X X X X 
11 Online Security Policy Configuration X • • • X • X • K 
12 Confirm / Recover the Impact of User Decision X X X X X X X X X 
13 Awareness of System Status all the Time X X X X X X X X X 
14 Help Provision and Remote Technical Support X X X X • x X X X X 
15 Offer Responses Match Expectations X X X X X X X X X 
16 Trust and Satisfaction X X X • X X X X 
With the exception of the terminology thai requires the assistant and the adoption of criterion 9 in 
some instances, the current criterion is rated according to the meaningful vocabulary to the end-user. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper investigated the usability of security alerts issued via a range of security 
products. The analysis showed that four of the HCI-S usability criteria (10, 12, 13, IS) are 
not addressed in any of the selected security measures. Specifically, none of the evaluated 
tools address criterion 10. to Take Advantage of Previous Security Decisions. Therefore, 
it would be desirable to leverage previous decisions on similar alerts, and modify alerts 
accordingly to account for the user's previous behaviour. For example, i f the user has 
consistently overridden the recommended option in a particular alert, the system can 
change the default option to their previous choice, or offer them the option to repeat their 
decision in future without the need for an alert. In order to give this level of flexibility, it 
is important to enable users to make informed decisions and recover from them i f needed. 
Therefore, it is important to address criteria 12, 13, 15 as well (namely Confinm / Recover 
the Impact of User Decision, Awareness o f System Status all the Time, and Offer 
Responses Match Expectations). Future work will focus on addressing these missing 
criteria and increasing the end-user's opportunity to customize the security measure. 
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